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But just as when an Architect has laid all the 
foundations and raised the main walls of some great 
edifice no one doubts that he can carry his plan to 
completion, because they can see that he's already 
done what was most difficu It ... 
Descartes, The Passions of the Soul, Preface, p. 12 
The edifice of your pride has to be dismantled. And 
that is terribly hard work. 
Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, p. 26e 
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The concept of reflexivity is important to many philosophical and theoretical 
positions on psychology and plays a central role in studies of people's 
private, personal and emotional experiences. Social constructionists, for 
example, emphasize both the self-referentiality of psychology and persons 
in their attempts to produce new, challenging and creative forms of social 
scientific knowledge. However, despite the metatheoretical insights and 
practical discoveries of social constructionism, in the two parts of this thesis 
it is argued that issues surrounding the respective notions of psychological 
reflexivity and personal reflexivity need to be reconsidered. Part 1 provides 
a critical survey of issues connected with the notion of reflexivity in 
psychology such as the limits and consequences of reflexive studies. The 
framework for this reconsideration of psychological reflexivity is derived from 
a detailed examination of the later philosophy of Wittgenstein (1953). 
Despite similarities between Wittgenstein's philosophy and reflexive work in 
psychology, it is argued that his methods and remarks can only continue to 
contribute to psychology if they retain an "outside" status. Part 2 builds upon 
this understanding of Wittgenstein's enduring relevance to critical studies of 
psychological phenomena by engaging with Rosenberg's (1990) ostensibly 
reasonable theory of personal reflexivity and emotion. An account of the 
uniquely human potential for thoughts and actions to be focused self-
referentially on cognitive and bodily components is achieved through a 
comprehensive Wittgenstein-inspired, conceptual-discursive survey of pride. 
The result is a detailed example of the relevance and limits of Wittgenstein's 
later philosophy to multidisciplinary studies of the discursive practices in 
which people control, embellish, endure and, in some respects, create their 
own and others' emotions. 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
In order to represent the argument of this thesis, its development must be 
placed in a narrative that is more personal than the final product rnight 
suggest. My concern initially was to examine what it means to be a reflexive 
investigator in psychology. What are the advantages of being reflexive over 
using mainstream empirical methods? What creative directions might this 
lead one in? And how might these reflections connect with innovations in 
cultural theory and philosophy? 
This interest in reflexivity quickly spread in two directions or, as some 
might describe it, towards work at two different levels. The 'first direction 
required an account of how a reflexive investigation of emotion might be 
carried out: the question of what methods and practical techniques any self-
critical investigation should use. For example, would it focus predominantly 
on language and people's accounts rather than a surveyor experimental 
study? And would it be best to work through and possibly integrate theories 
and studies especially of a relatively unexamined psychological 
phenomenon? The latter question was answered by an almost offhand 
remark in Rom Harre's (1986) The Social Construction of Emotion that pride 
had been ignored by traditional, biologically-oriented approaches to 
emotion. Thus I decided that the focus of any reflexive study would be pride 
and, moreover, that it would not merely be an integration of existing self and 
emotion theories. 
While a focus on the social and linguistic aspects of pride was an 
obvious starting point, it also seemed worthwhile to explore Morris 
Rosenberg's (1990) strong assertion that forms of reflexivity demonstrated by 
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individuals in relation to their own emotions should be regarded as central to 
the construction (and maintenance) of personhood. For despite 
Rosenberg's sociological and psychological insights, his theory also 
contains conceptual errors in various remarks about people's use of 
language to express and explore their emotions. More interestingly, the 
conceptual errors appeared to be very similar to the problems highlighted by 
social constructionists in their interpretation of the later philosophy of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein (1953). These interrelated concerns therefore combined to 
suggest the project that forms Part 2 of this thesis: a critical investigation of 
emotion and different related forms of personal reflexivity which would 
proceed through a study of the under-researched cultural, social and 
linguistic details of pride. 
The second, contrasting direction for this thesis was generated by the 
need to explore the limits and consequences of a reflexive study of emotions 
and personal reflexivity. Since most of the relevant work at the time was 
discursive and social constructionist, it became important to examine the 
arguments for adopting social constructionism over realism or persistent, 
mainstream remnants of positivism. Moreover, because a large part of the 
justification for the social constructionist "turn to language" and pursuit of 
self-critical reflexive studies could be found in the later philosophy of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, the ongoing relevance of Wittgenstein's philosophy to 
psychology had to be addressed. 
The impetus toward this second line of investigation was also 
strengthened by disquiet over issues that had not been addressed in a 
thesis on Wittgenstein and reflexivity in psychology by a student within the 
University of Canterbury Psychology Department, Kevin Moore (1990). 
These concerns led to the project that eventually formed Part 1 of this thesis: 
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in particular, that instances of psychological reflexivity identified and 
emphasized by social constructionists might, especially when taken to their 
extremes, suggest unexplored Wittgensteinian criticisms of many 
Wittgenstein-inspired psychological studies. 
Given this personal introduction to the collusion of severa.l events, 
ideas and interests in this thesis, it is now possible to revert to a more formal 
disputation of its "argument". 
It is important from the outset to distinguish two types of reflexivity that 
are revealed by a brief survey of remarks on psychology as well as a cursory 
investigation of theories and studies within the discipline. 
The first form of self-referentiality, which I shall hereafter term 
psychological reflexivity, is mentioned by Bechtel (1988), Buss (1978), 
Gergen (1987), Harre (1989), Howard (1985), Oliver and Landfield (1962), 
Shotter (1992a, 1992b, 1996), Smedslund (1985), Stam (1996), and Steier 
(1991). It is variously described as a problem, a virtue and an unavoidable 
fact about psychology in its present scientific form: reflexivity is a problem 
where psychological studies of psychology seem to be self-limited, a virtue 
where critical studies reveal background assumptions and values that guide 
psychological research, and it is unavoidable where it is recognized that 
psychologists use similar concepts and language to share the experiences 
of the "subjects" they study. To simplify matters, psychological reflexivity can 
be described as work within the discipline that questions, challenges and 
attempts to articulate the basis of existing psychological studies, theories, 
and methods with the aim of making changes to the practice of psychology 
(and hence it potentially connects and combines with similar perspectives 
and criticisms from outside psychology). 
Personal reflexivity, in contrast, is a more specific term which refers to 
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the self-referential abilities that people demonstrate in their everyday lives 
(i.e., in preference to the more confusing term "self-reflexivity"). The defining 
feature of studies of personal reflexivity by such theorists as Harre (1983), 
Kaplan (1986), Kemper (1991), Mead (1934), Parker (1994a, 1994b), 
Rosenberg (1990), Shotter (1991, 1997) and Smedslund (1990) is an 
emphasis on people's discourse and use of language-based skills to 
monitor, control and understand their own and others' public and private 
experiences. Rosenberg's (1990) theory is particularly relevant because he 
suggests that the most interesting, complicated and central examples of 
personal re'flexivity are emotion-related. The category of personal reflexivity 
also includes emotions such as pride, shame and guilt because they are 
often experienced and expressed in a self-conscious manner (Lewis, 1993; 
Taylor, 1985). Thus to simplify and focus matters, personal reflexivity will be 
taken to refer to self-directed actions and skills that people explicitly use to 
change, control and understanding their own and others' emotions (Le., in 
addition to the sort of activities and commitments that implicitly make such 
complicated, self-evaluative emotions as pride possible). 
Given these distinctions it might be asked why psychological 
reflexivity and personal reflexivity are being "reconsidered"? 
One major reason for a reconsideration of both psychological and 
personal reflexivity is the need for a clear view of the relations between the 
practices in which they are important concepts. For example, Howard (1985) 
not only hints at this issue in a commentary on psychology but also implies 
that philosophy might challenge the equivocation of psychological reflexivity 
with more mainstream notions of subject reactivity and researcher bias: 
Psychologists are well aware of the phenomenon of reactivity in 
research and have made tremendous strides towards 
ameliorating its debilitating effects in psychological studies. 
Reactivity problems in psychological research are owing to the 
reflexive nature of human beings. But reflexivity, as the 
superordinate category, has important implications, which 
extend beyond reactivity concerns. .. (p. 260) 
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While Howard describes different forms of reflexivity in terms of 
superordinate and subordinate categories, others are more explicit in 
presenting psychological reflexivity as an abstract, theoretical and meta-
level pursuit. The relevant point for the moment is that any account of the 
forms of personal reflexivity that people demonstrate in psychological 
experiments and everyday life needs to be kept distinct from the reflexivity of 
psychological, social psychological and relevant sociological studies 
(Parker, 1994b). 
Another reason for reconsidering reflexivity also emerges: it is difficult 
to represent the nature of reflexive psychological investigations because the 
results are often indistinguishable from philosophy. While a simplistic view 
might be that this is a matter of different levels of investigation which can be 
kept separate, such opinions quickly become unhelpful in negotiating the 
issues raised by a critical account of personal reflexivity. For example, 
relevant issues include: the relations between theory and practice in 
psychology, the difficulty of identifying the social and cultural assumptions 
that provide the unchallenged foundation to many studies, the role that 
philosophy can play in commenting on these and other debates, and the 
use of accounts of private and personal experiences to advance psychology. 
The examples, arguments, methods and results of a critical treatment of 
personal reflexivity can therefore be used to illustrate the limits and 
consequences of psychological reflexivity (Le., where it seems to lead "up" to 
philosophy or "down" to specific psychological studies). 
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Additionally, reflexivity needs to be reconsidered because it raises the 
issue of Wittgenstein's potential contribution to many sociological, social 
psychological and psychological accounts in which personal reflexivity plays 
a central role. Does Wittgenstein's philosophy inspire a novel investigation 
of the unexplored detail of personal reflexivity such as the nature of its limits, 
connections with specific cultural practices, links with language and the 
development of particular self-directed skills and abilities? Moreover, while 
it seems reasonable even for non-social constructionist theorists such as 
Rosenberg (1990) to argue that language is crucial to the development of 
personal reflexivity about emotions, the nature and detail of this and similar 
claims must be carefully examined. For example, despite recognizing the 
role of linguistic interaction Rosenberg (1990) still argues that reflexive 
agency and reflexive cognition in relation to emotion are the defining 
features of persons. 
The reflexiveness of this study is described as a reconsideration for 
several reasons. The main reason is that many of the psychologists who 
emphasize both forms of reflexivity and are broadly allied to the field of 
social constructionism draw much - but not all - of their support from the 
; 
later philosophy of Wittgenstein (1953). While social constructionists have 
created new, challenging and creative forms of social scientific knowledge 
- often in direct opposition to realist, cognitive and other approaches - it is 
timely to reconsider the limits and consequences of some of the more radical 
positions built around the "turn to language" and reflexivity in psychology 
(e.g., Gergen, 1985, 1995; Shotter, 1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1996). Engaging 
with the detail of many of Wittgenstein's disjointed and often cryptic remarks 
allows philosophical attention to be turned to potentially mistaken 
metapsychological and metatheoretical accounts of the limits and 
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consequences of reflexive studies in psychology. It is also possible that a 
critical evaluation of the philosophical basis of social constructionism will 
provide a considered perspective on debates about critical, postmodern, 
discursive and qualitative forms of psychology. Finally, a Wittgensteinian 
reconsideration of reflexivity is also worth pursuing because attending too 
closely to the similarities between Wittgenstein's philosophy and the 
reflexive methods and results of social constructionism can obscure 
important differences between philosophy and psychology. 
Although the line between the issues raised by the notions of 
psychological reflexivity and personal reflexivity may at some times seem 
blurred, the thesis will nevertheless be presented in two distinct parts. 
Part 1 focuses on issues that surround surveyed talk of psychological 
reflexivity and which can be given a treatment that is broadly consistent with 
the spirit of Wittgenstein's many philosophical remarks. 
Part 2 provides a critical examination of the notion of personal 
reflexivity and its relation to emotion through a detailed survey of pride that 
includes individual experiences, linguistic details and surrounding 
discursive and cultural practices. 
The overall aim is not merely to adhere to the letter of Wittgenstein's 
work and thus to engage in extended philosophical exegesis - a criticism 
that can be directed at the otherwise excellent work of Baker and Hacker 
(1984, 1985) or the philosophical psychology of Budd (1989) and Schulte 
(1993). Rather, it is to provide a study that is sensitive to the demands for 
innovative investigative practices in psychology. 
The following summary of the respective chapters of Parts 1 and 2 
sketches the central features of the argument and the directions it will take. 
Chapter 1 begins with an examination of Wittgenstein's philosophy 
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and some of the broader and more extreme forms of reflexivity that are often 
emphasized in postmodern philosophy and connected with the IIturn to 
language". Given this important clarification the more relevant issue of 
whether Wittgenstein's Upostmodern" philosophy can combine with reflexive 
and self-critical psychology is then addressed. Unexplored connections 
between Wittgenstein's remarks on psychology and mathematics will be 
introduced in order to provide a clear view of the relations between 
philosophy and psychology (Le., in contrast to some of the positions that 
have been built around an emphasis on psychological reflexivity). The last 
part of the chapter highlights in principle limits on "complete" theories in 
psychology and finishes with an account of the way in which a 
Wittgensteinian surview - a type of comprehensive, conceptual survey of 
language use - provides an important non-theoretical resource. 
Chapter 2 provides a critical account of a number of central social 
constructionist tenets from a Wittgensteinian perspective. The first section 
examines the limits and consequences of attempts to incorporate 
Wittgenstein's philosophicCiI methods within psychology (e.g., Harre, 1986; 
Shotter, 1991, 1996). One question is whether reflexive work within 
psychology connects with Wittgenstein's type of conceptual investigation 
because both provide a kind of second-order method for advancing 
psychology and avoiding persistent problems (Le., a position that contradicts 
Wittgenstein's view that his philosophy should not be used to reform 
linguistic practices). A central argument in social constructionism, namely 
that recognition of reflexivity in the discipline rules out objectivity, is then 
examined by way of Greenwood's (1991, 1992) contrasting realist position. 
The third important and related aspect of social constructionism is its 
reflexive critique of "everything that is taken to be an already existing, real 
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psychology object in the cognitive (realist) account" (Shotter, 1997, p. 21). 
The issue of ontology is examined through a Wittgensteinian account of what 
it means to discover new and previously hidden levels of phenomena in 
psychology. 
Chapter 3 shifts from a focus on the problems of social 
constructionism to an examination of ways in which Wittgensteinian 
description can augment self-critical psychological studies. The issue of why 
reflexive work should not lead to doing away with all explanation is explored 
along with the contrasting need to avoid comprehensive general theorizing 
(Le., as emphasized in naturalistic accounts of philosophy and science or 
produced by a sociological account of the construction of social scientific 
knowledge). Attention is then turned towards the explanatory systems of 
psychology and some of the ways in which Wittgenstein's remarks may be 
cautiously seen as similar to the results of reflexive psychological 
investigations because the same points of clarification may be reached from 
different directions. A critical account of causal explanation is also 
presented as a further example of how Wittgensteinian philosophy relates to 
self-critical psychological practice. The relations between training and the 
» 
process of becoming a reflexive psychological researcher about such issues 
as causal explanation are assessed. The chapter concludes with a section 
on the relations between psychological theories and everyday psychological 
concepts and practices which is pertinent to issues raised by discursive 
alternatives to existing emotion and personal reflexivity studies. 
Chapter 4 draws upon and reiterates many of the arguments already 
examined by addressing some aspects of Wittgenstein's conservatism in 
relation to theoretical and practical innovations in psychology. The concern 
is to examine issues surrounding reflexive studies that have proved useful in 
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opening new domains of inquiry (even though many of the arguments from 
postmodern studies and cultural theory are still regarded as radical and may 
not seem to get beyond potential Wittgensteinian criticisms). Issues relevant 
to the investigation of Part 2 include the importance of highlighting the 
cultural detail of different ways of life as well as unexamined concepts of 
power and control. The manner in which social arrangements and values 
provide psychology with unquestioned moral and political positions is 
therefore discussed (again using personality reflexivity and emotion as the 
main focus). Consideration of relevant reflexive techniques then leads to an 
exploration of critical work in psychology that can highlight and potentially 
change aspects of the discipline's direction and cultural surroundings. The 
last section provides a brief examination of how psychologists' familiarity 
with many of their own forms of personal reflexivity and emotion can be 
useful to the discipline without cultivating undue personal uncertainty and 
self-consciousness. 
Part 2 provides an alternative to the type of general theory of emotion 
that is exemplified by Rosenberg's (1990) "reflexivity and emotion" account. 
It builds on the Wittgensteinian treatment of metapsychological, 
metatheoretical and conceptual issues in Part 1 to provide a study of 
ostensibly important, emotion-related forms of self-directed agency and 
cognition. The study aims to "get beyond" potential Wittgensteinian 
criticisms by presenting a non-theoretical surview. The surview counters 
conceptual problems in Rosenberg's theory and presents an alternative 
account of reflexive processes and emotion through a detailed survey of the 
complicated cluster of concepts, judgements and practices that surround 
pride. What pride means to "us" and, where possible, other groups is 
explored through discourse that has an everyday accessibility about it. 
1 1 
Examples are drawn from novels, newspapers and other cultural forms of 
presentation rather than a comprehensive survey of existing theories and 
studies. The potential for multidisciplinary, empirical work on personal 
reflexivity to flow from this survey is acknowledged without necessarily 
supporting any 'fragmentation of studies along disciplinary lines. Moreover, 
in contrast to other accounts of Wittgenstein's relevance to psychology, the 
resulting self-critical study is not an attempt to replace contemporary person 
and emotion theories or specific empirical work on pride (e.g., with 
discursive, "poetic methods" (Shotter, 1996; Shotter & Katz, 1996). Instead, 
the aim is to highlight previously unexamined details of personal reflexivity 
and its practical and contextual limits which could be examined in future 
investigations. 
Chapter 5 examines the limits and surroundings of personal 
reflexivity with a detailed consideration of the relations between forms and 
expressions of collective and individual pride. An account is provided of 
forms of personal reflexivity that are only visible in comparisons and 
interactions between cultures (and subcultures). The investigation then 
moves beyond cultural differences to examine some of the historical and 
natural historical discontinuities suggested by the issue of the emergence of 
forms of personal reflexivity. Returning to the present and recent past, 
issues of moral autonomy and group movements to construct and maintain a 
positive identity are also explored. Many of these issues provide insights 
into the nature and limits of the moves that individuals can make against the 
normative practices and reactions of a wider community. Using examples of 
family, group and national pride, practical limits on identity formation and 
choice are rlighlighted. The last section provides an analysis of social 
institutions and arrangements which are implied by cases of pride that 
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centre on notions of responsibility and ownership. 
Chapter 6 takes a more obviously social-psychological orientation 
toward personal reflexivity with an examination of the practical and personal 
details surrounding potentially transgressive cases of "self-elevated" pride. 
Social limits on personal autonomy are also highlighted by examples of 
pride that seem to be independent of social comparison, confirmation and 
approbation. The further reflexive potential to engage in acting and 
deception that theorists such as Kaplan (1986), Rosenberg (1990) and 
Smedslund (1990) emphasize is also reconsidered through the detail of 
pride. The analysis then shifts towards many of the relationships that are 
implied by the role that other people playas the "objects" of many personal 
emotions. The underexplored sense in which pride can be said to prolong 
arguments and lead to a kind of personal communicative paralysis is also 
suggested by examples from the conceptual-discursive survey. The chapter 
concludes with the importance of forms of self-control to the maintenance of 
privacy and the potential for private reasons to become unintelligible to 
others. 
Chapter 7 examines personal reflexivity as it pertains to issues raised 
by examples of the individual expression, experience and embodiment of 
pride. The initial focus is on intense emotions through examples of pride 
and their relation to a unique or personal history. Some remarks are made 
with regard to how individuals make the "linguistic transition" from private 
feelings to public language, before examining points about the duration of 
pride and individual experiences of its components (e.g., in relation to self-
control versus embellished expression). The contemporary fascination with 
underlying processes and mechanisms is assessed through the notion that 
some emotions are caused by cognitive self-evaluation. The attempt to 
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provide research directions for an alternative conceptual-discursive 
approach includes an examination of conversation-based accounts of pride 
that do not necessarily exclude an account of its cognitive, thoughtful and 
immediate aspects. Self-consciousness is also examined in terms of our 
lack of awareness and control over many of the neurophysiological 
substrates of emotions. The chapter ends with the issue of vacillating 
emotions and the problem of identifying and describing ambiguous feelings. 
Chapter 8 provides a critical account of how forms of personal 
reflexivity and emotion are cultural and linguistic constructs as well as 
individual "creations". The investigation includes the sense in which 
understanding the reflexivity of other persons is based on an individual's 
own potential for personal expression, exploration, and understanding of 
emotions. The development of older children's independence and identity 
projects (especially when these are explicitly about their own thoughts, 
actions and emotions) is understood through widely available cultural and 
textual examples of pride. The investigation of personal reflexivity also 
involves a treatment of privatization and internalization accounts of the 
control and content of emotions in younger children. The importance of 
linguistic supplementation to the creation of forms of personal reflexivity and 
reflexive emotions is also assessed. The last section examines 
prerequisites of reflexive techniques and pride in forms of prelinguistic, 
agentive emotional activity. 
The Wittgenstein approach to and reconsideration of psychological 
reflexivity and personal reflexivity is summarized in the section "Conclusion: 
Parts 1 & 2". 
PART 1 
Psychologica.l reflexivity reconsidered: 
a Wittgensteinian account of the limits and 
consequences of self-critical investigations in 
psychology 
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Psychological reflexivity refers to the potential for psychological studies to 
become self-regarding and critical in a manner that it is hoped will lead to 
the discovery of new domains and forms of investigation. It can be 
distinguished from remarks on personal reflexivity by the fact that 
psychological reflexivity involves more than revealing how psychologists 
personally engage with, construct or change the knowledge of their 
discipline. Reflexivity should not be equated solely with individual reflection 
and will be, in a number of circumstances, contrasted with personal 
reflexivity (Le., psychologists' use and explorations of their own personal 
feelings and experiences). Thus while individuals writing on the history of 
scientific psychology such as Klein (1970) are aware that "no science is 
likely to get under way without the impetus of a critical interest as manifested 
by some sort of reflective curiosity" (p. 4), the reflexivity of psychological 
studies to be reconsidered in Part 1 is primarily a philosophical examination 
of the limits, consequences and methods of self-critical psychological 
investigation. 
The material for this reconsideration of psychological reflexivity has 
been assembled from a survey of philosophical, metapsychological, 
metatheoretical, theoretical and other remarks about psychology. At its 
simplest, examples were initially included because the word "reflexivity" was 
used to highlight an important feature of psychology that should be dealt 
with. For example, Smedslund (1985) argues that psychology "must be a 
reflexive discipline" (p. 73) and, not surprisingly, it is important to determine 
exactly what this means (as well as the reasons offered by those who agree 
or disagree). However, the final treatment of the issues raised by the survey 
bears little trace of the method used. In this sense, the contrast between the 
method used to achieve a position on psychological reflexivity and its end 
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product as a particular argument is similar to the approach that Wittgenstein 
took towards psychological concepts. But while Wittgenstein suggested that 
a detailed examination of the use of psychological concepts would dissolve 
conceptual confusions caused by theorizing in philosophy and empirical 
work in psychology, no analogous solution is applicable to psychological 
reflexivity. Thus although a detailed survey of the use of "reflexivity" helps to 
determine its meaning, this examination of use cannot, by itself, provide a 
solution to the philosophical issues raised1• 
In order to achieve an understanding of the limits and consequences of 
psychological reflexivity, some of Wittgenstein's relatively unexplored 
remarks will be used. As a matter of clarification it should be noted that the 
argument to be detailed below is not that reflexive forms of psychological 
investigation must inevitably end with Wittgensteinian philosophy. Instead, 
a number of Wittgenstein's remarks are used to counter some of the more 
extreme forms of radical reflexivity advocated by social constructionists (e.g., 
Gergen (1985) and Shotter (1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1996)) in addition to the 
type of "social psychology in the host discipline of psychology rather than 
sociology" that "traditionally abhors reflexivity" (Parker, 1994b, p. 528). The 
aim is to clarify the nature of the connections between Wittgenstein's 
philosophical remarks and contemporary forms of critical psychology (i.e., 
the fruit of several decades of reflexive theorizing and investigation). This 
treatment of reflexivity also recognizes that not all of the best critical work 
has come from within the discipline. 
1 Also as Henwood and Parker (1994) note: "researchers with backgrounds in social studies 
of science, humanistic, or feminist research may conceptualize the issue of reflexivity 
differently" (p. 220). 
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CHAPTER 1: The relevance of Wittgenstein's later 
philosophy to issues of psychological 
refl exivity 
Introduction 
While it is undeniable that Wittgenstein's later philosophy has affected 
psychology, a central question to be addressed in this chapter is whether 
Wittgenstein wanted to produce any of the changes that his remarks have 
inspired. In particular, social constructionists have based many of their 
valuable theoretical and practical contributions to understanding 
psychological and personal reflexivity on remarks from Wittgenstein's 
philosophy (e.g., Gergen, 1985; Harre, 1986; Shotter, 1991, 1992a, 1992b, 
1996; Shotter & Katz, 1996). Moreover, Wittgenstein's philosophy has been 
used to support new programs of psychological research, to persuade 
others of the linguistic nature of forms of psychological reflexivity, to highlight 
researchers' tacit assumptions and to challenge the persistent conceptual 
errors of mainstream, empirical and positivist psychology. Thus while many 
similarities exist between the descriptive approach of Wittgenstein's later 
philosophy and the reflexive work of contemporary psychologists, confusion 
remains about how Wittgenstein's philosophy and philosophical method can 
and should contribute to psychology. 
Chapter 1 therefore explores connections between Wittgensteinian 
philosophy and forms of psychological reflexivity - such as their possible 
combination into a metapsychological 'or theoretical position - in the 
following manner. Section 1.1 examines Wittgenstein's status as a 
postmodern philosopher and provides a contrasting account of forms of 
contemporary philosophy and social science in which a general sense of 
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reflexivity is explored to almost paradoxical extremes. Despite some 
similarities, the general sense of reflexivity is contrasted with more specific 
forms of social scientific and psychological reflexivity. Section 1.2 
introduces the possibility that an emphasis on psychological reflexivity 
attaches a false significance to forms of metapsychology that attempt to lay 
down new foundations for the discipline. An extended account of 
Wittgenstein's remarks on metamathematics, mathematics, and set theory is 
used to provide a treatment of "entirely analogous" problems with 
psychology (PI, xiv, p. 232)2. Wittgenstein's game analogy of the relations 
between philosophy and psychology is used to provide a 
metapsychological account of the relations between philosophy and the 
practices of psychology. Section 1.3 explores contradictory positions in 
psychology and the way in which they are the result of attempts within the 
discipline to build "complete" theories. Analysis of this issue centres on the 
supposed contrast between a "new paradigm", social constructionist 
understanding of emotion and its biological alternative. These 
considerations lead to the question of what it means to attain a 
comprehensive Wittgensteinian surview of a particular area of language 
and whether it provides the basis from which one can cross from philosophy 
to various specific multidisciplinary studies. 
2 Usual conventions for referring to Wittgenstein's work will be adopted in this thesis. For 
example, 88 (The Blue and Brown Books), CV (Culture and Value), LFM (Lectures on the 
Foundations of Mathematics), OC (On Certainty), PG (Philosophical Gramma~, PI 
(Philosophical Investigations), RFM (Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics), PR 
(Philosophical Remarks), RPP I (Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology Volume 1), RPP I I 
(Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology Volume 2), T (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus), 
and Z (Zettel; see References). 
1 .1 The relations between Wittgenstei n ian 
philosophy and contemporary forms of 
reflexive psychology 
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At many points throughout Wittgenstein's volumes of remarks and 
observations, there are attempts to clarify actual and potential 
misconceptions about the nature and limits of his philosophical approach. 
Philosophers such as Baker and Hacker (1984, 1985) have also contributed 
much to a detailed exegesis and understanding of Wittgenstein's remarks. 
However, they have not adequately addressed the issue of how 
Wittgenstein's philosophy seems to provide a context in which it is possible 
for psychologists and others to "undertake a logically compelling, 
theoretically neutral, and reflexive evaluation of many philosophical and 
other positions" (Bartlett & Suber, 1987, p. 10). Also, where psychological 
studies seem to combine with a more general or extreme sense of reflexivity 
caused by recognition of the need to work within language, there is a need 
to clarify connections with more specific accounts of reflexivity in 
psychology. It is therefore important to examine how Wittgensteinians deal 
with the relations between Wittgenstein's philosophy and contemporary, 
, 
postmodern alternatives which recognize the importance of psychological 
reflexivity and encourage its pursuit in more radical directions than 
modernist philosophers. 
Wittgenstein's later philosophy, postmodernism and recognition 
of psychological reflexivity 
It has already been noted that a comprehensive survey of the word 
"reflexivity" in many philosophical and theoretical remarks relevant to 
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psychology provided the basis for this Wittgensteinian reconsideration. The 
definition (or restriction) of psychological reflexivity to these surveyed 
examples avoids a host of potentially related but broader reflexive issues 
(e.g., why Wittgenstein accords no special significance to metaphilosophy 
(PI, §121) and reflexive considerations in psychology need not produce an 
infinite hierarchy of further self-conscious and general levels of investigation 
(see LFM, I, p. 14 and Woolgar (1988)). Interest is centred on the way in 
which the postmodern "turn to language" and reflexivity (Bertens, 1995) has 
affected our recognition and understanding of reflexive issues in 
psychology. In this section, the general sense of reflexivity evident in 
Wittgenstein's philosophical work within language - the use of remarks 
about language-games to "establish an order in our knowledge of the use of 
language: an order with a particular end in view; one out of many possible 
orders; not the order" (PI, §132) - is contrasted with more extreme 
postmodern accounts: more specifically, the widespread view that 
postmodern philosophy employs excessively self-regarding, deconstructive 
strategies. Uncertainty about these similarities demands an account of 
whether a Wittgensteinian position should be regarded as postmodern 
before attempting to provide a clearer picture of the connections between a 
Wittgensteinian position and the work of a reflexive, critical, postmodern 
psychology. 
An initial question is to what extent does Wittgenstein's later 
philosophy offer a postmodern understanding of many contemporary 
knowledge and cultural practices? Bertens (1995) suggests one way in his 
description of two contrasting views in contemporary thought: the idealized 
pursuit of universal, transcendent knowledge and, in contrast, the 
recognition that knowledge has many self-limited, arbitrary, contingent and 
local features. Bertens notes that modemity: 
sends out contradictory impulses which have come to constitute 
the two modes of thought - the one expansionist, 
transcendent, and omni-representational, the other self-
reflexive, inward spiralling, and antirepresentational - that in 
our day and age have come to clash so violently. (p. 242) 
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With respect to Wittgenstein's philosophical career, it is interesting that both 
aspects of modernism are exemplified by Wittgenstein's earlier work in the 
Tractatus (Le., the transcendental aspect of its overall approach and the 
paradox of its final, nonsensical conclusion (T, §6.54)). Such a description 
of Wittgenstein's early philosophy certainly accords with Bertens' view that 
both modes of thought "constantly lead us into the temptation of wanting it 
both ways, and thus into self-contradiction" (p. 242)3. 
But the central issue is really whether Wittgenstein's later philosophy 
can contain these contradictory impulses and thus resist the self-
contradictions of postmodernism. Again a useful clarification of 
Wittgenstein's later philosophy is suggested by Bertens' remark that the 
"only option would seem to go beyond reflexivity itself" (p. 242). In the 
context of postmodern philosophy it seems that Wittgenstein has indeed 
gone beyond reflexivity rather than pursue it to an extreme, as Lawson 
(1987) remarks in her book Reflexivity: the Postmodem Predicament 
The later Wittgenstein provides a . . . means of avoiding the 
paradoxical effects of reflexivity in his attempt to avoid any 
general theory of language, and to explicate philosophical 
problems by showing how language is in fact used. (p. 22) 
3 The pronouns "we", "us" and "our" will be used throughout this thesis in discussions of 
psychological reflexivity and the relevance of philosophy. Where these pronouns are used in 
a manner that does not refer only to psychologists, social scientists and philosophers, an 
attempt will be made to clarify which groups of people are included and which are excluded. 
This approach is an important aspect of adopting a reflexive form of conceptual-discursive 
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Lawson suggests that Wittgenstein shows how important it is to describe our 
practices without relying on a general theory (or theories) to highlight hidden 
features of our language, culture and practices. 
One effect of Wittgenstein's insights on psychology has been the 
emergence of discourse analysis and the further interest in forms of 
psychological reflexivity. Parker (1994b) suggests, for example, that "the 
study of discourse marks a further twist in the turn to language which 
characterized the 'crisis' in social psychology at the end of the 1960s, and 
explicitly opens the discipline to a reflexive critique" (p. 527). While for the 
moment the exact nature of this reflexive critique (or form of psychological 
reflexivity) and its relation to the broader sense of reflexivity will be 
eschewed, there are further reasons why Wittgenstein's emphasis on the 
description of ordinary language avoids the charge of self-contradiction (or 
the need to adopt a deconstructionist perspective in which self-contradiction 
is an unavoidable feature of any text). 
An analysis by Strom (1994) is relevant because he notes that 
Wittgenstein would be "hoist on his own petard" if he were "advancing a 
philosophical thesis about everyday human activity and the conditions that 
make it possible" (p. 18). Instead of offering, for example, a theory of how 
theories are possible, Wittgenstein can be described as "a foundationalist of 
sorts, but not of a traditional solf' (p. 141). In particular, Strom argues that 
Wittgenstein's later philosophy is not self-contradictory because "his form of 
foundationalism is consistent with his apothegem that description should 
replace explanation in philosophy" (p. 141). Although Wittgenstein's later 
philosophy is similar to other postmodernist positions with its emphasis on 
investigation (see chapter 3 and chapter 4 for more specific details in relation to cultural 
differences). 
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language and a broad sense of reflexivity, both Lawson and Strom show 
that Wittgenstein's disdain for general theorizing and preference for a form 
of descriptive foundationalism should be distinguished from paradox-
embracing postmodernist perspectives. 
Wittgenstein's view of philosophical investigation as a descriptive 
task also distinguishes his remarks from postmodernists who rely more 
heavily on potentially obfuscating theoretical concepts (see chapter 4). This 
effect of reflexivity is apparent in Lyotard's (1984) position on 
postmodernism which, although it is described as "simplifying to the 
extreme", is essentially to "define postmodern as incredulity towards 
metanarratives" (p. xxiv). For although examples of metanarratives within 
psychology that are informed by modernism and challenged by postmodern 
philosophers include humanized science, progress and individual meaning 
(Parker, 1989), attempts to connect Wittgenstein and Lyotard's popular 
position on metanarratives (as least in critical psychology), run the risk of 
treating important concepts in a theoretical manner. For example, Bertens 
argues that Lyotard builds upon the later Wittgenstein to suggest "that these 
metanarratives have been replaced by a great number of 'language 
games'" (p. 124). 
However, while Wittgenstein's work contains analogies, comparisons, 
and detailed descriptions of linguistic and cultural practices, notions such as 
"form of life" and "language-games" only help to collect and organize these 
observations. Although "form of life" and "language-games" are not 
theoretical concepts, postmodernists seem to be unaware that 
indiscriminate use of these and other similar concepts might be seen only as 
creating a what Wittgenstein described as a "certain jargon" (LFM, XXXI, p. 
293). The contention here is that postmodernism may reject metanarratives 
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only to create what Rorty (1989) describes as ''the freedom to speak a kind 
of ironic theoretical metalanguage which makes no sense to the man on the 
street" (p. 88). 
In a further distinction from other postmodern positions that take 
reflexivity to extremes, Wittgenstein's philosophy cannot be represented as 
a practice that seeks to replace metanarratives such as humanized science, 
progress and individual meaning in psychology with a theoretical 
metalanguage (or languages). By avoiding general criticisms of scientific 
knowledge and its problems, a Wittgensteinian approach avoids the 
sometimes incomprehensible extremes of postmodernism. Moreover, as 
already stated, Wittgenstein suggests that "the edifice of your pride has to be 
dismantled" (CV, p. 26e) which, in this case, can be taken to mean the 
results of modern philosophy and theory construction: in short the pride of 
"modern man". It may therefore seem that this "dismantling" - described 
elsewhere by Wittgenstein as destroying "nothing but houses of cards and .. 
. clearing up the ground of language on which they stand" (PI, §118) - is 
similar to Derrida's (1982) deconstruction ism. 
This point also requires clarification and it can be achieved through 
some of Parker's (1989) critical psychology remarks about the 
deconstructive approach. Parker suggests that both radical postmodernists 
and Wittgensteinians will not appeal to the truth of their position to justify 
their criticisms (Le., the sort of perspective that Bartlett and Suber (1987) 
suggest is "outside" and "above" the philosophical and other positions that it 
comments upon). 
The politics of a deconstructive strategy twists around to 
deconstruct the position of the critic. The proposal that the 
world consists merely of discourses then entails that radicals 
must recant attachments to a truer account, admit that their own 
account is just another discourse and seek solace in 
'reflexivity'. (p. 139) 
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While aspects of the deconstructive strategy apply to Wittgenstein, it is 
unreasonable to trlink that Wittgenstein's position is "just another discourse". 
Moreover, his approach does not merely seek solace in reflexivity, at least in 
the form advocated by Parker and other postmodernists, because the 
notions of "language-games" and "forms of life" collect together remarks that 
highlight important features of our cultural and linguistic practices (e.g., as 
demonstrated by the ground-breaking work that has occurred in psychology 
as a result of the notion of investigating the self and emotions within 
particular "language-games" and "forms of Iife")4. 
While Wittgenstein cannot be regarded as part of an "anti-reflexive" 
movement (Bertens, 1995, p. 242), there are further reasons why 
Wittgensteinians do not use deconstructive techniques to highlight 
contradictory assumptions and concepts within a position (or text). Parker 
(1989), for example, provides such a deconstruction of the internal 
contradictions of attribution theory in psychology (admittedly with the aim of 
reconstructing how one of the contradictory assumptions in a pair has 
attained dominance over the other). In this respect, Parker unwittingly 
extends and refines an earlier critical study by Buss (1978) to which the 
same argument (and a similar solution) applies. In particular, Buss (1978) 
argues that shifts between the contradictory positions of "person constructs 
reality" and "reality constructs person" in psychology are a direct result of 
4 However, a point for further examination is the social constructionist argument that 
Wittgenstein's methods of "social poetics" (Shotter, 1996; Shotter & Katz, 1996) provide a 
practice that can be "inserted into psychology" to achieve the aims of reflexive psychological 
studies. Also the role of Wittgenstein's philosophy in providing an "outsider critique" of 
psychology needs to be more closely examined along with more specific remarks and, 
possibly, theories that will help to "throw light on the vexed question of when and where a 
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conceptualizations of personal reflexivity. Although Buss does not make the 
further move from reflexivity and the identification of this central paradox to a 
deconstructionist position, he does argue that these internal contradictions 
occur in psychology because "the objects of study in the social sciences 
(people) are also subjectsU (p. 59). 
The relevant question is whether a Wittgensteinian approach can 
dismantle such internal contradictions without recourse to a 
deconstructionist account? One way in which Wittgenstein treats paradoxes 
(Le .• internal contradictions) is evident from the following remark: 
Something surprising, a paradox, is a paradox only in a 
particular, as it were defective surrounding. One needs to 
complete this surrounding in such a way that what looked like a 
paradox no longer seems one. (RFM, V, §36) 
By "complete this surrounding", Wittgenstein can be taken to mean an 
examination of the detail of language use that a position in psychology 
attempts to summarize. One of the most important means of completing the 
"defective surrounding" of a self-contradictory statement or position is to 
favour the notion of contradiction and then to examine the further question of 
whether the discovery Qf contradictions undermines psychology (see section 
1.2). A simple example can be used to illustrate this point. Hochschild 
(1990) hints at a central paradox in the field of emotion with her remark: "a 
feeling is what happens to us ... yet it is also what we do to make it happen" 
(p. 120). Wittgenstein's argument applies equally to this comment because 
the defective surrounding is a particular kind of useless metapsychological 
practice in which paradoxes are thought to be significant, and the solution is 
to examine the linguistic detail of emotion ascriptions, expressions and 
reflexive analysis is appropriate or useful" (Parker, 1994b, p. 528; as section 1.2 will provide 
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experiences in normative practices. 
It may appear that Wittgenstein rejects forms of postmodern 
reflexivity. But rather than attempting to "get beyond reflexivity" by becoming 
part of an "anti-reflexive movement", Wittgensteinians realize that "critical 
reflexiveness is too great an intellectual and moral good to be thrown 
overboard in that way" (Bertens, 1995, p. 242). The broad re"flexivity of 
working within language to highlight features of our linguistic practices has 
inspired many of the useful and revealing forms of psychological reflexivity 
to be examined below. But if an emphasis on psychological reflexivity can 
be regarded as postmodern because it emphasizes the creation of 
contradictions and disagreement in psychology, then a further difference 
between Wittgenstein's philosophy and other postmodernists emerges. 
However, to make this point we must provisionally accept the argument, to 
be presented in section 1.2, that there are many fruitful comparisons to be 
made between mathematics and psychology. For the moment, a more 
detailed consideration of Wittgenstein's relevance to psychology is possible 
if we substitute "psychological" for "mathematical" in the following remark 
and ask why, as psychologists, we might: 
... have wanted to produce a contradiction? Have sa.id with 
pride in a mathematical discovery: "Look, this is how we 
produce a contradiction?" Might not e.g. a lot of people 
possibly have tried to produce a contradiction in the domain of 
logic, and then at least one person succeeded? (RFM, II, §81). 
Even though Wittgenstein's remark is about mathematics, it is equally 
applicable to psychology because it raises the question: 
But why should people have tried to do this? Perhaps I cannot 
at present suggest the most plausible purpose. But why not 
with a detailed account of Wittgensteinian metapsychology). 
e.g. in order to show that everything in this world is uncertain? 
(RFM, II, §81) 
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The relevance of the remark to psychology is confirmed by one of Parker's 
(1989) comments about the postmodern and critical psychology he 
advocates: 
Postmodernity provokes an attitude of uncertainty, of studied 
doubt, and any attempt to gain knowledge involves a continual 
reflexivity which underlines the provisional and transitory 
nature of that knowledge. (p. 139) 
An important part of the argument in subsequent sections is that 
Wittgenstein's philosophy provides a general form of reflexive approach that 
is useful to social scientists and psychologists because it does not produce 
uncertainty or highlight contradictions. 
To summarize, Wittgenstein's later philosophy was described as 
postmodernist in its turn to language and interest in reflexive questions. 
However, it differs from more radical forms of postmodernism in which a 
general interest in reflexivity: creates potentially impenetrable general and 
theoretical metalanguages when challenging metanarratives, presents 
concepts such as "language-games" and "forms of life" as "just another 
discourse", deconstructs rather than dismantles positions, attempts to 
extend reflexivity towards the notion of highlighting paradoxes, and, as more 
specific examples of reflexivity in psychology indicate, attempts to create 
contradictions and to produce uncertainty. Wittgenstein can be seen to 
counter both general and more extreme forms of reflexivity in postmodern 
philosophy. However, the extent to which a Wittgensteinian position can be 
regarded as "outside" and different from the practices it comments upon 
remains. 
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A Wittgensteinian criticism of philosophy's sUbsumption by self-
critical social science 
Wittgenstein does not advocate the extreme forms of philosophical 
reflexivity that are found in the paradoxes and uncertainties of 
postmodernism, but the potential for his work to be combined with the 
results of critical studies in psychology needs to be clarified. One of the 
problems faced by supporters and critics of Wittgenstein alike is that by 
dismantling the traditional role of philosophy, Wittgenstein seems to pave 
the way for the work of philosophy to be subsumed by self-critical science. 
Of course, a number of diverse approaches and innovations in 
epistemology, philosophy of science and the sociology of knowledge have 
attempted to build upon the insights of the Philosophical Investigations and 
On Certainty (e.g., Bloor (1976, 1997)). The purpose of this section, 
however, is not to trace all of these possible connections, but instead to 
examine whether Wittgensteinian philosophical criticisms can be used in 
self-critical social scientific investigations and thus potentially combine with 
studies that recognize the importance and implications of psychological 
reflexivity without relinquishing an important "outsider" role for philosophers. 
It is apparent from many of Wittgenstein's remarks that he is highly 
critical of the emphasis on scientific generality, explanation and abstraction 
(BB, p. 18) in Western culture. This attitude seems to concur with many of 
the popular modernist metanarratives identified by Parker (1989) and 
challenged by postmodernists. Moreover, Wittgenstein's position seems to 
work broadly within language but, at the same time, "outside" science. 
Finch (1995), for example, suggests that one of the most important features 
of Wittgenstein's philosophy is the tendency to stop and look around at our 
culture, language and practices when others would much rather have faith 
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in science to progress our understanding. Wittgenstein himself also 
remarked that the philosopher is "not a citizen of any community of ideas" (Z, 
§455). This remark serves as an important reminder of the outside, 
uncommitted role a philosopher should have towards different positions 
advocated in the social sciences. The result is that Wittgensteinians 
philosophers tend to eschew any encroachment of scientific values and 
methods into philosophy, hence their agreement with Wittgenstein's disdain 
for theory construction in philosophy (PI, §109). 
However, one problem with Wittgenstein's dissolution of the 
traditional, overarching role of philosophy is that he seems to invite an 
alternative approach that blurs the boundaries between philosophy and 
science. Trigg (1991) suggests, for example, that "with the blurring of the 
distinction between the epistemological and the sociological, it could even 
appear as if social science would take over the former role of philosophy" (p. 
219). Social scientists often work within and between their disciplines to 
include the insights of philosophical pOSitions, an observation which may 
even seem to suggest that there are now more Wittgensteinians to be found 
in the social sciences than in philosophy. Presumably, this state of affairs is 
a consequence of the fact that "the work of the later Wittgenstein has had a 
vast influence in the field of social science" (p. 209). If correct, it certainly 
explains the increasing popularity of attempts to use Wittgenstein's 
ostensibly reflexive methods and techniques in the social sciences. Indeed, 
it is difficult to tell whether contemporary innovations are coming from 
philosophical work outside the social sciences or from versions of 
philosophical positions that have been usurped by social scientists (see 
chapter 3, section 3.2 for the issue of the point at which a critical "career" in 
psychology is likely to be most productive). But the problem remains that 
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Wittgenstein's method of dismantling theories and positions in philosophy is 
even more destructive when it is taken into the social sciences. 
If Wittgenstein's later philosophy is not "above" or "below" the social 
sciences in the sense that Wittgenstein once thought his earlier philosophy 
related to the natural sciences (T, §4.111 )5, it is also appropriate to note that 
neither is it "beside" the social sciences. Moreover, further questions arise 
such as: how does the sUbsumption of philosophy by social science occur, 
what crucial aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy does this sUbsumption 
hide, and what are the implications for psychology? One way in which 
philosophy is subsumed is by claiming that its skills and perspectives are 
increasingly similar to those of social science. This position is evident in 
Bechtel's (1988) realist-cognitive summary of a critical perspective on 
science: 
... inquiry into the nature of science, whether carried out by 
philosophers or others, is a reflexive endeavour, using the very 
skills that are employed in human inquiry to understand the 
human race's most systematic example of inquiry - science 
(p.2) 
On the realist view, philosophy is an abstract extension of scientific thinking 
with no special warrant for consideration because "it employs the methods 
of science to study science, it is, where appropriate, constrained by the 
findings of science and it is itself a general scientific theory of science" 
(Haig, 1991, p. 82). Realists also favour the sUbsumption of philosophy into 
science as a type of super-scientific theorizing. This is evident in Hooker's 
(1987) view that the "complex internal and meta self-reflection" of science 
can be regarded as "an emerging scientific theory of human kind, the 
5 The actual quotation from the Tractatus is: "the word "philosophy" must mean something 
which stands above or below, but not beside the natural sciences" (T, §4.111). 
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evolutionary theory of self-organizing systems" (p. 174). By regarding 
philosophy in his way, it may seem that a perspective is still provided from 
which it is possible to speculate on what scientists cannot see from within 
their own practices. The realist view of philosophy as an abstract and 
somewhat independent part of science is also attractive because it aims to 
provide "a 'halfway house' between some transcendent (and epistemically 
inaccessible status) for philosophy on the one side and the collapsing of 
philosophy into science on the other" (Hooker, 1987, p. 270). 
However, arguing for a similarity between philosophy and science 
(and hence social science) by allowing that philosophy must be 
epistemically accessible and potentially fallible, contrasts with another of 
Wittgenstein's reminders: "I am not aiming at the same target as the 
scientists and my way of thinking is different from theirs" (CV, p. 7e). An 
alternative picture is preferable to Hooker's account because it suggests 
philosophy's enmeshment within cultural and linguistic practices as well as 
its use of "poetic methods" (Shotter, 1996) to highlight important aspects of 
those practices. In particular, Dennett's (1995) view that "philosophy can be 
seen to lie about midway between science and the arts" (p. 141) seems 
appropriate to the conceptual-discursive survey that forms Part 2 of this 
thesis (even though Dennett is an avowed ex-Wittgensteinian). 
A testing ground for a view of philosophy that is more allied to the arts 
than the natural sciences is the importance that Wittgenstein attaches to 
attaining a surview of cultural and linguistic practices through revealing 
remarks, analogies and internal comparisons. When realists emphasize the 
"synoptic character of philosophical theories" it is mainly for the purpose of 
"studying science in a general way" (Haig, 1990, p. 83). A Wittgensteinian 
perspective, in contrast, avoids generalities and philosophical theorizing 
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and must relies on different methods. To put this point in another way by 
using Dennett's (1995) philosophical work on evolutionary theory, it is 
reasonable for Dennett to state that even though his remarks may contribute 
to the construction of abstract theory in some areas of evolutionary biology, 
nevertheless it is "largely about science but is not itself a work of science" (p. 
11; the topic of evolution will be further examined in section 1.3 and chapter 
5, section 5.2). The implication is that a Wittgensteinian surview may 
engage with the detail of particular theories in psychology but need not be 
seen as a substitute for theory construction or particular types of 
investigation. 
However, detail needs to be provided about how Wittgenstein's 
philosophy can provide non-theoretical insights, particularly in the social 
sciences. As Baker and Hacker (1985) note, there is considerable potential 
to explore the role of a non-theoretical, descriptive surview with respect to 
scienti'fic creativity and similarities to the use of models in science. The 
usefulness of attaining a synoptic view of a practice is indicated by 
Wittgensteinian contrasts with attempts to subsume philosophy by social 
science (see also the importance of a synoptic view or surview of 
psychological concepts in section 1.3). For example, Barker (1989) shows 
that Wittgenstein's remarks about rules, which do not resemble a scientific 
theory, can be used to clarify the mistaken view that science cannot study 
itself (Le., the claim that important points about science cannot be 
discovered from within because that would use the same method we wish to 
investigate). Barker argues that the "reflexivity objection" is predicated on 
the philosophical error that the rules of a practice cannot change because 
they prefigure their own application even in such new contexts as a 
sociology of psychological studies. Barker's use of Wittgenstein's remarks 
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on rules clarifies the problem and removes a meta-scientific objection and 
allows such forms of reflexive work to proceed simply by noting that the 
application of the new rule-governed methods and concepts in novel 
circumstances would be settled "on the basis of the common practice 
shared by competent practitioners" (p. 107; i.e., rather than by 
philosophers). 
Barker's work not only suggests the utility of allowing Wittgenstein's 
type of philosophy to maintain an outside perspective on many practices, it 
also suggests that reflexive work within the social sciences does not 
necessarily solve every problem. From a Wittgensteinian perspective, it is 
interesting to note the growing agreement between realist-cognitive and 
social constructionist positions on psychology. For example, Greenwood's 
(1992) view that "scientific theories are themselves socially constructed" (p. 
139) seems to accord with a Wittgensteinian perspective (see chapter 2 for 
more detail). Even though social constructionists are more likely to engage 
with Wittgensteinian remarks about the importance of particular judgements 
to linguistic practices from On Certainty (e.g., Shotter, 1992a), still they are 
also tempted to subsume parts of Wittgenstein's philosophy within 
psychology. Rather than showing where critical realists such as Greenwood 
(1992) misrepresent Wittgenstein's investigation of relevant epistemological 
issues, they are more inclined to suggest that Wittgenstein's methods 
replace forms of theoretical and empirical work in psychology. 
Shotter (1996), in particular, generalizes Wittgenstein's rejection of 
theories in philosophy (PI, §128) to the social sciences, thus encouraging a 
radical position that is both reflexive and challenging even to other forms of 
postmodern psychology (e.g., many of the positions that constitute critical 
psychology such as cultural and feminist theory). The result is considerable 
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confusion about the role of theory in psychology and how Wittgenstein's 
philosophical aims could possibly be usurped to this end. Both Dennett 
(1995) and Barker (1989) indicate that the line between philosophy and 
speculative science is often difficult to draw (as section 1.2 will demonstrate 
with more exegetical material). In contrast, there is less support for Shotter's 
(1996) argument to replace theory almost completely in psychology with 
Wittgensteinian methods of "social poetics". The fact that subsequent 
sections challenge aspects of social constructionism with remarks from 
Wittgenstein himself provides an added reason for us to reconsider the 
relevance of Wittgenstein's diverse body of later writings to reflexive social 
scientific work. 
To summarize, Wittgenstein's dissolution of philosophy as a position 
"above" the sciences seems to provide an opportunity for it to work "beside" 
social science work. Therefore it seems possible for Wittgenstein's 
philosophical method and remarks to be subsumed by self-critical social 
science. The rising interest in reflexivity in the social sciences and the 
incorporation of many Wittgenstein-inspired social constructionist criticisms 
by realists seems to indicate the potential for social science to solve its own 
problems. However, it was argued that philosophy and critical social 
science are practices that differ in kind and not in degree. Moreover, while 
there is no Wittgensteinian "reflexivity objection" to the possibility of science 
studying itself, it is unlikely that the insights produced would entirely replace 
an enduring role for philosophy. The importance of retaining philosophy as 
an outside perspective that can identify conceptual confusions and 
philosophical prejudices in the social sciences is shown by the need to 
reconsider positions that have been inspired by his remarks, as well as the 
approaches of individuals who attempt to use his methods within the social 
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sciences. 
The contemporary relevance of specific Wittgensteinian remarks 
on the relations between philosophy and psychology 
Wittgenstein's later philosophy has, to this point, been contrasted with other 
postmodern philosophical positions and distinguished from increasingly 
autonomous forms of self-critical social science. The fact that Wittgenstein 
offered few specific remarks on the relations between his philosophy and 
contemporary psychology does not help psychologists who are tempted to 
adopt only those aspects of Wittgenstein's work that they like. Some of the 
reasons for the lack of critical attention to the relations between philosophy 
and psychology have been intimated in previous sections: that is, 
Wittgenstein's attitude towards paradoxes and contradictions in 
deconstructive psychology was constructed from analogous arguments 
about mathematics. Although Wittgenstein's remarks on the relations 
between philosophy and psychology tend to be scattered, obscure and 
need to be carefully derived from other remarks (e.g., such as the claim not 
to want to "reform language" (PI, §132)), comparing mathematics with 
psychology provides a useful perspective on the relations between 
philosophy and psychology. 
Traditional comparisons involving reflexivity usually focus on the 
similarities and differences between the social and natural sciences, which 
invite further specific comparisons between psychology and physics. In 
contrast, Wittgenstein was critical of such comparisons: 
The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be 
explained by calling it a "young science"; its state is not 
comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings. 
(Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set 
theory.) (PI, xiv, p. 232e) 
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Wittgenstein's alternative comparison of mathematics with psychology is 
useful because exegesis of contemporary psychology's similarities with the 
problems of "certain branches of mathematics" can inform contemporary 
views of theoretical psychology and metapsychology. For although the 
following extract from the Philosophical Investigations suggests that 
Wittgenstein was about to produce remarks about mathematics based on an 
existing study of psychology, it is useful to examine the detail of his earlier 
remarks on mathematics: 
An investigation is possible in connexion with mathematics 
which is entirely analogous to our investigation of psychology. 
It is just as little a mathematical investigation as the other is a 
psychological one. It will not contain calculations, so it is not for 
example logistic. It might deserve the name of an investigation 
of the 'foundations of mathematics'. (PI, xiv, p. 232e) 
The next section will present insights about psychology that come from a 
detailed exploration of Wittgenstein's "entirely analogous" work on the 
foundations of mathematics. However, some remarks that clarify 
Wittgenstein's philosophy in relation to the limits and consequences of 
reflexive work in psychology can be examined here: that is, where 
Wittgenstein's remarks seem to coincide with positions developed in 
response to forms of psychological reflexivity such as "new paradigm" 
attempts to create new methods and forms of psychology. Thus, given the 
obvious interests of psychologists, it is important to repeat an otherwise 
obscure admission by Wittgenstein - which can be extended to any 
investigation of the "foundations of psychology" - that he was not 
"interested in constructing a building, so much as having a perspicuous view 
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of the foundations of possible buildings" (CV, 7e). 
Two important questions that produce conflicting answers from 
philosophers, social scientists and psychologists are: on what basis can 
Wittgenstein criticize psychology and, moreover, what influence did 
Wittgenstein wish to have on the discipline? For example, by his use of "we" 
and "us" in the famous quotation about psychology, Wittgenstein implies a 
waning faith in the methods of psychology to supply conceptually adequate 
answers to important questions of human existence: 
The existence of the experimental method makes us think we 
have the means of solving the problems which trouble us; 
though problem and method pass one another by. (PI, xiv, p. 
232e) 
Wittgenstein's later philosophy has nevertheless had considerable influence 
on the social sciences, even though it seems that he sought to have no such 
effect6. It seems more appropriate to argue that the use of "we" was justified 
only to the extent that psychologists might accept that the problems he 
identified were similar to theirs, hence the difficulty for social scientists who 
take seriously the dismantling of traditional philosophy and have 
incorporated his remarks in the social sciences as a broad theory of 
language and practices. 
Wittgenstein also acknowledged the considerable potential for a 
descriptive philosopher to interfere in a practice such as mathematics. In 
this respect, Wittgenstein's remarks about the relations between philosophy 
and mathematics are directly relevant to understanding the importance of 
philosophy for psychology: 
6 For example, the following remark can be extended from the treatment of mathematics to 
psychology: "labour in philosophy is as it were an idleness in mathematics" (RFM, IV, §S2). 
The philosopher easily gets into the position of a ham-fisted 
director, who, instead of doing his own work and merely 
supervising his employees to see they do their work well, takes 
over their jobs until one day he finds himself overburdened with 
other people's work while his employees watch and criticize 
him. (PG, p. 369) 
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Wittgenstein clearly felt that his role was to comment upon the conceptual 
problems of a practice but not to take over the work of its practitioners. By 
extension, psychology is obviously regarded by Wittgenstein as an 
autonomous discipline that is as free to entangle itself in conceptual 
confusion as it is to acknowledge philosophical criticisms with the aim of 
disentangling itself. This analogy therefore confirms previous remarks 
about self-critical social science and shows that, despite the close links that 
have developed between philosophy and psychology, "it is important that 
the closeness of the links should not obscure the differences in what can be 
asked of each subject" (Rundle, 1995, p. 207). 
The remark from Philosophical Grammar is also useful because it 
demonstrates the difficulty of adequately incorporating Wittgenstein's 
philosophy into psychology as a critical part of the discipline. An alternative 
view is that psychological reflexivity requires a broad to and fro movement 
between philosophy and psychology. In practice, of course, this might only 
mean that the psychologists concerned can confidently survive in both 
practices (i.e., to be proficient with the different skills, writing styles, concepts 
and techniques required by philosophers and psychologists). But the 
difficulty that I suggest occurs when crossing between psychology and 
philosophy also creates many problems for the interpretation and 
application of Wittgenstein's remarks (even though by helping psychologists 
to remove philosophical errors and find their way about the discipline, it 
might seem that Wittgenstein's philosophy offers many new ideas to exploit). 
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For instance, the work of Baker and Hacker (1984, 1985), Budd (1989) and 
Schulte (1993) on Wittgenstein seems to have little regard for its relevance 
to contemporary psychology. In contrast, Gergen (1985), Harre (1986, 1989, 
1992), Shanker (1991, 1993) and Shotter (1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1993a, 
1996) are not as concerned with the detailed exegesis of Wittgenstein in 
relation to traditional philosophical problems. Their interest is more in 
relating Wittgenstein's philosophy to contemporary psychological practices 
and, where possible, reinterpretating work that invites convincing 
Wittgensteinian criticisms. The latter group of individuals is more interested 
in how psychologists and social scientists are attracted to philosophical 
investigations from the direction of their specific practices and, moreover, 
what movement between the two practices will achieve. 
However, the to and fro movement between philosophy and 
psychology that is occupied mainly by social constructionists and theoretical 
psychologists creates a number of problems which require clarification. One 
of the benefits of the benefits of combining the skills of philosophers and 
psychologists is that social constructionists, for example, understand the 
implications of Wittgenstein's philosophical att~ckon Cartesian dualism. 
While this to and fro movement can also lead to arguments about the extent 
to which cognitive scientists endorse a form of dualism, it is far more relevant 
here to examine the idea that philosophy provides a plan that either could or 
has the potential to be carried out and completed by social scientists and 
psychologists. In a remark that can be taken to mean that philosophers 
should not take pride in constructing theoretical edifices and, moreover, 
should dismantle such proud achievements by examining the detail of 
everyday language use, Wittgenstein stated: "The edifice of your pride has 
to be dismantled. And that is terribly difficult work" (CV, p. 26e). This remark 
41 
can be contrasted with a remark from the Preface to Descartes' The 
Passions of the Soul which is of contemporary relevance to person and 
emotion studies: 
But just as when an Architect has laid all the foundations and 
raised the main walls of some great edifice no one doubts that 
he can carry his plan to completion, because they can see that 
he's already done what was most difficult ... (p. 12) 
The point here is not merely of historical interest because it suggests that 
even those psychologists interested in Wittgenstein's philosophy can adopt 
a Cartesian view of philosophy if they think that Wittgenstein's remarks 
provide a plan, foundation or programme for "new paradigm" psychology 
(see section 1.3 for further remarks about the language that psychologists 
use to describe the relations between philosophy and psychology). 
A more complicated version of this argument can be illustrated by 
remarks about the nature of Wittgenstein's effect on psychology. Coulter 
(1989), for example, argues that a Wittgensteinian rejection of a Cartesian 
approach provides a framework that allows for the "development of a fully 
sociological understanding of the mental, subjective and cognitive aspects 
of persons" and which "presages a redrawing of the intellectual boundaries 
of the human sciences" (pp. 6-7). Trigg (1991) similarly argues that the work 
of the later Wittgenstein "has provoked much interest in the philosophy of 
psychology, but his pre-occupation with the public world leaves little scope 
for psychology as a discipline except as a branch of social science" (p. 215). 
On the view adopted here it seems better to describe the effects of 
Wittgenstein's philosophy as the confluence of similar problems from 
different practices. Thus where Wittgenstein's work on rules, rule-following 
and the possibility of a private language suggests that Wittgenstein had a 
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plan for psychologists to follow, it is important to see how the confusion 
evident in many cognitive and mainstream psychological accounts of 
internalization, privatization and other rule-following abilities reflects a 
fundamental lirnit of Wittgenstein's seminal philosophical work. 
A reconsideration of the use of Wittgenstein's later philosophy in 
psychology is important if, in this case, a comprehensive comparison of 
cognitive theories and fully developed aspects of social constructionism is to 
be avoided. The twists and turns of a Wittgensteinian treatment of 
philosophical errors - such as those identified by the remarks of the private 
language argument and the preceding account of rules - can occur 
regardless of whether the source is cognitive science or everyday accounts 
of how we are able to talk about private events. Accordingly, when 
approaching philosophy from the practice of psychology and specific 
accounts such as Rosenberg's (1990) theory, it is the freedom to entangle 
ourselves in our own concepts and then disentangle ourselves from 
particular representations of their use that is crucial to understanding the 
role of Wittgenstein's method. Wittgenstein's influence is therefore indirect 
since we may deny that conceptual therapy is required to remove 
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misconceptions. On Wittgenstein's view of philosophy, a psychologist who 
commits a philosophical error can only be brought to the point of a clear 
view by assembling relevant reminders of language use. There is no room 
to push, persuade, convert, seduce or train an individual into accepting a 
philosopher's power to remove a conceptual problem. 
These considerations bring us back to an account of how 
Wittgenstein's philosophy might be incorporated in the future work of 
psychology (or, in this case, the work of Part 2). Since Wittgenstein did not 
open up potential lines of inquiry to be "colonized" by particular social 
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scientific investigations, the aim of psychologists doing particular research 
should not be to use Wittgenstein's remarks as the foundation for their work. 
Instead, an alternative view of a future psychology can be inferred from one 
of Wittgenstein's further remarks about mathematics: 
A philosopher feels changes in the style of a derivation which a 
contemporary mathematician passes over calmly with a blank 
face. What will distinguish the mathematicians of the future 
from those of today will really be a greater sensitivity, and that 
will-as it were-prune mathematics; since people will then be 
more intent on absolute clarity than on the discovery of new 
games. Philosophical clarity will have the same effect on the 
growth of mathematics as sunlight has on the growth of potato 
shoots. (In a dark cellar they grow yards long). (PG, II, V, §25) 
The analogous point for psychology is that the positive contribution of 
philosophy now, as well as in the future, will be to place tighter conceptual 
limits on possible branches of growth without necessarily obscuring genuine 
opportunities for creative research. And, in this case, a greater emphasis on 
conceptual clarity should limit possible future investigations in the study of 
personal reflexivity and emotion. For example, the interdisciplinary 
explosion of interest in emotion may eventually need to be pruned by 
philosophical clarity because continuing growth in the area will eventually 
reach a point where a clear view cannot be achieved solely on the basis of a 
review of all relevant psychological studies. Thus, Wittgenstein's role is a 
kind of conceptual pruning in the consideration of actual and possible lines 
of investigation. 
The suggested analogous future form of psychology that incorporates 
Wittgensteinian philosophical criticisms is, accordingly, the only one that 
Wittgenstein could consistently advocate: a future psychology in which 
sensitivity to language, expressions and concepts will help to avoid growth 
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in pointless areas but which will not undermine the freedom for 
psychologists to make conceptual mistakes in the name of theory 
construction and empirical work. The role of philosophy is to dampen the 
enthusiasm for potential areas of growth while also allowing the freedom of 
individuals within psychology to attempt the impossible, so to speak. 
Wittgenstein's philosophical remarks can provide the basis for a 
"Wittgensteinian program" in psychology (Harre, 1988) or, more specifically, 
a new "social psychology of human development" (Jost, 1995; ct. Part 2, 
chapter 8), but only in the sense that they are usurped by psychologists for a 
different purpose than Wittgenstein intended. Scince, as Bloor (1997) notes, 
even Wittgenstein's account of rules and rule-following can admit both 
collectivist and individualist readings, a crucial task is to bring these debates 
back to an examination of detailed but otherwise ordinary examples. More 
generally, heeding the call for conceptual tightness on the future possible 
directions of psychology assures a continuing role for philosophy to 
comment on advances and discoveries in psychology without the need to 
offer what Wittgenstein similarly referred to in mathematics as prophecies 
(LFM, p. 13). 
In summary, recognition of the mutual limits of philosophy and 
psychology does not diminish the scope of the former or the freedom of the 
latter to become entangled in its own conceptual confusions. Some initial 
similarities between Wittgenstein's treatment of mathematics and 
psychology were discussed. The temptation to regard philosophers as 
"directing" psychologists was dismissed in favour of the view that 
Wittgenstein's philosophy offers assistance to disentangle psychologists 
from their conceptual problems. Wittgenstein does not necessarily attempt 
to redirect every branch of the social sciences, but rather aims to convince 
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psychologists to stop growth in pointless directions through conceptual 
clarity. On this account, the future form of psychology owes less to a 
Wittgensteinian programme within psychology that extends notions of rules 
and rule-following, and more to an era in which psychologists attend more 
closely to conceptual issues. The difficulty of connecting psychologically 
reflexive work with the methods and remarks of Wittgenstein's philosophy 
therefore raises issues for further investigation which include: the 
usefulness of a game analogy of psychology, the difficulties of switching 
between philosophy and psychology, and the nature of psychologists' 
critical careers. 
1.2 Metapsychology and Wittgenstein's "entirely 
analogous" treatment of mathematics 
Often it is difficult to determine whether the process and results of reflexive 
and critical psychological studies should be regarded as philosophy or, 
instead, should be treated as a subdiscipline within psychology. Although 
the Wittgensteinian treatment of psychological reflexivity given thus far 
. . 
demonstrates the importance of the "turn to language" - hence leading to 
the growth of discursive studies - the line between philosophy and 
theoretical areas of psychology is still difficult to draw. The previous section 
began to address some of the details of Wittgenstein's relevance to 
contemporary psychology through the largely unexamined potential of 
Wittgenstein's "entirely analogous" remarks on mathematics and 
metamathematics. In this section, further remarks on the similarities between 
psychology's problems and set theory in mathematics will be assembled and 
analysed in order to clarify the role of theoretical psychology, offer an 
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alternative Wittgensteinian metapsychology and examine the issue of 
contradictions in psychology. 
Wittgensteinian metapsychology: 
psychology 
the game analogy of 
The reversal of Wittgenstein's suggestion that a philosophical investigation 
of mathematics could be undertaken that would be "entirely analogous" to 
that of psychology (PI, xiv, p. 232) leads to the potential for a comparison 
between Wittgenstein's extensive remarks on mathematics and 
contemporary metapsychology. The topic is relevant to a reconsideration of 
psychological reflexivity because metapsychological remarks are the 
formalization and disputation of what psychologists are tempted to say about 
what they do. While Wittgenstein denied that metamathematics has the 
philosophical significance that some claim, it seems reasonable to think that 
his alternative metamathematical "game analogy" remarks may usefully 
inform our understanding of the limits of reflexive work in psychology (Le., 
work that might connect with metapsychological attempts to use such a 
perspective as well as to change the practices of the discipline). 
Wittgenstein was highly critical of problems with accounts of the 
foundations of mathematics: 
The mathematical problems of what is called foundations are 
no more the foundation of mathematics for us than the painted 
rock is the support of a painted tower. (RFM, V, §13) 
It is reasonable to think that he did not wish to establish or deny 
contemporary forms of metapsychology. For example, Gergen's (1989) 
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mention of the different methods that metapsychology employs to highlight 
what cannot be investigated by the use of the discipline's techniques and 
methods seems reasonable. Instead, Wittgenstein would probably be 
critical of attempts to claim that the "meta" in "metapsychology" implies that 
this work provides the foundations for psychological practices. For example, 
problems identified in a metapsychology position would not undermine the 
actual practices of psychology. Also while metapsychology could be a 
complicated combination of theory and Wittgensteinian philosophy, it is only 
"about" psychology in the sense that it involves different methods, concepts 
and skills to describe psychology and it is not "below" the discipline in a 
foundationalist sense. 
A particular task here is to show the utility of extending the game 
analogy that Wittgenstein used to understand mathematics (RFM, V, § 12) 
and metamathematics to psychology. The analogy serves as a simplified 
"object of comparison" and does not play a foundational role because, for 
example, the discovery of disanalogous aspects of the game account does 
not lead the practices of psychology to be undermined (Le., just as 
dismantling a painting of a tower's supporting rock does not lead the tower it 
represents to fall down). The point that the analogy of psychology as a game 
is to clarify the relations between the tasks, skills and resources of 
philosophers and psychologists. The game analogy is, therefore, not a 
metapsychological theory that is being used to set up a new game for 
psychology (PG, pp. 289-293; PR, p. 327). In fact, the irony of the game 
analogy is that it is a means of showing the limits of Wittgenstein's 
philosophical remarks to psychology. What the game view highlights, 
according to Monk (1990), is that "you cannot gain a fundamental 
understanding of mathematics by waiting for a theory" (p. 307). This is 
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simply because "the understanding of one game cannot depend upon the 
construction of another" (p. 307). 
The analogy also shows that metapsychological theories need not be 
described as organizing important empirical discoveries about the discipline 
and its history. Although the use of particular rules in psychology can be 
described in factual terms, such a factual description does not mean that the 
rules themselves are facts that need to be explained (Le., empirical 
propositions that are organized by a theory). This is indicated by 
Wittgenstein's treatment of a similar case in mathematics. He notes that an 
individual might claim with regard to a particular rule-governed practice: 
"surely it remains an empirical fact that men calculate like tl"lis" (RFM, V, 
§1S). Wittgenstein's succinct reply is "yes, but that does not make the 
propositions used in calculating into empirical propositions" (RFM, V, § 15). 
Hence, in this case, the game analogy is not a theory that organizes facts 
about the use of rules in psychology. 
The game analogy therefore suggests that philosophy only plays the 
role of describing the rules of psychology and addresses such nonsensical 
questions from psychologists as "So where are the rules?". It should be 
noted that the rules of psychology are the complicated concepts, 
propositions and rule-governed techniques used in the discipline that are 
demonstrated in "knowing our way about" (RFM, II, §81). This is in contrast 
to the sort of philosophical confusion - generally described by Wittgenstein 
as "I don't know my way about" (PI, §123) - that might prevent such an 
overview of the discipline. An example of such a philosophical problem is 
the view that contradictions identified in metapsychological accounts 
undermine the practices of psychology. It is also important, as the next 
section will demonstrate, to be aware of Wittgenstein's important distinction 
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between rules that are grammatical propositions, which function as rules for 
the use of concepts, and empirical propositions. This is because empirical 
propositions might, once they have been tested, "be transformed into a 
postulate-and then become a norm of description" (Oe, §321). The rules 
of psychology evident in the correct use of its propositions, concepts and 
techniques cannot exist above, separate from, or independent of their use 
and application: in other words, propositions that function as rules can only 
be redescribed by philosophy or metapsychology. Thus, Wittgenstein notes 
that propositions and facts about the history of the game are often not 
included in the rules of a game in any clear sense (PG, VI, §75). 
The game analogy instead functions like the notion of a surview of 
science that was indicated by Barker's (1989) clarification of how rules can 
change in a practice (Le., rather than mysteriously prefiguring all future 
applications and extensions; see section 1.1). In this case, the game 
analogy is not a claim about the real, structural nature of psychology. Rules 
cannot be described as procedures that psychologists unknowingly follow 
and which can only be revealed by theories about psychology. A rule 
should not be regarded as an explanatory concept because, as Wittgenstein 
notes, it is "what is explained, not what does the explaining" (RPP II, §405). 
Wittgenstein adds detail to the description of rules in a way that avoids the 
difficulties "associated with the attempt to define science, or any other 
human practice, by rules alone" (Barker, 1989, p. 95), but is still relevant to 
the extension of the analogy to psychology. For example, he notes "I cannot 
describe how (in general) to employ rules, except by teaching you, training 
you to employ rules" (RPP II, §413). The issues of teaching and training in 
psychology, and the important question of whether psychologists can be 
trained to be reflexive, will be addressed in chapter 3 (i.e., since critical 
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psychology may seem to encourage training to "break the rules"}. For the 
moment, the analogy suggest that it is only within psychology that attempts 
to alter the rules can be undertaken by individuals who have mastered 
important skills, techniques and concepts. 
Philosophers, in contrast, can only describe the rules so that while 
they may propose rule changes that will alter the character of the game, they 
cannot institute them since that would be to do psychology, to become a 
psychologist, albeit perhaps only in the manner of a theoretical psychologist 
or, as in mathematics, a set theorist. Wittgenstein is clear that his purpose is 
not to attack the metamathematics of set theory from "within", but from 
"without": 
That is to say: not to attack it mathematically-otherwise I 
should be doing mathematics-but its position, its office. 
(RFM, V, §16) 
It will often be more interesting for philosophers to describe the nature of the 
innovations and, as subsequent sections will show, that the kind of practical 
knowledge acquired by individuals who participate in a culture cannot be 
mastered by learning rules alone. Moreover, to extend the director analogy 
in section 1.1, the role of a philosopher is like a referee who broadly 
participates in the game in the sense that he or she polices the rules. 
However, this referee role is also "outside" the play in the sense that the 
individual philosopher cannot, so to speak, score a goal for one side or the 
other. Although the details of this position will be explored in subsequent 
sections, it is most appropriate to apply it to the issue of the relations 
between philosophy and psychology, as directed by the reconsideration of 
psychological reflexivity and personal reflexivity. 
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The analogy is relevant to the reconsideration of types of reflexivity in 
their contexts because it shows how the remarks of Part 1 about 
psychological reflexivity can describe some of the studies examined in Part 
2. That is, while the attempt to provide a reflexive study of personal 
reflexivity suggests an account that is, in some respect, at a higher level, this 
contradicts the fact that this task is accomplished within the same broad, 
discursive game. An enduring picture of philosophy and theoretical 
psychology as the higher and more abstract of two levels can be dismissed 
as a myth which is created by much of our everyday language. Although it 
might seem helpful to regard the different' treatments of psychological 
reflexivity and its consequences and limits in Part 1 as the higher level and 
the treatment of personal reflexivity in Part 2 as the lower level (Le., closer to 
the reality of people's experiences that we wish to investigate). But the 
game analogy favours an analysis of the roles and skills of the individuals 
concerned within what is broadly regarded as the game. Thus, the game 
analogy suggests that there are simply two different practices that are 
related in a manner that is better described in terms of the roles, skills and 
tasks of the director or referee and the players. 
To reiterate, Wittgenstein's remarks and their use within psychology 
should not be seen as the metapsychological provision of a foundation for a 
new psychology. For example, the game analogy that was extended to 
psychology is metapsychological only in the sense that it is "about" how 
philosophy relates to psychology (Le., it is not a theory of the game of 
psychology and its rules). The game analogy is important because it shows 
that connecting Wittgenstein's remarks with the results of self-critical 
psychology is not the same as moving from a description of the rules to 
proposing new rules and forms of investigation in the "game" itself. This 
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helps to clarify how Wittgenstein could be consistent on maintaining a 
position that entails "there is no metapsychology" in a foundational sense, 
while at the same time making useful remarks about psychology's concepts, 
techniques and propositions. The utility of the game analogy and the focus 
on rules, despite disanalogies that will be mentioned in subsequent 
sections, is further extended in the next section to deal with the problem of 
contradictions. 
Further remarks on the rules of, psychology and the 
consequences of contradictions for the game 
While the description of the rules of psychology has provided an account of 
grammar of the propositions of psychology, their different roles and 
surroundings (RFM, V, §14), further clarification of the rules of psychology is 
required. Whether a rule, axiom, or proposition in psychology is grammatical 
or empirical (OC, §321) is important to consider because it tells us whether 
some of the more radical statements we might be tempted to make are 
contradicting a rule for teaching a concept or a point that has been 
established on the basis of experiments and observations. This conceptual 
distinction is also useful as a way of clarifying the issue of contradictions in 
psychology, especially when they are thought to suggest fundamental 
problems that only the unity of a new paradigm will solve (Buss, 1995; see 
section 1.3). Furthermore, considering the issue of contradictions in 
psychology also allows us to address the view that many of the contrasting 
positions in psychology are the result of our failure to deal appropriately with 
the personal reflexivity of the discipline's "subjects" (Buss, 1978; Howard, 
1985). 
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An important Wittgensteinian point that can be made about 
psychology is that although many of its concepts seem to refer to real 
objects, it is important occasionally to accept Wittgenstein's challenge of 
imagining a quite different history for the discipline and then ask whether its 
concepts still seem quite as natural (RFM, II, §80). The point is relevant to 
the issue of psychology's "rules" because a common, contemporary remark 
is that an independent reality does not justify the current shape of the 
discipline and its concepts. While the following point about rules of 
grammar describing the correct use of concepts may seem irrelevant, it is an 
important prelude to a clarification of the role,· if any, for contradictions and 
their identification in psychology. The point is that: 
There is no such thing as a correct rule of grammar (it can only 
be correct or incorrect, true or false, that this is a rule of 
grammar). For there is no such thing as justifying grammar by 
reference to reality - as strange and counterintuitive as this 
may sound. (Baker & Hacker, 1985, p. 54) 
This point initially rejects a broad view that the rules of a game can be said 
to contradict reality and restricts the notion of contradicting reality to the 
more limited sense in which an empirical proposition may be false (PG, X, 
§ 133). For if a proposition is to function as a rule of description that is 
certain (i.e., rather than hypothetical and hence potentially leaving one with 
two choices) it cannot leave two paths open (RFM, V, 32). 
The rules of psychology do not contradict reality and it is more 
pertinent to examine where two propositions or concepts in psychology 
contradict each other (Le., the type of problem that could not be resolved 
simply by empirical investigation). In this case, the Wittgensteinian solution 
is to note that either a new rule is required or some other form of appropriate 
investigation should be carried out to determine which rule is correct, simply 
54 
because "it is part of the grammar of the word 'rule' that if 'p' is a rule, 'p.-p' 
is not a rule" (PG, II, 14). The specific point is that while there are numerous 
contradictions within psychology that seem to involve what Wittgenstein 
described as grammatical propositions, Wittgenstein suggests that there are 
limits to the use of philosophy to resolve such contradictions. This is 
especially important because mainstream psychologists such as Staats 
(1991) regard contradiction as a fundamental obstacle to psychology's 
development beyond its present pre-paradigmatic scientific status (see 
section 1.3 for a Wittgensteinian treatment of the "new paradigm" approach 
to broad theoretical contradictions in psychology). 
However, as Wittgenstein notes with regard to similar problems in 
mathematics: 
... it is one thing to use a mathematical technique consisting in 
the avoidance of contradiction, and another to philosophize 
against contradiction in mathematics. (RFM, III, §55) 
A case of using a psychological technique "consisting in the avoidance of a 
contradiction" in psychology would be where two contradictory theories (Le., 
theoretical or hypothetical propositions) can be decided, it is hoped, on the 
basis of empirical evidence. By analogy, Wittgensteinians should not 
circumvent the use of legitimate techniques for avoiding contradictions 
within the practices of psychology. In other words, they cannot take over the 
role of a psychologist who, when faced with a particular contradiction, may 
well ask "how must I change the rules of this game, so that such-and-such a 
situation cannot occur?" (RFM, V, §27). 
In contrast, philosophizing against a contradiction in psychology 
should instead occur where problems arise 'from persistent conceptual 
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problems or a mistaken ideal. For example, the view that unification is an 
ideal for psychology is predicated on the view that psychology contains 
deeply problematic contradictions (of the binary form, for example, that 
deconstructionists aim to identify and subvert (Parker, 1989)). The potential 
for a Wittgensteinian treatment is especially relevant where it is argued that 
the provision of a unifying theory may eventually remove the contradictions 
in psychology (a position advocated by Staats (1991) and evident in 
paradigm accounts of psychology; see section 1.3). Wittgenstein attacks 
the view that highlighted contradictions have the potential to undermine or 
"infect" the discipline. In a striking mixed metaphor, Wittgenstein argues that 
the game "is only sick if we do not know our way about" (RFM, II, §81). Such 
a position is referred to - albeit in a tongue-in-cheek allusion to earlier 
accounts in psychology such as Oliver and Land-field (1962) - by Shotter 
(1992): "we have been infected with a touch of reflexivity: psychologists are 
people too, and we live in the same world as that we attempt to investigate" 
(p. 178). But the view that there is a serious problem can only occur where 
there is a misconception about the problem and the way in which it may be 
solved, hence Shotter's ironic use of "infected" in a position that 
nevertheless conforms with Oliver and Landfield's (1962) earlier conclusion 
that "psychology should be re'flexive, but should not commit fallacies of self-
reference" (p. 118). 
As the following analysis will show, metapsychological accounts of 
psychological reflexivity generating contradictions in psychology hinder a 
clear view of these problems and their significance. The alternative position 
advocated in Section 1.3 is that a surview can be used, as Shotter (1993a) 
argues, to counter the "painful contradictions" of conceptual problems in 
psychology. A relevant Wittgensteinian position is that an emphasis on the 
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ideal of a contradiction-free, unified psychology prevents its practitioners 
from correctly negotiating (and treating) the discipline's conceptual 
problems. It is almost as if the unity that psychologists seek is hidden and 
needs to be discovered in the same manner that contradictions are often 
viewed as hidden but, in contrast, are regarded as potentially destructive. 
Interestingly, Baker and Hacker (1983) present a view which suggests that 
the latter problem occurs when the "rules" of the social scientific practice are 
viewed in theoretical terms: 
A putative system of rules may be' vitiated by a hidden 
contradiction, conflict or inconsistency among the rules. Since 
the only role of such postulated rules is theoretical and 
explanatory rather than normative, contradictions may lurk 
unbeknown to anyone. It seems to be the task of the theorist to 
'ensure' that his system of rules is consistent. (p. 61) 
However, Wittgenstein worked through the confusions of this position in 
conversations with Turing about set theory and contradictions in 
mathematical logic (LFM, pp. 138,210,221-224). Allusions to the problems 
of psychology and "certain branches of mathematics" (PI, xiv, p. 232) can 
now be made explicit. The analogous problem for psychology - and 
clarification of remarks at the end of the Philosophical Investigations - is 
that inconsistent rules may seem to lurk hidden within its systems and 
theories in a manner that has the potential to undermine the whole 
discipline. But the solution to the deep problems supposedly caused, in this 
case, by personal reflexivity is to achieve a descriptive surview of the 
relevant psychological concepts and clarity about the role of such a 
comprehensive survey (see section 1.3). 
Thus the actual or potential preoccupation in metapsychology with 
the identification of contradictions can be challenged by noting that it makes 
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as much sense to look for hidden contradictions as it does to look for a 
hidden unity. In both cases, Wittgenstein philosophizes against an 
inappropriate ideal for psychology which, if left unchecked, would continue 
to inspire respective forms of pessimism and optimism. As a result, where it 
is tempting to say that "finding a contradiction in a system, like finding a 
germ in an otherwise healthy body, shows that the whole system or body is 
diseased", Wittgenstein's reply is: 
Not at all. The contradiction does not even falsify anything. Let 
it lie. Do not go there. (LFM, p. 138) 
Wittgenstein's work cannot be used to remove all of the contradictions that 
can be found in psychology and which are sometimes resolved by the use 
of psychological techniques. However, his remarks do help us to challenge 
the nonsense of an inappropriate ideal which is nonsensical because 
achieving it would dissolve the discipline (or, as Wittgenstein suggests in a 
different context with regard to false moves in a practice: "if what we now call 
by that name became the rule, the game in which they were false moves 
would have been abrogated" (PI, p. 227)). In the process it may seem as if 
an important goal has been dismissed which inspires many forms of 
theoretical system building and talk of new games based on different 
foundations, but the clarity achieved and its potential effects should not be 
u nde resti mated. 
Exploration of some of the connections between Wittgenstein's 
remarks about set theory, mathematics and psychology now provides an 
opportunity to clarify problems raised by contrary accounts of personal 
reflexivity. A relevant example to psychology is Buss' (1978) already 
mentioned account of the history of different theories in psychology which 
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can be described in terms of shifts between the positions of "person 
constructs reality" and IIreality constructs person" (p. 59). In particular, Buss 
argues that this problem in the treatment of what has been termed "personal 
reflexivity" can account for such transitions in theoretical orientation from 
behaviourism to cognitive psychology (and might also be applied to more 
recent contrasts between the broad positions of social constructionism and 
evolutionary psychology; see section 1.3). For Buss argues that 
contradictory theoretical positions in the history of psychology reveal "a 
submerged pattern in the coming and going of psychological revolutions" (p. 
59). The relevant point is that recognition of psychological reflexivity by 
Buss - namely, that "the objects of study in the social sciences (people) are 
also subjects" (p. 59) - seems to produce a contradiction that cannot be 
resolved by the discipline. The oscillation between contradictory theories 
would seem to have the potential to undermine the scientific status of 
psychology, perhaps because arbitrarily favouring one side of the 
contradictory poles in the discipline for reasons of fashion or power (Parker, 
1989) would hardly be regarded as progress. The relevance to positions 
within psychology such as behaviourism, cognitive psychology, and social 
constructionism is that these and other positions come and go in the history 
of psychology because at various points the reflexivity of persons is 
emphasized or denied. 
However, Buss' account of the way in which people are variously 
emphasized to be subjects or objects should only be accepted as 
metapsychologically revealing in the sense that it is a highly theoretical way 
of redescribing psychology. The fact that this metapsychological account 
needs to be explained for us to understand it does not mean that 
psychological reflexivity really describes a hidden structure within 
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psychology that generates contradictions. For if this really were the case, 
there would seem to be no way of prevent future contradictions from 
emerging or that we could "get outside" these positions to the phenomenon 
"in itself", Buss, of course, wants to end the continuing oscillation between 
contradictory position, but the way of achieving it is described as a 
dialectical revolution which, when realized, will "end the need for 
revolutionary subject-object transformations" (p. 63). While subsequent 
work will show that Wittgenstein's notion of a surview is different from a 
dialectical solution, Buss at least provides some support for the decision not 
to examine personal reflexivity in terms of all the contrasting theories that 
are potentially surveyable. 
However, one criticism of Buss' account is that it is now quite dated 
and, moreover, does not seem to have inspired much similar work. It is 
therefore useful to provide a further, more recent example of a position that 
not only accords with many of the features of the social constructionist focus 
on language but also is analogous to set theory. In particular, Smedslund 
(1990) provides an example of an attempt to describe, draw out and 
formalize tacit rules (or axioms) for the use of psychological concepts into 
what he terms a "psycho-logic". The analogy with set theory is that its main 
concern was to the "reduction of arithmetic to pure logic (set theory)" 
(Hacker, 1996, p. 403), a task that Smedslund's "psycho-logic" emulates. 
This is interesting because Hacker describes the importance of 
Wittgenstein's entirely analogous treatment of problems in psychology as 
the parallel between the above point about arithmetic and: 
... the envisaged eliminability (in principle) of what Kohler 
called 'qualitative observation' (e.g. of a subject's anger or 
pleasure, hope or fear) in favour of quantitative physiological 
and neurophysiological description in a future psychological 
science. (p.403) 
60 
While Hacker's analysis is relevant to issues which will examined in 
chapters 2 and 3, exegesis is limited here to the issue of discovering a 
hidden contradiction in such a "system" or "calculus". For it is conceivable 
that there is a technique that allows one to look for hidden contradictions in 
the results of his investigations. Thankfully, Smedslund does not seem to be 
concerned with this potential problem even though it is possible that 
sOmeone may find it has escaped Smedslund's notice that one proposition 
contradicts another in his system of rules or axioms (LFM, XXI, pp. 209-10). 
Would even this sense of a hidden contradiction in a position that is close to 
the social constructionist interest in describing the results of a linguistic 
survey undermine anything? 
This point is crucial to an understanding of the usefulness of such a 
system and its applicability in contexts such as the representation of forms of 
personal reflexivity (see chapter 2, section 2.1.3 and section 2.2.1). 
Wittgenstein's response to such an inconsistency in the rules is to note that 
either one of 'them is not a statement or, if it is a statement, "it is a useless 
one" (LFM, XXI, p. 209). Again the result is that nothing is undermined by 
the identification of such a hidden contradiction, even though this seems to 
be one of the consequences of the activity. Description of the system of 
rules does not provide a foundation for the actual use of concepts in the 
normative practice of psychology. In other words, if it is a game (or what 
could be described as a calculus) that is only used in metapsychological 
"theory" (i.e., as a description of the game), the following interrogation might 
well be conducted about the "practical effects" of any identified contradiction: 
I should like to ask something like: "Is it usefulness you are out 
for in your calculus-In that case you don't get any 
contradiction. And if you aren't out for usefulness-then it 
doesn't matter if you do get one." (RFM, II, §80) 
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In other words, a contradiction does not arise in a useful calculus (or game) 
simply because those problems will tend to be cleared up when they occur 
in practice, usually by producing a new rule or making a decision about 
which rule will be followed. Moreover, contradictions in metapsychological 
theory or in the theoretical foundations of psychology are not symptoms of a 
more general problem. Rather, the role of what respectively can be called 
the "discovery" of an error in a metapsychological system or the invention of 
a new game or calculus needs to be called into question because, if 
application is not a goal, a contradiction in it will not matter. If these points 
are not recognized it is likely that an emphasis on the reflexivity of 
psychology and especially the need to pursue radical forms of reflexivity, will 
produce confusions that are analogous to the results of mistaken 
programmes in the history of metamathematics (Le., to find contradictions in 
the rules of a system which is not meant to be applied). 
To summarize, the game and rule analogy was extended to the issue 
of contradictions in psychology where concepts, rules, axioms or 
propositions contradict others and not reality. Wittgel1stein's remarks 
suggest that it is only possible to philosophize against contradictions in 
psychology where, for example, it seems that a mistaken ideal or solution 
can overcome the "ill", pre-paradigmatic state of psychology and its endless 
oscillations around the confirmation or denial of the similarity between 
psychologists and the subjects (or objects) they study. While it remains to 
provide more detail about Wittgenstein's alternatives, a dialectical revolution 
and production of a "psycho-logic" were both dismissed as solutions. 
62 
Moreover, since the latter position is close to social constructionism, it 
implied an interesting parallel with set theory and suggested the important 
issue of how useful such a system or calculus could possibly be. 
A Wittgensteinian view of theoretical psychology and 
metatheoretical description 
The Wittgensteinian position on psychology adopted in the previous section 
used the game analogy and an account of rules to distinguish between 
different philosophical and psychological techniques for removing 
contradictions. The indication was that a surview of psychological concepts 
could achieve this outcome, although it is difficult to determine whether this 
activity would be regarded as describing the rules of psychology or playing 
the game. The Wittgensteinian treatment of contradictions therefore 
suggests that theoretical psychology is a complicated combination of both 
practices that is not entirely at home in either. Because theoretical 
psychologists draw on the concepts, skills and techniques of both practices 
they may seem to occupy a level between philosophy and psychology. 
While we need not endorse such a view, the issue to be addressed in this 
section is whether Wittgenstein's comparison of psychology with 
mathematics has further implications for our understanding of contemporary 
forms of theoretical psychology and metatheoretical description. 
Although theoretical psychology provides a perspective on highly 
theoretical and conceptual debates within psychology, it has fashioned an 
outsider role to such an extent that some regard it as occupying a 
hinterland. But if reflexive work is so important to psychology why does it 
seem to leave its practitioners stranded without a strong basis either in 
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philosophy or psychology? Some of Wittgenstein's further remarks on 
mathematics and set theory provide an answer, especially when theoretical 
psychology is viewed as a form of pure psychology that contrasts with 
applied psychological work such as counselling and empirical research. A 
misleading picture that Wittgenstein identifies in the branch of 
metamathematics known as set theory is equally applicable to forms of 
theoretical and "pure" psychology: that is, the similarly misleading "charm" 
of pure mathematics is that it "looks as if it were applied 
mathematics-applied to itself" (LFM, XV, p. 150). When the analogy is 
extended to psychology it seems that some psychologists argue for this view 
in a more literal fashion. For example, Gergen (1985) argues that ''the study 
of social process could become generic for understanding the nature of 
knowledge itself" (p. 266). But in contrast to Gergen's project, the main point 
here is that although both pure mathematics and theoretical psychology 
seem to have an autonomous existence, it is important that the practice is 
not cut off from any application in the practices of psychology as well as the 
potential clarity of philosophical description. 
This comparison may seem to provide a sweeping characterization of 
theoretical psychology, but the problems of psychology cannot all be solved 
from within. Moreover, many of the conceptual problems that lead to 
reflexive work and theoretical psychology would not occur in an entirely 
practical, applied, technological, or otherwise restricted form of psychology. 
The individuals of such a discipline would not be concerned with the 
propositions of any "pure", theoretical psychology simply because their 
"centre of gravity" could be said to found in doing rather than thinking, 
hypothesizing or reflecting (RFM, III, §15). Psychologists concerned solely 
with the aim of practical application would not be free to become entangled 
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in conceptual problems and, therefore, to disentangle themselves through 
the kinds of highly conceptual twists and turns identified in the previous 
section. Wittgenstein's philosophical methods are relevant to psychology 
because our freedom to produce complicated conceptual vocabularies also 
contains the greatest likelihood of philosophical error (Le., the reintroduction 
of persistent misrepresentations of our psychological concepts in new 
theory-oriented concepts and practices). Thus although it would probably 
not occur to individuals with a practical interest to explore conceptual 
possibilities, this is what reflexive psychology should attempt. 
An important task of reflexive psychological work is to determine 
which concepts, models and ideas work in theory, rather than solely being 
concerned with what works in practice. This activity does not necessarily 
begin with a survey of theories and end in metatheoretical description. 
Instead, an important aim for reflexive work is to examine alternatives to 
theory construction. For example, Shotter's (1997) case for social 
constructionism is summarized as an attempt to provide new "vocabularies" 
that change the subject, "rather than simply proposing another new theory 
within the methodological 'framework of contemporary academic 
psychology" (p. 8). On this view it is important to show that practice can 
drive theory in a more reflexive and discursive way than theory alone (see 
chapter 2 for a more detailed treatment of social constructionist alternatives 
to existing methodologies in psychology). This is simply because, as the 
explication of the notion of a surview in section 1.3 will demonstrate, "the 
vast majority of the psychological concepts that are the starting-point for 
psychological investigation are ordinary, everyday ones" (Hacker, 1996, p. 
412). 
However, have social constructionists been too hasty in following 
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Wittgenstein's rejection of theory in favour of the sort of philosophical 
psychology that Hacker describes (Le., to generalize Wittgenstein's remarks 
in philosophy to the social sciences and, in particular, psychology)? It seems 
reasonable to argue that the pursuit of critical, reflexive work in psychology 
is not necessarily the construction of new theories. Shotter argues that the 
relevance of Wittgenstein's remarks - what he describes as inserting a 
Wittgensteinian practice into psychology - is to show that the resulting 
discipline: 
... must be unamenable to disciplinary confines. It must be 
continuous with and work from within our ordinary everyday 
practices, without its being necessary to step outside them. 
Hence, theoretical explanations are not only unnecessary but 
inimical to what is required. Their aim is simply to make the 
subtleties and nuances we sense in dealing with the unique 
relational moments in which we are involved rationally-visible 
to us. (p.6) 
In contrast to a survey of relevant theories and studies, a survey of ordinary 
examples is preferred. Shotter also suggests that a focus on theory 
construction as the most appropriate means of driving further innovations in 
psychology has led to forms of knowledge that bear little resemblance to the 
detail of people's everyday lives. 
Shotter (1996) describes the alternative to theory as "a new practice 
that now directs our attention and guides our conduct in new ways" (p. 10). 
The difficulty is that while use of methods of "social poetics" seem capable of 
complementing the attainment of a surview, it should not be seen to replace 
theoret!cal and empirical work in psychology completely. Although a 
surview is not like the collection of linguistic data that should eventually be 
understood through a theoretical explanation, it is difficult to understand 
how it provides a resource from which theoretical work may grow. A good 
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summary of this problem can be found in Shotter's (1996) argument for a 
supposedly Wittgensteinian alternative: 
... what is new in all of this is our coming to a more direct and 
immediate understanding of how to deal with our practices in 
practice, using methods that by-pass the whole attempt to first 
understand them in terms of theories (as at present we feel we 
must). (p. 11) 
Although theory-first views of understanding abound in psychology, the 
work in Part 2 on personal reflexivity and emotion does not assume that a 
survey of theories and empirical studies is the most important focus (Le., 
even though it may seem as if the notion of a surview is presented as a 
complicated combination of philosophical psychology and psychological 
studies). Instead, the surview of pride that informs the general issue of 
personal and reflexivity is regarded as the basis from which theories may 
grow using the discursive material that surrounds us (and can even be said 
to constitute us). As already noted elsewhere, a surview provides a 
resource that even theory-first supporters may occasionally return to for 
clarification. Thus, a surview is not just the result of a broad survey of 
relevant theories and empirical studies. 
But since reflexive work usually leads to the consideration of 
metatheoretical issues, it might be argued that this should be the focus of a 
critical study. Indeed, the often complicated and technical points that arise 
from a metatheoretical survey can be seen as an attempt to achieve a 
surview. For instance, Kemper's (1990) description of work in the sociology 
of emotions, to offer one example, suggests that a "synoptic view" needs to 
be attained of particular themes and variations in the literature. These 
themes are presented to form a table of all the possible choices for the 
theoretician to explore in detail or, optimistically, attempt to integrate 
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(possibly with one new theory). Thus Kemper states: "as one opts for one 
or another side of each of the alternatives [of particular theories of emotion], 
one achieves a definite position that comprises a metatheory over and 
above the substantive core of one's work" (p. 5, brackets added). 
However, any superficial similarities between a surview and 
metatheoretical surveys such as Kemper's need to be distinguished by 
examining their fundamentally different roles. A comprehensive survey of 
psychological concepts can collect together remarks in order to combat 
particular metatheoretical issues: that is, through its detail a surview may 
provide clarification of such metatheoretical issues as objectivity, causation, 
ontology and explanation (see chapters 2, 3 and 4). But the relevance of 
Wittgenstein's remarks and methods is not merely in their contribution to 
psychology at this "level". Knowing our way about the discipline is not 
achieved metatheoretically or, for that matter, by reflexive work that entails a 
to and fro movement between theory and metatheory. The description of the 
"substantive core of one's work" by Kemper also implies a combination of 
theories and studies from a particular area. 
On my .view the "substantive core of one's work" is instead a 
comprehensive conceptual-discursive survey which precedes theory 
construction and may, when used to disentangle the problems caused by 
pictures and philosophical errors in psychological theories, suggest aspects 
to phenomena that might promote further studies. A surview provides one of 
the most obvious points at which one can cross from philosophy to work 
within a kind of conceptually-oriented approach within psychology (such as, 
in this case, the broad topic of personal reflexivity and emotion). Moreover, 
its purpose is not to describe the point at which differences between 
potentially competing approaches arise. The key point to recognize about a 
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surview is that it is between philosophy and psychology rather than wholly 
within one practice. It is contributed towards by both practices and either 
provides the basis from which further work may flow or, at other times, 
functions as a resource that psychologists may return to for clarification and 
important reminders of cultural and linguistic detail. 
Metatheoretical description of a domain of investigation such as 
studies of personal reflexivity and emotion does, of course, provide an 
agenda that any self-respecting theoretician will feel compelled to address. 
But perhaps the most important point to emerge from this Wittgensteinian 
clarification of the traditional aim of reflexive studies in psychology is that it 
not only challenges but reverses an implicit notion of levels. For example, in 
contrast to accounts of levels within psychology such as that offered by 
Rosenthal (1976), the interest for Wittgensteinians is not in problems that 
occur "at the highest level of generality" in which "differences in 
interpretation are nothing more than differences in theoretical positions" (p. 
17). Applying this view to the attempt to provide a critical study of personal 
reflexivity and emotion, Rosenthal's remarks imply that a surview of pride 
provides bottom-level data which can be explained by an appropriate theory 
(or theories). In an extension of a point by Shotter (1992), I argue that talk of 
levels is a salient example of a debate "within which we have ensnared 
ourselves in our academic thought about ourselves and our psychology" (p. 
66). The Wittgensteinian alternative is that a comprehensive conceptually-
sensitive survey of the everyday detail of people's lives should have 
precedence over the theories drawn from this resource. 
In summary, because new forms of critical and theoretical psychology 
draw on philosophy and the practices of psychology they may appear 
capable of solving any problems in an autonomous manner (Le., by the use 
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of their own or usurped methods and philosophical remarks). However, 
psychologists whose reflexive work leads to theoretical psychology may find 
themselves positioned outside psychology by both philosophers and 
mainstream psychologists. Moreover, it can be argued that theoretical 
psychology does not connect with potential sources of clarification in 
philosophy or applications in psychology. But one of the important tasks of 
theoretical psychology has been to argue for less theory in the discipline, a 
point which is also reflected in the fact that reflexive work in psychology 
does not aim only to propose yet another theory. Shotter's remarks on the 
alternative use of Wittgenstein-inspired methods of "social poetics" were 
examined in order to highlight some similarities between his anti-theoretical 
account and the notion of a surview. However, while it was argued that a 
Wittgensteinian position reverses our understanding of the relations 
between theory and data, suggesting instead a more reflexive and 
dialogical approach, the methods of his philosophy should not replace 
existing theoretical and empirical work. Attention then turned to the notion 
of metatheoretical description and Kemper's account of a synoptic view of 
the differences between theories. I argued that although a surview may 
provide the basis for specific theories, reflexive work should not aim to 
produce a to and fro movement between metatheory and theory. By 
replacing levels of theory and data with a surview account, it is possible that 
a surview of psychological concepts can provide the "substantive core" of a 
study from which multidisciplinary theories may be derived without being 
considered as the "lower level" of data to be explained. 
1.3 The .role and status of a Wittgensteinian 
survlew 
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A Wittgensteinian treatment of metapsychology and metatheory can be used 
to identify correctly the way in which Wittgenstein's remarks can contribute to 
clarification of psychology's problems. In particular, the aim is to examine 
whether our recognition of reflexive issues in psychology should lead to 
attempts to achieve a Wittgensteinian descriptive surview: that is, in order to 
remove problems within psychology that do not arise "out of any lack of 
empirical knowledge, but out of 'painful contradictions' in our ways of 
representing such knowledge to ourselves" (Shotter, 1991, p. 196; Baker 
and Hacker, 1985). This section uses Wittgenstein's notion of a surview to 
inform our understanding of self-conscious attempts to fashion "new 
paradigm" work within psychology. In addition, it counters the problems of 
pursuing "complete" psychological theories with an account of the 
importance of achieving a pretheoretical surview. Thus while some 
accounts of psychological reflexivity, its consequences and limits have been 
clarified from a Wittgensteinian perspective, there is still considerable scope 
for confusion about the,potential contribution of Wittgenstein's philosophy to 
psychology. 
Wittgenstein's notion of a surview and "new paradigm" work in 
psychology 
The notion of a synoptic view, ubersicht or surview is not only useful in the 
philosophy of social science (see Baker & Hacker, 1985), but is also a 
central concept in Wittgenstein's treatment of psychological phenomena. To 
this point, descriptions of the synoptic nature of Wittgensteinian 
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philosophical inquiry has already been contrasted with general theorizing 
and used to show why "outside" philosophical remarks should not be 
subsumed by self-critical social science. Moreover, Wittgensteinian remarks 
by Baker and Hacker (1985) again demonstrated the difficulty of deciding 
where the line should be drawn between philosophical work and potentially 
integrative, creative work within the social sciences. In this section, the goal 
of attaining a surview is contrasted with the attempts of social 
constructionists and evolutionary psychologists to fashion a "new paradigm" 
of psychological studies (Buss, 1995; Harre & Gillett, 1994; Parker, 1989; 
Shotter, 1991, 1996). 
Kuhn's (1970) notion of a paradigm has considerable appeal to 
psychologists whose recognition of psychological reflexivity drives the 
production of new discursive approaches, insights and methods. As Parker 
(1989) notes: 
. . . critics of traditional laboratory-experimental social 
psychology a decade and a half ago actually used the terms 
'old paradigm', 'new paradigm', and 'paradigm shift' self-
consciously as rhetorical constructions. (p. 12) 
The term "paradigm" is used not to describe some ideal state for 
psychology, but is instead used to challenge traditional views of the nature 
of changes in psychology with the aim of eventually realizing a whole new 
position (Le., especially where one's work is described as "new paradigm"). 
Interestingly, Wittgenstein seemed to consider seriously a paradigm-like 
account of psychology: either that or his remarks pre-empt a paradigm 
account of the discipline's failings while they emphasize the failure of 
positivists and empiricists to solve important problems. For in a quotation 
that has already mentioned, Wittgenstein remarked that "the confusion and 
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barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a "young 
science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its 
beginnings" (PI, xiv, p. 232). Wittgenstein's account contrasts with 
contemporary attempts to claim that the problems of psychology are the 
result of its "pre-paradigmatic" status akin to the beginning of physics 
(Staats, 1991). It does not imply that multidisciplinary studies of emotion, for 
example, are just another aspect of "the present period of deconstruction, in 
which no paradigm is credible as more worthy than another" (Kemper, 1990, 
p. 22). Rather, Wittgenstein suggests that a different means of attaining 
conceptual clarity has to be found. 
But given the necessity of working within language, should reflexive 
work attempt to represent clearly our cultural and linguistic practices with a 
surview? We might also ask whether social constructionists have 
equivocated the aim of producing non-theoretical, descriptive work and the 
different goals of contributors to "new paradigm" research? These issues 
can be clarified by examining contemporary remarks about "new paradigm" 
studies in psychology and comparisons with work from "other" and "older" 
paradigms. To delimit this task, remarks that are relevant to studies of 
personal reflexivity and emotion will be examined in the hope that they are 
representative and refer to a central debate in psychology. Thus although a 
more comprehensive account of paradigm differences might have included 
older biologically-oriented emotion studies and work from cognitive science, 
the analysis will focus on social constructionism and evolutionary 
psychology (mainly because the former can be taken to include cognitive 
psychology in its account of the "second cognitive revolution" (Harre and 
Gillet, 1994»). 
The appeal of the paradigm account is that it suggests a "gestalt", a 
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whole that can be known in broad aspects that are different theories (Le., 
amounting to something like Buss' (1978) contradictory positions on 
personal reflexivity (see section 1.2)). Parker (1989) suggests that the 
notion of a gestalt is usually described in terms of the: 
. . . perceptual metaphor of the gestalt switch [which is] 
designed to sell the idea of 'paradigmsl in science. You are 
often, in this literature, invited to collude in a little experiment 
which will confirm a particular model of science and even flatter 
you into believing that you too are a (na'ive) scientist: you see a 
duck which changes magically into a rabbit and back again. In 
reality, of course, this model of change is too 'free-flowing and it 
needs to be supplemented with an account of the constraints 
which hold interpretations of a figure as duck or rabbit in place; 
the 'disciplinary matrix' of the paradigm, perhaps, that Kuhn 
(1970) describes. (p. 12, brackets added) 
Parker correctly recognizes that the problem is not merely one of explaining 
individual psychologist's experiences of perceptual shifts when changing 
from one paradigm to another (Le., because he emphasizes broader 
constraints). It is perhaps better, then, to extend Wittgenstein's duck-rabbit 
problem (PI, IIxi, p. 194) to understand how we view the mutually exclusive 
theories and paradigms which contain such theory-informed, observational 
"gestalt switches": in other words, to regard paradigms as contrasting, 
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organized impositions on a whole that we cannot get outside of (Le., it is 
impossible to see the whole of the evidence "in itself" or to use a clear-cut 
empirical test to decide between competing paradigms). With regard to the 
aims of this thesis, accounts of emotion that place contrasting emphases on 
discourse or cognition can be described as a field within psychology "where 
two (or more) competing theories will both (or all) remain epistemically 
viable in the face of the total 'evidence'" (Greenwood, 1991, p. 104). Thus 
we see the "whole" of people's emotions and their reactions toward them 
through the concepts of social constructionism or evolutionary psychology 
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but never as they really are in some mythical, non paradigm-informed 
reality. 
However, there is a clearly a tension between the description of 
social constructionism as a "new paradigm" and recognition that the "whole" 
of psychological concepts and their circumstances cannot be known in its 
entirety by theory. Wittgenstein's notion of a surview has informed some of 
the seminal work in the "new paradigm" such as Harre's (1986) social 
constructionist work on emotion, to the extent that he suggests that a survey 
of cognitive and moral language-games needs to be carried out before 
biological studies (see the previous section for an alternative interpretation). 
Evolutionary psychologists, in contrast, would probably argue that the "old 
paradigm" biological studies that Harre attempted to replace are "new" in a 
manner that directly competes with social constructionism. It is tempting to 
view social constructionist and evolutionary accounts of emotion as different 
paradigms that have led to different treatments of such obviously human, 
linguistic and cultural phenomena as pride, shame and guilt. Of course, the 
aim here is not to speculate on how the form of psychology and its theories 
of emotion would have been quite different if "instead of focusing on such 
'bodily' emotions as anger and fear, we focused instead on such intellectual 
emotions as hope and pride" (Averill, 1992, p. 4)7. But it is important to ask 
whether there is any useful Wittgensteinian approach to this debate. 
In reply, it seems reasonable to think that Oatley (1993), in particular, 
is closer than most social constructionists to realizing that the "gestalt" upon 
which broad theories are imposed is a surview. Nevertheless, he obviously 
7 Averill's (1992) point here also raises the question of the connection between such an 
intellectual emotion as hope and the importance placed on personal reflexivity. For the 
moment, it may be said that although hope is not a "reflexive emotion" it may still be an object 
of self-control or, in other situations, self-created by earlier choices and commitments (which 
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finds it difficult to resist adopting a similar picture to the paradigm account of 
what it is required to attain "the whole" against which competing theories 
can then be compared: 
One would have to judge from a much wider gestalt of evidence 
on emotions. This gestalt has not yet been fully defined, nor 
has it been subjected to detailed scrutiny from different points of 
view. (p.342) 
The emphasis on points of view is similar to the notion that one may 
organize particular parts of this gestalt in accordance with particular 
techniques and possible lines of research. But what social constructionists 
attempt to achieve should not be called a broad theoretical "aspect" of a 
. whole, since this view implies that there is no point at which both positions 
have some concepts in common. 
From a Wittgensteinian perspective, Oatley provides a worthwhile 
contribution to this debate with the following observation: 
... although arguments from either side of a social-biological 
divide can readily be found, they are often based either on 
evidence that is ambiguous, or on different working definitions 
of emotion (which will then relate to different kinds of 
evidence). (p. 34'1) 
Oatley's account is relevant to the critical study of personal reflexivity and 
emotion because he notes how emotions can be treated in different ways by 
social constructionist and biological-evolutionary accounts of emotion. The 
problem with the social constructionist account of emotion, in particular, 
attaining a gestalt is that it is "usually contrasted with biological accounts in 
which universality is asserted, and continuities of adult emotions with those 
then raises the issue of whether people find it important to predict and control in advance 
emotions that they could have). 
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of nonhuman animals and with those of childhood are pointed out" (p. 341). 
Interestingly, these experiences can be described as forms of "seeing as" to 
social constructionists - akin to the duck-rabbit example - which 
evolutionary psychologists instead "take as" evidence of our evolutionary 
past (see chapter 3, section 3.3). Furthermore, Oatley concurs with the 
extension of the duck-rabbit account to paradigms themselves when he 
suggests that "one way to see these two approaches is as different theories 
in competition: either emotions are social constructed or they are biological" 
(p.341). 
However, since an evolutionary-biological account of personal 
reflexivity and emotion is clearly unfeasible - at least where it results in 
what Dennett (1995) terms "greedy reductionism" - it is appropriate to 
agree with Oatley's metatheoretical scepticism "as to whether this is a viable 
way of proceeding at our present level of understanding" (p. 341). Oatley's 
view is also endorsed because his emphasis on personal reflexivity and 
emotion is not regarded as an aspect of a gestalt. In other words, emotion 
accounts that emphasize personal reflexivity are not viewed as theories in 
direct competition with other, perhaps exclusive, evolutionary-biological 
accounts. Moreover, if the social constructionist account of emotion is 
methodologically true to Wittgenstein's philosophy, the outcome should not 
be a theory 'that competes against its biological counterpart. Perhaps 
because social constructionism is so often connected with Wittgenstein's 
form of philosophical description, it is not surprising for Oatley (1993) to 
admit that "social constructionism is at present an approach to 
understanding emotions rather than a theory, though the approach does 
contain some fully developed theories of aspects of emotion" (p. 351; some 
of these fully developed theories from a Wittgensteinian surview will be 
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examined in the next section}. 
Where social constructionism is connected with Wittgenstein's notion 
of a surview, it should not be regarded as part of a rival paradigm to that of 
the evolutionary~biological perspective. The aim of Wittgenstein's remarks 
is to attain a perspicuous representation of the ordinary use and 
surroundings of person and emotion concepts (not to do the work of 
psychology). More specifically, the nature and limits of Wittgenstein's 
contribution need to be clarified simply because Oatley hints at the 
alternative basis for limited theory construction that Wittgenstein offers. 
Since it has been admitted that social constructionism is not a theory, then it 
can reasonably be said to be a perspective on persons and emotion that 
approximates a surview but does not entirely achieve it. But what prevents 
social constructionism from achieving a surview? One answer is that social 
constructionists have been misled by talk of offering a rival paradigm, in part 
because they share the same desire as evolutionary~biological theorists to 
offer a complete account (see next section). Oatley's account not only 
unsettles the paradigm account of competing theories but also highlights the 
motivation behind Harre's (1986) remark that "pride is another puzzling 
emotion, at least if one tries to understand it within the old paradigm" (p. 9). 
In attempting to achieve a reflexive study of the group of emotions 
and types of personal activities that pride represents, it is appropriate to deal 
with this issue by showing on what grounds misleading aspects of the 
biological theory must be avoided. For example, Harre's (1986) 
presentation of social constructionism implies that a survey of everyday 
emotion practices and language must be carried out before the work of 
biological theorists can proceed. But in contrast to Shotter's (1996) more 
extreme view, it seems clear that the philosophical errors of evolutionary~ 
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biological theorists can be explored from a surview without throwing out all 
existing biological studies or making a surview of psychological concepts a 
methodological prerequisite for neurophysiological studies. Otherwise the 
result would be to commit us to a new insular perspective without giving any 
priority to the task of reinterpreting existing studies of the same or similar 
psychological phenomena. 
In this section, an attempt was made to provide a Wittgensteinian 
treatment of the view that there is a domain, a whole of the reality of forms of 
personal reflexivity and emotion, that is organized into mutually exclusive 
social constructionist and evolutionary paradigms. An account of social 
constructionism was presented which suggested that it approximates a 
Wittgensteinian surview of psychological concepts. While a surview should 
not be thought to provide a methodological prerequisite for specific 
empirical work in psychology, it may nevertheless provide a resource that 
reminds both social constructionist and evolutionary-biological accounts of 
features of personal reflexivity and emotion that might otherwise be 
overlooked. This is particularly important when the narrow pursuit of 
particular research within a theoretical position leads to a loss of judgement 
about emotions as meaningful phenomena in the lives of different peoples. 
The limits of "complete" theories in psychology 
Wittgenstein's remarks can be used to philosophize against forms of 
contradictory organization of knowledge that are the product of 
inappropriate forms of theoretical completion. More specifically, describing 
a surview as an integrated theoretical (and possibly interdisciplinary) survey 
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does not achieve the clarity that Wittgenstein envisaged because of the 
importance of contributing towards the "new paradigm". The Wittgenstein-
inspired approach towards personal reflexivity and emotion through pride 
provides such a surview in Part 2. However, before detailing what a 
comprehensive, pretheoretical surview will look like, it is important to 
examine some of the limits on "complete" theorizing about psychological 
phenomena. For example, Averill (1992) presents a metatheoretical view 
that it is important to focus on social, psychological, and biological "levels" of 
emotion because "any analysis that remains on only one level must ... be 
incomplete" (p. 20). However, Averill's account begs the more general 
question of whether there is a Wittgensteinian perspective that might 
connect with scepticism within psychology about such a "complete" theory. 
It has been argued that the relevance of Wittgenstein's philosophy to 
psychology is the potential to describe the whole of a surveyed domain of 
psychological grammar before being distracted by the specific views, 
different techniques, contrasting evidence and meta-theoretical 
commitments of competing but ultimately "incomplete" psychological 
theories. While it is important to examine the detailed support and 
techniques that lead one position to be preferred over another, a 
metatheoretical solution may only be found - as strange as it sounds - by 
challenging the need to achieve completeness. Since Wittgenstein's aim is 
not to contribute towards an established form of theoretical organization, a 
surview represents language use in practices that constitute our social and 
personal "worlds", Wittgenstein confirms this in a remark that extends the 
surview account of the previous section: 
The treatment of all these phenomena of mental life is not of 
importance to me because I am keen on completeness. Rather 
because each one casts light on the correct treatment of all. (Z, 
§465) 
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More specifically, the example of emotion is appropriate because of the 
recognition that it is now an interdisciplinary pursuit and, as a result, it is 
unlikely that the methods of one particular area will achieve a synoptic view 
of them all. However, some crucial qualifications need to be made in order 
to understand the role of a surview and how it contrasts with the results of 
interdisciplinary, theoretical integration. 
But surely there is no relevant Wittgensteinian treatment of personal 
reflexivity and emotion that attends to this issue of forms of theoretical 
"completion"? Surprisingly, Wittgenstein does investigate this issue by 
asking the question of how one may attain "'expert judgement' about the 
genuineness of expressions of feeling" (PI, p. 227). The example not only 
implies different cultural forms of personal reflexivity and emotion but also 
suggests that individuals need to be able to make appropriate judgements 
about what Rosenberg (1990) terms the "reflexive phenomenon" of acting. 
The Wittgensteinian point is that in cases such as judging a false or true 
case of a particular emotion in another culture, "correcter prognoses will 
generally issue from the judgments of those with a better knowledge of 
mankind" (PI, p. 227). And it is obvious that such knowledge would not be 
learned by taking a course or even learning a particular theory. Moreover, it 
may only be approximated, for example, by reading about the travel 
experiences of other people or by watching a wide variety of films from 
countries that we would not otherwise encounter. For that reason, it would 
be difficult to describe the collection of such experiences as forming a 
system or as amenable to explanation by one theory. 
However, it is not inconsistent for Wittgenstein to note that some 
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individuals can learn this knowledge and, moreover, that an individual may 
be someone else's teacher in imparting such knowledge. Wittgenstein's 
primary aim is to dislodge the notion that there are "techniques" to be 
learned and a complete system to be discovered (PI, p. 227). In contrast, 
Averi"'s (1992) contemporary account of emotion attempts to survey the type 
of levels that must be included if an account is not to be incomplete. 
Interestingly, one consequence of this approach is that it wi" "highlight gaps 
in our current efforts" and show that "some variables have received relatively 
little attention compared to others" (p. 1). The difficulty facing psychologists 
and other social scientists is that these judgements do not form a complete 
system of rules as in, for example, the practices of mathematics. 
Wittgenstein therefore concludes that in learning the practice of judging the 
genuineness of emotions "there are also rules, but they do not form a 
system, and only experienced people can apply them right" (PI, p. 227). 
This point not only demonstrates an important disanalogy between 
mathematics and psychology, but also place a crucial in principle limit on 
any atternpts to provide a complete account of personal reflexivity and 
emotion. 
The analogous point here is that a comprehensive account or surview 
of emotion need not be a complete theory although there are certainly 
worthwhile attempts to represent the entire domain of emotion studies (e.g., 
for the purposes of predicting possible novel directions for research; see 
chapter 2, section 2.2.3). For example, while the complicated phenomena 
that fa" within the purview of Rosenberg's (1990) broad account of retlexivity 
and emotion cannot be represented as a complete system of rules that can 
be taught to someone else, the theory seems to offer genuine insights (ct. 
Kaplan's (1986) social psychology of self-referential behaviour). However, 
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the distinction between reflexive agency and reflexive cognition does little to 
provide convincing detail (and also highlight the limits of our forms of 
personal reflexivity). More importantly, many of the examples in 
Rosenberg's analysis bear a striking resemblance to the discussion of 
problems about first-person psychological concepts that constitute 
Wittgenstein's "Private Language Argument" (Baker & Hacker, 1985). 
"Private Language Argument" is presented in quotation marks because it 
can be argued that many of the remarks that constitute it, as well as the 
preceding sections on rules and rule-following, are the result of a careful 
and detailed survey that is designed to remove philosophical errors, many of 
which are reinforced by pictures contained in our linguistic expressions. 
Rosenberg's theory is, accordingly, what would be expected from a 
theory that integrates others and can be contrasted with other approaches 
such as social constructionism. It does not, however, resemble a surview 
because it collects together a variety of theories and studies of the fully 
developed type that Oatley (1993) suggested can be found in social 
constructionism, some of which may have been inspired by Wittgenstein's 
remarks on rules and rule-following (e.g., work on displays rules or, in 
contrast, Schachter and Singer's (1962) account of the interpretation of 
rules to identify emotions which is a precursor of more complicated cognitive 
theories). Moreover, it is possible for a complete account of emotion and 
personal reflexivity also to include fully-developed attribution theories 
covering pride, shame and guilt (Weiner, 1986) and studies of how 
individuals actively create or maintain their own self-esteem (e.g., Wells & 
Marwell (1976)). Examining all of these theories and some of their 
connections to Wittgenstein's remarks would not, of course, remove the 
conceptual entanglements they contain. Instead, it is sufficient to note that 
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while theoretical integration works toward the aim of offering a complete 
theory, there is no guarantee that it will attain conceptual clarity. 
In this regard, a comprehensive surview is better than a general and 
complete theory of personal reflexivity that operates through broad 
categories and attempts at generalization. The fact that many of the more 
specific theories demonstrate some connection with Wittgenstein's remarks 
on rules, rule-following and the possibility of a private language reinforces 
the importance of attaining a surview. Moreover, it provides some insights 
into Wittgenstein's general criticism of inappropriate and IIfalsifying" 
accounts of psychological phenomena which can be dismissed by 
"renouncing all theory" and coming to IIregard what appears obviously 
incomplete, as something complete" (RPP I, §723; PI, p. 227). Wittgenstein 
implies that a mastery of theory-based rules, concepts and categories 
cannot substitute for the experience of applying particular concepts and 
making appropriate judgements in everyday practice. A surview draws out 
the background of concepts that are used without reflection and heralds this 
achievement with the acknowledgement that even "the most general 
remarks yield at best what looks like the fragments of a system" (PI, p. 228). 
What Wittgenstein's method shows is that theories organize and "complete" 
remarks that should be left incomplete if the aim is to achieve clarity (see 
chapter 3 for a criticism of Shotter's interpretation and application of 
Wittgenstein's supposedly "atheoretical" approach to psychology). 
In this section, the limits on complete theories in psychology were 
examined using an example that resembles the central focus of 
Rosenberg's (1990) theory of personal reflexivity and emotion. In particular, 
Wittgenstein's remarks about '''expert judgement' about the genuineness of 
expressions of feeling" provide a different treatment of cases that Rosenberg 
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would redescribe as forms of "re'I:lexive agency". Wittgenstein's point that 
such remarks do not form a system also highlights an important disanalogy 
between psychology and mathematics. The fact that Rosenberg's account 
also includes philosophical errors that Wittgenstein addressed in remarks 
on rules, rule-following and the possibility of a private language, is further 
support for the importance of achieving a surview. Finally, where theoretical 
integration seems to provide one means of achieving a complete account, 
Wittgenstein suggests that it is important to avoid completing by theory what 
seems "obviously incomplete". 
The importance of achieving a comprehensive pretheoretical 
surview 
In an early remark on the need for a surview of psychological concepts, 
Wittgenstein remarked: "I strive not after exactness, but after a synoptic 
view" (Z, §464; although it should be noted that Wittgenstein's initial plan of 
a genealogical tree for the treatment of psychological concepts (Z, §472) 
looks distinctly Cartesian before its subsequent abandonment). It is obvious 
from the treatment of completion and theories in the previous section that 
there are undoubtedly many other criteria on wrlich Wittgenstein's 
philosophy and modern psychology part company. Nevertheless, achieving 
a comprehensive surview is useful for psychology as is evident from 
attempts to make Wittgenstein's remarks and methods part of a new 
psychology (Harre, 1989; Shotter, 1991, 1992b, 1996; Shotter & Katz, 
1996). In this final section of chapter 1, the reasons why it is important to 
attain a comprehensive pretheoretical surview are detailed as a prelude to 
the work on pride in Part 2. 
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A comprehensive sLirview is not an integrated theory even though the 
impetus towards the attainment of such a "synopsis of trivialities" (Shotter & 
Katz, 1996) often comes from dissatisfaction with the variety of conflicting 
theories and empirical studies in psychology. Similarly, even though the 
collection of ordinary examples of the use of psychological concepts may 
seem to resemble an empirical method, it is not the case that every collected 
example should be regarded as a fact that needs to be explained. As Baker 
and Hacker (1985) note: 
... the outcome of a surview of a segment of grammar is not a 
theory (a 'theory of truth' or a 'theory of mind' in philosophy is 
nonsense) nor an explanation. (p. 545) 
In this case, the survey of pride which is used to counter the conceptual 
confusions contained in Rosenberg's (1990) and others' theories is not a 
replacement for those theories. Thus the product of a comprehensive 
conceptual-discursive survey of pride is not a theory of pride and provides 
detail that cannot be explained by a general theory of emotion. 
However, the results of the surview in Part 2 are described as 
pretheoretical rather than nontheoretical because they represent concepts 
that must be mastered before any theory can be constructed. Moreover, in 
contrast to Shotter and Katz's (1996) position, there is considerable 
potential for a surview to connect with specific instances of theoretical and 
empirical work in particular disciplines; that is, with tlie purpose of informing 
those debates through the detail of psychological discourse and disabusing 
theoreticians of misleading pictures of phenomena. The argument that 
Wittgenstein's methods provide an atheoretical alternative to existing and 
possible theories fails to recognize those situations in which a particular 
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theory should be retained for pragmatic reasons. The notion of a 
pretheoretical surview also highlights the fact that the sUbtleties and 
intricacies of the examples surveyed are not informed by eXisting theories in 
psychology (although, as indicated in chapter 3, people's talk about 
psychological matters in Western culture is often informed by particular 
theories and concepts). Instead, it is simply a presentation of the detail of 
people's everyday lives and the complex activities and practices in which 
we, sometimes self-consciously, perform with the words, concepts, 
narratives and vocabularies at our disposal. 
The surview of pride is as comprehensive as any other survey of a 
psychological concept, but not because it is concerned with grammatical 
and discursive minutiae. Rather, some of the reasons for a wide ranging 
surview are indicated by the following quotation from Hacker (1996): 
The mastery of our psychological vocabulary involves neither 
homespun philosophy nor psychological theory. The 
suppositions underlying this picture involve a profound 
misconstrual of the role of psychological predicates (vaguely 
circumscribed as that category is) in human life, of their logical 
character, and of the grammatical nature of both first-person 
present-tense uses of these expressions and of third-person 
uses. (pp.414-415) 
The interconnected cluster of concepts surrounding pride is used to 
highlight important, unexamined features of our psychological vocabulary. 
And as Hacker suggests, it is important to examine more than first person 
and third person singular cases. Accordingly, the use of the words "pride", 
"proud" and related expressions are examined in all possible pronominal 
forms in Part 2. In this respect, it resembles MOhlhaOsler and Harre's (1990) 
interdisciplinary study of persons and pronouns, although it should be noted 
that the chapters of Part 2 are grouped according to pronominal structure 
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rather than contemporary disciplinary demarcations (i.e., because a surview 
is a description of a normative conceptual structure that is antecedent to the 
concerns of particular disciplines). Although examples such as "they are a 
proud race" might seem to be superl:luous to a psychological investigation, a 
representation of the everyday use of what shall be called social concepts 
can provide many insights into the relations between individuals and 
collectives (see chapter 2, section 2.1 for consideration of related 
ontological issues and Part 2, chapter 5). 
The philosophical task of attaining a surview of a particular fragment 
of grammar is described by Wittgenstein as the attempt to represent the 
relations between concepts and overlapping families of cases that often 
form a "complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: 
sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail" (PI, §66). 
Wittgenstein's argument is that it is difficult to represent language as a 
whole without the further task of examining specific "grammars" or clusters 
of related expressions. Baker and Hacker (1985) clarify many of the 
philosophical issues raised by the notion of a surview (e.g., such as 
similarities and differences with scientific theories). However, arguments for 
the importance of attaining a surview are more likely to come from 
psychologists adopting social constructionist and related conceptual-
discursive approaches rather than philosophers. For example, Shotter and 
Katz (1996) argue that it establishes "a knitting together of all the details and 
subtleties into a great overall network of possible concrete ways of 'going 
on'" (p. 232). Although the work of Part 2 can only hint at the likelihood of a 
similar outcome for an investigation of other emotions, some comparisons 
and connections between pride, shame, love and other emotions are 
included. Moreover, the fact that examples can be derived from the work of 
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philosophers, psychologists, other social scientists, artists and ordinary 
people is less important than their use in clearly representing distinctions, 
subtleties and background practices which we might otherwise overlook. 
In this section, some of the reasons why it is important to achieve a 
comprehensive surview of psychological concepts were contrasted with the 
ubiquitous interest in theory construction. The comprehensiveness of the 
synoptic view of language is different from the results of an interdisciplinary 
investigation. A surview is also pretheoretical rather than atheoretical 
because it may inspire or need to engage with multidisciplinary theories of a 
particular psychological phenomenon. In this respects, Wittgenstein's 
restricted interest in first person and third person singular uses of 
psychological concepts was extended to 'first person and third person plural 
examples, thus creating an additional interest in the use of "social concepts". 
The comprehensive survey of pride therefore has a structure that is 
pronominal rather discipline-based. 
Sumnla.ry 
In Chapter 1, an account of the limits and consequences of psychological 
reflexivity was presented. The first section examined the similarities 
between psychological reflexivity and aspects of the reflexivity that are the 
result of the "turn to language" in postmodern philosophy. Wittgenstein's 
later philosophy was distinguished from more extreme forms of reflexivity 
that occur in postmodernism and further distinguished from psychological 
reflexivity. A general consideration of reflexive work in the social sciences 
suggested that an outside role needs to be retained for philosophy (I.e., 
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rather than view Wittgenstein's philosophy as super-scientific theorizing or 
allow his remarks and methods to be subsumed by self-critical social 
science). Moreover, although aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy are 
similar to the results of reflexive work in psychology, it is important to retain 
an understanding of the differences between philosophy and psychology. 
Thus subsuming Wittgenstein's later remarks and methods within 
psychology does not rule out the possibility of future Wittgensteinian 
critiques and reconsiderations of "new paradigm" studies. 
Wittgensteinian points about the relations between philosophy and 
psychology derived from "entirely analogous" earlier work on mathematics 
were also extended to address further reflexive issues. Wittgenstein's game 
analogy and remarks on rules were used to address contemporary issues 
about the limits of reflexive psychological studies, including possible 
connections with Wittgenstein's philosophy and any effects on the 
discipline's practices. The role and status of theoretical psychology and 
metatheoretical description were also examined with respect to 
psychological reflexivity. While it was argued that a comprehensive surview 
can inform metatheoretical issues, it is important that the central role of 
theory construction in psychology is questioned (otherwise the results of a 
surview would be seen as bottom-level empirical data to be explained by a 
theory). Moreover, when reflexive work leads psychologists to try to attain a 
surview, it is important to resist being positioned by philosophers and 
mainstream psychologists into a theoretical hinterland (Le., one removed 
both from any potential application as well as further philosophical 
clarification). 
It is also important to recognize that philosophers and psychologists 
are the primary contributors to a comprehensive surview of psychological 
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concepts and it is not formed for the purposes of producing a complete, 
integrated and interdisciplinary theory (Le., even though a surview may 
inspire different multidisciplinary investigations). While in this case the 
surview is achieved by examining the detail of pride and is used to counter 
conceptual confusions in existing theories of emotion and personal 
reflexivity, it should not be regarded as a form of philosophical psychology. 
The resulting surview is pretheoretical because it describes psychological 
concepts that need to be mastered in everyday practices before we can 
construct theories about specific psychological phenomena. A surview also 
provides the basis for potential multidisciplinary theoretical and empirical 
work, as well as a resource to counter the confusions that such 
investigations will inevitably generate. Thus even though some have used 
Wittgenstein's remarks and methods for the purposes of doing work within 
psychology, a surview does not compete directly against or replace the 
theories and methods of particular disciplines. 
CHAPTER 2: A Wittgensteinian account of 




Wittgenstein's philosophical method and the attempt to achieve a surview 
have been distinguished from the results of interdisciplinary theoretical 
integration and completion. Perhaps because of the similarities between 
reflexivity in postmodern philosophy and already examined forms of 
psychological reflexivity, parts of Wittgenstein's work appear to provide a 
type of reflexive, second-order investigation for psychology. Shotter 
(1992b), for example, describes the relevance of Wittgenstein's remarks and 
methods as precipitating a move from metatheoretical to 
metamethodological concerns. More specifically, Shotter and Katz (1996) 
argue that types of Wittgensteinian practice can be inserted into psychology 
in manner that is "beside" - and therefore in competition with - existing 
methods. While it is sympathetic to Shotter's view, the position developed 
here uses Wittgenstein's remarks to address further consequences and 
limits of reflexive work within psychology; in particular, to draw out debates 
between social constructionists and their realist-cognitive critics for 
Wittgensteinian consideration. 
Wittgensteinian remarks on the social constructionist and realist-
cognitive treatment of further reflexive issues in psychology are addressed 
in the following manner. Section 2.1 examines objections to the use and 
limits of a Wittgensteinian conceptual-discursive investigation in psychology. 
This section criticizes the tempting view that Wittgensteinian philosophy 
offers a kind of second-order methodology for revealing and avoiding 
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problems in psychology. The advantages and limits of conceptual-
discursive studies are also examined in relation to more traditional 
psychological approaches. Section 2.2 strengthens the presentation of a 
Wittgensteinian reconsideration of reflexivity by clarifying some of the 
pictures and problems surrounding the use of psychological methods (e.g., 
to reveal an objective and independent psychological reality). The main 
question to be examined is whether psychological phenomena have an 
independent existence even though they presuppose an interdependent 
language. This issue is relevant to a critical treatment of the view that many 
forms of personal, reflexive and emotional activity are dependent on and 
constructed by language. Section 2.3 examines the social constructionist 
ontology and specific talk of levels within psychology. In contrast to broad 
presentations of the realist-social constructionist debate, the status of 
discoveries of structures and processes that are hidden from our ordinary 
talk and practices is addressed. The aim is to provide a detailed account of 
the way in which conceptual-discursive investigation can help to decide 
whether talk of new objects or levels of phenomena should be challenged. 
2.1 Wittgenstein's philosophy and the role of 
conceptual-discursive investigation in 
psychology 
Wittgenstein's philosophy has been introduced as postmodern and reflexive 
in the sense that it works within language to highlight important features of 
our cultural and linguistic practices. Wittgenstein's rejection of his earlier 
philosophy shows that metalogical perspectives, pictures and ideals require 
philosophical treatment because they are ungrammatical, nonsensical and 
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unattainable (Le., where "metaiogical" means a perspective that uses 
language in its attempt to stand outside language and describe the 
foundations of grammar or logic). But while it is not necessary to work 
through all of the related philosophical points inspired, for example, by the 
related "urge to understand the basis, or essence, of everything empirical" 
(PI, §89), it is important to examine some of the more specific reasons why 
Wittgenstein argued that is extremely difficult to represent grammar from 
within. Further implications of Wittgenstein's later philosophy will then be 
addressed through an examination of conceptual-discursive responses to 
more specific reflexive issues in psychology. 
Wittgenstein's method and the difficulty of representing 
"grammar" 
Wittgenstein's method for representing the grammar of psychological 
concepts acknowledges that there is no position outside language from 
which the relations between words and the world can be viewed. 
Wittgenstein recognized in his later work that we must work within grammar 
to represent the words and rules governing their use that create what will 
count as particular phenomena; that is, "grammar tells us what kind of 
object anything is" (PI, §373). However, a detailed account of what a 
grammatical investigation is, especially in relation to conceptual 
investigations in philosophical psychology (e.g., Budd (1989)), will not be 
provided. It is more important to examine how Wittgenstein rejected the 
notion of an outside view - as a prelude to a treatment of realist 
misconceptions of a similar social constructionist argument - and then to 
address the issue of why it is so difficult to represent our psychological 
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concepts. 
Recognition that all investigations work within the bounds of grammar 
may sound as if Wittgenstein's position has consequences for psychology 
that many would rather ignore. The confusion surrounding the notion of 
grammar which can be defined as the rules that govern the use of 
concepts and thus can be said to form the possibilities of language - is not 
cleared by many of Wittgenstein's poorly defined and even contradictory 
statements. For example, Wittgenstein suggests at one point that grammar 
is autonomous (Baker & Hacker, 1985) and, at another, that it is arbitrary (PI, 
§497). However, Baker and Hacker (1983) offer some initial clarification: 
Although it lacks features of both content and form that typify 
system-building, the Investigations is not a random collection 
of remarks without internal unity. Rather the source of its unit is 
in its method, The aim is always to generate an Obersicht of 
parts of the grammar of language that give rise to puzzlement, 
and the method is to explore and describe the criterion of 
understanding the relevant expressions (or kinds of 
expressions). (p. 368) 
Baker and Hacker's remarks help to establish connections between an 
investigation of grammar and notion of a surview in chapter. 1, but it still 
remains to detail why it is so difficult to represent grammar and how 
Wittgenstein's method (or methods) help. 
An understanding of the difficulty of working within grammar to reveal 
important features of language and concept use can be improved by 
contrasting the later philosophy with the earlier perspective of the Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus. The Tractatus is metalogical in the sense that it aims 
to get outside language to examine the nature of the logical correspondence 
of words with reality (even though, paradoxically. this task requires 
language). An crippling problem with Wittgenstein's earlier position was the 
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difficulty of reconciling the view that "propositions can represent the whole of 
reality" with the competing proposition that those propositions "cannot 
represent what they must have in common with reality in order to be able to 
represent it-logical form" (T, §4.12). This is simply because "in order to be 
able to represent logical form, we should have to station ourselves with 
propositions somewhere outside logic, that is to say outside the world" (T, 
§4.12). 
The move that Wittgenstein initially thought would allow him to show 
rather than say the logical form - to use language to describe its extra-
linguistic correspondence with reality - was to rely on a form of realism 
about how the names that constitute propositions attach to the objects that 
constitute the world. He argued that the logical possibilities of language are 
restricted by "rules of logical syntax" which: 
... specify the logical form of a name and ... permit only those 
combinations of names that mirror the combinatorial 
possibilities of the named objects. (Arrington, 1993, p. 56) 
The important point is that it may seem as if it is possible to get outside and 
describe what is behind language and that this "can be justified ... by 
reference to some transcendent logical reality that stands behind the rules 
that constitute our form of representation" (Baker & Hacker, 1985, p. 315). 
In contrast to these objectivist and transcendental leanings, a 
description of Wittgenstein's later view is that "everything is held together by 
connections of concepts expressed within grammar . . . by overlapping 
criteria of understanding" (pp. 316-317). Any person asserting otherwise 
fails to recognize that the account of language required is one ''that is part of 
the calculus' (PG, p. 70, §33) and works within it to highlight relevant 
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internal connections. Philosophical problems therefore demonstrate that the 
individual or individuals concerned cannot find their way around these 
complicated relations. Moreover, when philosophers, psychologists and 
others attempt to theorize about these relations, they are likely to 
misrepresent the criteria for the concepts we use. The relevant 
Wittgensteinian conclusion with regard to reflexive psychological work is 
that any attempt to use language to get outside to an extra-linguistic reality is 
a nonsensical activity. 
However, realists such as Greenwood (1992) generally misrepresent 
this point as the social constructionist argument that realism is nonsensical. 
For example, Greenwood considers "the general philosophical thesis of 
realism to be relatively.uninteresting" and mentions it only because "some 
constructionists claim it is unintelligible" (p. 184). But in Wittgensteinian 
terms, the latter remark is most probably based on social constructionists' 
acceptance that "the idea of 'agreement with reality' does not have any clear 
application" (OC, §21S). To put this point in another way, whether the 
proposition that "language must agree with reality" is asserted or denied is 
irrelevant because the proposition does not play any useful role in a 
language-game (even though it may seem to "do work" especially in a 
philosophical language-game). On this view, denying the proposition 
serves a similar purpose with regard to language as the following "logic" 
serves with regard to personal embodiment: "since we cannot escape our 
own bodies we must be trapped in them". The point is to "cure" realists of 
the view that we potentially have access to something outside, something 
more than we would have if we represent ourselves as "trapped" in 
language (Le., a view that is mistakenly attributed to a relativist, social 
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constructionism)8. 
A further advantage of Wittgenstein's philosophy is that the method 
can also be extended towards other propositions in language that do not so 
easily admit the possibility of an alternative perspective. For example, it is 
difficult to see how anything meaningful could be achieved by contradicting 
such propositions as "theories are language-games" (Moore, 1990, p. 211), 
"every rod has a length" (PG, VI, §83), "my images are private" (PI, §251) 
and "people are reflexive agents". However, imagining the opposite of a 
particular proposition is a useful technique to determine whether a 
statement that is accorded philosophical significance is really an example of 
idle language; since it not only helps to distinguish grammatical 
propositions from empirical propositions which, when contradicted are false, 
but also shows that the supposedly positive statement is similarly idle (PI, 
§251). Moreover, Wittgenstein also shows that the only reason why we do 
not reject such positive but idle propositions as "people are reflexive agents" 
is that they are connected with many other useful propositions. That is, 
grammatical propositions represent what Wittgensteinians describe as "the 
internal relations between essentially connected, interdependent concepts" 
(Baker & Hacker, 1985, p. 265). 
The issue of contradictory positions adopted within language also 
suggests the issue of the autonomy of grammar that Wittgenstein 
emphasized and which can be extended to indicate the nature of limits on 
re"flexive studies in psychology. Wittgenstein invoked the notion of autonomy 
of grammar even in quite particular linguistic practices. For example, Baker 
and Hacker (1985) notes that the autonomy of grammar is "expressed in the 
8 See chapter 3 for more useful remarks about the relations between "language-games" and a 
''form of life" which are concepts used by Wittgenstein to emphasize that "our talk gets its 
meaning from the rest of our proceedings" (Oe, §229). 
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negative dicta that there is no metalogic, no metamathematics" (p. 315). 
This point can be extended to include metapsychological projects such as 
Smedslund's (1990) "psycho-logic" which similarly would not affect linguistic 
practices if one of its axioms or rules was contradicted (see chapter 1, 
section 1.2). Moreover, the notion of the autonomy of grammar also 
provides a fresh perspective on the traditional contrast between subjectivity 
and objectivity. For example, an individual who surveys concepts that are 
independent and thus seem to express metaphysical truths, may also 
realize that he or she is powerless to alter what are, at the same time, 
conventions (even where they appear to be metamathematical or 
metapsychological). 
The issues here are complicated but worth spelling out since the fact 
that grammar can be both conventional and arbitrary in its origins does not 
undermine the necessity that is found within it (Le., the already mentioned 
point that propositions such as "my images are private" cannot be 
contradicted even though at some point no human used such concepts to 
describe their experiences in this way). The necessity of these conceptual 
connections and the "truths" they express seems to contradict the view that 
grammar is arbitrary. But the limit to this arbitrariness is demonstrated by the 
fact that individual "subjects" are not totally free to invent new concepts for 
themselves even when challenging the conventions of grammar. An 
example of this issue is the possibility of a private language explored by 
Wittgenstein and the fact that although we may think that we can invent a 
new emotion term and make it refer to an "inner experience", our language 
simply will not allow this move (Le., the "argument" leads the reader through 
a series of detailed remarks about the attempt to set up such a private 
language, for example, through what turn out to be useless definitive rituals 
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(PI, §253); see chapter 7). It is clear that "subjects" or people must instead 
work within grammatical conventions that at times appear to have the 
hardness of objective, independent and undeniable truths. 
Wittgenstein, of course, remarks on the difficulty of representing 
grammar and the actual use of language from "within". For example, he 
notes: 
A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not 
command a clear view of our use of words. - Our grammar is 
lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation 
produces just that understanding which consists in 'seeing 
connections'. (PI, §122) 
Rather than looking at how language is used, it is tempting to offer 
explanations. But the grammar of "pride" and the grammar of "shame", for 
example, cannot be explained as different because the words refer to 
different objects. In this respect, Wittgenstein can also offer analogies of 
language that help to turn attention towards the telescope (or microscope), 
so to speak, of language through which the world is viewed. 
A lack of recognition of language in psychology leads to a restricted 
diet of examples for eX'Planation (which is also reflected in the discipline's 
individualism). But in such cases, Baker and Hacker (1985) note that a 
surview of the segment of language that surrounds the confusion will 
dissolve it. Moreover, a surview: 
... removes those misunderstandings which stem from false 
analogies, misdirected questions, and failure to apprehend the 
status of grammatical sentences. The aim of a surview is to be 
able to 'take in at a glance' a segment of grammar, so that one 
will not be misled by surface grammar, false analogies, or 
pictures embedded in language which, considered 
independently of their application, mislead us. But our 
grammar, or those crucial parts of it that give rise to 
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philosophical problems, is not readily surveyable. It is 
embodied in our dynamic linguistic practices, not in a 
concretized 'frozen' structure" (p. 542) 
100 
However, pace Parker (1994b), it is not simply the case that the task of 
representing grammar, "the process of identifying discourses, and the 
presentation of the material, depend, to a large extent, on the analyst's 
ability to be 'reflexive'" (p. 531). That is, while there are obviously different 
forms of skill involved, the reflexivity of identifying and presenting discourses 
is simply the ability to provide a comprehensive survey of the use of relevant 
psychological concepts in particular cultural practices. Moreover, the 
difficulty of representing a part of grammar is that a surview cannot be 
achieved solely by reflection or description. Instead, a clear and surveyable 
representation of language involves participating in related practices and 
undertaking a study that is inclusive of all forms of language-related 
examples. 
To summarize, some of the difficulties of representing grammar from 
within were examined through an account of the philosophical problems 
with Wittgenstein's earlier Tractatus. What Wittgenstein attempted to show 
(rather than to say and thus risk self-contradiction) was a connection 
between language and reality. From the perspective of the later philosophy, 
reflexive work would not have to achieve such a nonsensical perspective. 
Instead, grammar is regarded by Wittgenstein as autonomous in a way that 
is not explained by concepts such as "agreement with reality". Accordingly, 
where it might seem that the nonsensical contradiction of propositions such 
as "my images are private" supports their positive role as expressions of 
metaphysical truth, Wittgenstein regards such propositions as similarly idle 
pieces of language which only seems to be doing work because of their 
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interdependent connections with other concepts in our language. This point 
about grammar was illustrated also by the difficulties of changing language 
which are suggested, for example, by Wittgenstein's remarks about private 
experiences that constitute the "Private Language Argument". Thus 
although it may seem that for psychologists to act-lieve a surview of a part of 
grammar depends on their ability to be reflexive, this simply means that they 
should represent all of the relevant forms of discourse that can be found the 
linguistic practices in which they participate. 
Can reflexive work in psychology prevent problem and method 
from passing one another by? 
Given Wittgenstein's criticisms, an important aim connected with reflexive 
work in psychology is to prevent the conceptual problems and methods of 
the discipline from continuing to pass one another by (PI, xiv, p. 232). The 
highly conceptual problems that allow psychologists to become entangled in 
their own rules, propositions, models and theories are often compounded by 
misunderstandings of the nature of Wittgenstein's contribution to the 
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disentangling of any "knots in our thinking" (PR, I, §2). Wittgenstein's form of 
conceptual investigation seems to offer a way of discovering widely shared 
conceptual problems that are beyond the limits of contemporary 
psychological methods. Further Wittgensteinian remarks will therefore be 
assembled and extended to address these issues. 
Although Gergen (1985, 1989) correctly notes that conceptual 
problems in psychology are due to widely shared misrepresentations of 
language, it is important to understand the role and limits of any conceptual 
investigation of psychology's methods. The fact that advances have 
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occurred in dealing with reactivity concerns without dealing with the broader 
notion of the reflexivity of psychological studies is a good example of 
Wittgenstein's claim that method and problem in psychology pass one 
another by. But one of the problems with the interpretation of Wittgenstein's 
later philosophical psychology is that it seems as if his methods can be part 
of a reflexive psychology. In other words, one problem with the linguistic 
solution that Wittgenstein appears to offer psychologists is that attaining a 
conceptual surview may be viewed as a type of second-order method. In 
particular, a conceptual investigation can seemingly achieve answers to 
psychological questions that contemporary empirical methods of 
observation and experimentation cannot because, as Wittgenstein 
recognizes, "there is no sharp boundary between methodological 
propositions and propositions within a method" (OC, §318). 
The blurred line between conceptual investigation and the methods of 
psychology can lead to improvements in the discipline that favour qualitative 
rather than quantitative approaches. However, equivocation also occurs 
between Wittgenstein's philosophical labours and the use of qualititative 
approaches to challenge traditional studies in psychology. Harre (1986), for 
example, argues that comprehensive linguistic studies based on a 
Wittgensteinian approach, provide the "methodological enrichment 
necessary to study scientifically what we can now see as the domain of the 
emotions" (p. 12). More recently, articles by Shotter (1996) and Shotter and 
Katz (1996) suggest the importance of using Wittgenstein's methods of 
"social poetics" in the practices of psychology to counter the importance 
placed on theory as the basis of practical knowledge. The methods they 
suggest can be used within psychology include: attempts to arrest or 
interrupt spontaneous activity, use of selected images, similes, analogies, 
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metaphors or 'pictures' to suggest new ways of talking, the use of objects of 
comparison such as the notion of language-games, and, more generally, 
avoiding the view that any method in psychology will lead to "a final, fixed 
account of what something 'really' means" (Shotter & Katz, 1996, p. 232). 
However, while Shotter and Katz suggest that these methods will 
create new forms of knowledge within psychology and, moreover, bypass 
the traditional problems of empirical work, it is debatable whether existing 
empirical practices should be disregarded. For example, where a practical 
survey and collection of experiences of being struck by the similarities 
between pride and guilt or, in Wittgenstein's case, sorrow and care, it is 
important to ask whether this is a grammatical or empirical fact (RPP I, §69). 
While a surview does promote a practical understanding and situated 
knowledge, it may be important to assess such connections (and general 
statements) in more rigorous terms. To offer a more extreme example, 
Rosenberg (1990) claims as part of his theory that reflexive processes 
"pervade virtually every important aspect of human emotions" (p. 1). 
However, while Rosenberg can therefore see reflexive processes almost 
everywhere he looks, it is important to ask whether such processes pervade 
psychologically in observable, empirically-ratified differences or 
grammatically in a form of representation that has yet to prove its worth. 
These criticisms of both theory and its practical alternative suggest an 
issue that seems to be missing from Shotter and Katz's (1996) 
metamethodological account: namely, that it is important to distinguish 
between grammatical and empirical propositions. In this respect, 
Smedslund's (1985, 1990) work is useful - and also relevant to the 
"treatment" of personal reflexivity and emotion - because of the recognition 
that in many cases, psychological studies conduct tests that are "pseudo-
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empirical". In other words, Smedslund points to the fact that many of the 
propositions supposedly tested by the methods of psychology are not 
empirical propositions but ''tests'' of grammatical propositions. There is 
considerable potential for confusion about the role of conceptual 
investigations with regard to empirical studies of particular psychological 
phenomena. For example, in an article about the form that reflexive 
psychological studies should take from a social constructionist perspective, 
Gergen and Gergen (1991) argue that: 
The confirmations (or disconfirmations) of hypotheses through 
research findings are achieved through social consensus, not 
through observation of the 'facts'. The 'empirical test' is 
possible because the conventions of linguistic indexing are so 
fully shared ('so commonsensical') that they appear to 'reflect' 
reality. (pp. 81-81) 
While there is an element of truth to this point, understanding an empirical 
proposition should not be regarded as prefiguring the result of any test. 
Indeed, if the emphasis on conventions with regard to empirical propositions 
does point to something important, it is that it is not always easy to determine 
what the result of an empirical study means (and the process of deciding its 
significance is quite different from agreement about the concepts). 
Moreover, it is simply not possible to know in psychology how fruitful an 
experiment (or study) will be (RPP, I, §1039). 
It therefore seems better to admit that although some generalizations 
about emotion may seem to be amenable to an empirical test, they may be 
more closely examined by restating the detail of existing conventions for the 
detailed everyday use of concepts. For example, Rosenberg's (1990) 
general distinction between reflexive cognition (I.e., cognitive strategies 
designed to change a person's emotions) and reflexive agency (I.e., what 
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individuals do to change an emotion or produce a new one) can be informed 
by detail about specific emotions. This point is supported by Smedslund's 
investigation of the "psycho-logic" of surprise which, it should be noted, also 
criticizes any simplistic attempt to operationalize definition for the purposes 
of specific empirical observation for everyday conceptual reasons: that is, 
Smedslund (1990) notes that an operational definition of surprise cannot be 
given because "one may successfully simulate surprise and hide surprise" 
(p. 46; see Part 2, chapter 6 for this issue in relation to pride). Thus it is 
important for general categories or generalizations about emotion to be 
examined - rather than tested - by providing everyday conceptual-
discursive detail (which is perhaps what Gergen and Gergen (1991) 
meant)9. 
The use of a surview should reduce the potential for empirical 
methods to bypass important conceptual issues by incorporating 
Wittgenstein's criticisms, but not necessarily his specific philosophical 
methods, in the future conduct of reflexive psychological work. Attaining a 
comprehensive surview of, for example, our use of the word "pride" with the 
aim of clarifying a more general position on emotion does not allow us to 
collapse the distinction between a conceptual investigation of the methods 
used in psychology, and the use of the methods themselves. This point can 
be illustrated by extending a remark that Wittgenstein made in the context of 
commenting on a physical investigation: that is, in an investigation of 
"determining the length of an object" - which could easily be extended to 
the example of "measurement of psychological phenomena" - Wittgenstein 
9 However, pace Smedslund (1990) on surprise, Parrott and Harre (1991) on embarrassment 
and Gergen and Gergen (1991) on jealousy, the aim will not be to extend the view that "an 
important step into a reflexively oriented inquiry into jealousy [for example] would be to 
formalize the understandings already contained in the common conventions for talking about 
jealousy" (Gergen & Gergen, 1991, p. 81, brackets added). 
argues that: 
... the word 'methodology' has a double meaning. Not only a 
physical investigation, but also a conceptual one can be called 
'methodological investigation'. (PI, p. 225) 
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This is not only the "physical" investigation exemplified by the use of a 
particular method to make observations and "measurements" of a 
psychological phenomenon, but also what Wittgenstein describes as a 
conceptual problem: for example, where adhering to a view such as "the 
method of measuring a psychological phenomenon determines what it is" in 
practice would produce obvious conceptual confusions. Hence, a surview 
will help to counter the problems of a particular method but should not 
replace the psychological equivalent of the "physical investigation" 
Wittgenstein describes. 
To reiterate, although a surview of a particular psychological concept 
and its connections may seem to be the collection of factual examples of 
language use, it should not be regarded as a method that can be easily 
incorporated within the methods of a new, critical psychology. However, 
using the example of person and emotion studies, it was argued that it is 
inappropriate for Wittgenstein's methods of conceptual investigation to be 
described as a contribution to the methodology of investigations. Since 
Wittgenstein's remarks do not substitute for or replace more limited empirical 
research within psychology, they can hardly be said to provide a type of 
critical, second-order method for psychology. Nevertheless, by being aware 
of the potential for a conceptual type of methodological investigation, 
reflexive work in psychology can help to prevent conceptual problems and 
methods from passing one another by. 
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The practical limits and advantages of conceptual-discursive 
investigation 
A surview that aims to be comprehensive will draw on conversational and 
discursive examples in a way that includes "all forms of spoken interaction, 
formal or informal, and written texts of all kinds" (Potter & Wetherall, 1987, p. 
6). But however richly a reflexive, conceptual-discursive investigation is 
grounded in the texts and conversation of a culture, it will inevitably confront 
practical limitations when it is based solely on a survey of language. In 
particular, a surview cannot substitute for judgements that are formed in 
mastering a linguistic practice: that is, on the basis of individual participation 
in and mastery of the linguistic practices of culture. It is important to consider 
some of these problems and potential Wittgensteinian approaches before 
confronting the linguistic and cultural detail of Part 2. 
An in principle constraint on the possibility of a comprehensive 
Wittgenstein-inspired, social constructionist and discourse-based research 
programme is suggested by extending the Wittgensteinian remark that was 
introduced at the end of the previous section. In a relevant quotation, 
Wittgenstein notes that the conceptual investigation of a method does not 
substitute for a practical mastery of "determining the length of an object": 
What "determining the length" means is not learned by learning 
what length and determining are, but the meaning of the word 
"length" is learnt among other things, by learning what it is to 
determine length. (PI, p. 225) 
Thus, learning what the words or concepts mean is part of a conceptual 
investigation which cannot substitute for the skill of being able to determine 
the length of an object in a particular practice. As noted in the previous 
section, this example can be extended to studies in psychology that attempt 
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to "measure" various aspects of psychological phenomena. 
The implication of the analogy for critical studies of personal reflexivity 
and emotion is that the detail of appropriate words and expressions is 
learned as part of training in a practice. For instance, there is the already 
mentioned example of judging the genuineness of expressions of feeling (PI, 
p. 227). A reflexive researcher cannot learn about cases of acting, self-
control and deception solely on the basis of a conceptual investigation 
because the use of these concepts presupposes mastery of complicated 
judgements and, moreover, a broad experience of humanity (PI, p. 224). As 
a result, the meaning of the words "genuine" and "emotion" is initially 
learned as part of the practices of everyday life before their significance can 
become a specific topic for treatment by psychology. A conceptual 
investigation therefore cannot substitute for ostensibly independent skills 
created in the practice of making ordinary empirical judgements (apart from 
the sense in which it is a conceptual error to claim that a particular 
complicated form of emotion is determined by the way it is measured). Thus 
the "measurement" of genuine and acted cases of pride, for example, cannot 
be achieved solely by the description or definition of the concepts. 
Practical limitations on what a conceptual-discursive survey can 
achieve and therefore contribute to psychology must therefore be 
acknowledged. Where particular words provide the basis for a survey, 
further limitations may depend on the source of the material for analysis. 
For example, one of the problems of relying on examples from novels, plays, 
newspapers and other cultural sources is that psychologists seem to be put 
in a position usually faced by inexperienced directors and actors. That is, 
when using texts as examples it seems important to imagine how the 
scenes involved, the pieces of conversation reported, or the specific 
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reactions of individuals could be realistically portrayed. Many of the 
examples that form the study of pride in Part 2 may seem less certain than 
other forms of psychological knowledge because they can be reconstructed 
in different ways with different emphases. In other words, we would hardly 
want to conduct a rigorous observational study of pride if our only subjects 
were bad actors reconstructing segments of dialogue from, for example, 
Ibsen's A Doll's House. 
A great deal of emphasis in psychology is also placed on studies that 
are real, rather than imagined. This criticism can be extended to the use of 
novels because even if the segments of discourse contained in them are 
based on careful observation, it may be difficult to know how much is 
described from the author's potentially distorted perspective. Examples 
gained from newspapers also have this problem because it is not possible 
to interrogate the reporter or the individuals reported to find out more detail 
about a particular incident (Le., that their ascription of pride, for example, is 
correct or that the words they report were actually used in that manner and 
context). Similarly, it may be argued that writing based on an author's or 
psychologist's own experiences is simply a form of self-report that also 
might be challenged if we were able to see the actual events. 
Interestingly, if an example of a good performance of a relevant piece 
of discourse is captured on film this may give the example a form of validity 
that texts are denied. For example, it is possible that a case of suppressing 
pride from a novel might be realized on film and serve a similar role to an 
incident in everyday life. The example might prove to be similar to an 
opportunity for ostensive definition of the notion of controlling an emotion in 
everyday life (e.g., such as when prompted by a child's question). There are 
also legitimate concerns that too narrow a focus on language may make it 
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seem as if we were more concerned with words, rather than with what the 
words describe or represent. But in reply it may be argued that conceptual-
discursive studies do not always privilege what people say to such an extent 
that what they do is ignored. Moreover, such examples are offered in place 
of the sort of empirical study that would ignore much of the conversational 
detail of everyday events. Nevertheless, doubts about the authenticity and 
hyperreality of examples that are derived from fiction, drama, film and 
newspapers might continue to be used to undermine the results of a 
comprehensive survey of linguistic practices (see chapter 4 for a 
consideration of the cultural aspects of a broad survey). 
While many of these issues suggest serious limitations to a survey 
based on particular words, in reply it is worth noting that conceptual-
discursive studies can be rigorous and, moreover, conform to many of the 
existing criteria for good social scientific work. Also it is quite possible to 
make legitimate discoveries about the detail of people's conversations and 
the functions that particular uses of words perform. The use of the word 
"pride" in a particular circumstance, for example, might not necessarily be 
an expression of the emotion "pride", but may nevertheless be chosen to 
have a particular effect on another person. Moreover, the use of 
imagination in connection with a surview can help to chart the logical 
features of the appropriate use of a word - or cluster of related concepts -
in a way that a discursive analysis of factual examples cannot. For example, 
in an examination of the variety of circumstances in which the word "fear" is 
used, Wittgenstein notes that nit would be possible to imagine people who 
as it were thought much more definitely than we, and used different words 
where we use only one" (PI, p. 188). Thus some of the limitations of having 
to focus on actual examples of discourse gathered in a methodologically-
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ratified manner can be overcome. 
The result of a comprehensive survey may therefore provide 
examples that would not be imagined, let alone included in a more specific 
study. They can include, for example, not only translated accounts of 
individuals from other cultures but also the experiences of individuals who 
become members of what can broadly be described as our culture. The 
attempt to attain a surview in this manner may resemble the "achievements" 
of armchair psychology, sociology or anthropology. However, it could 
contrast the results of a linguistic surview with specific examples of relevant 
theories and studies, thus examining the detail of language as well as 
overcoming the fact that "time and training assure that an investigator will be 
able to conduct research only on a narrow range of topics, for example, 
neurological mechanisms, facial expressions, or social rules" (Averill, 1992, 
p. 1). A conceptual-discursive surview can present a much broader "diet" of 
examples (PI, §593) for potential research that an individual might otherwise 
ignore. The result should be examples that would not normally be included 
because of the more restricted engagement of individuals with relevant 
discourses and cultural practices dependent also upon how much the 
"subjects" of research choose to reveal. Finally, a survey does not aim to 
achieve specific practical knowledge, it is also worth noting that acquiring an 
ear for linguistic differences is an ability that can lead to further "testing" in 
everyday talk (e.g, in interview situations). 
In this section, the practical limits and advantages of conceptual-
discursive investigations were discussed. The extension of Wittgenstein's 
analogy of the practice of determining the length of an object clearly 
demonstrates the limits of any attempt in psychology to make a conceptual 
survey achieve practical ends. One problem with the outcome of a 
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conceptual-discursive survey is that examples from texts may need to be 
reconstructed (and, moreover, could be acted out in different ways). Also it is 
often not possible to engage in dialogue with the writer or reporter of events 
as well as with the individuals reported or described. One advantage is that 
we can attend to many features of language that we usually "look through" 
and use to co-ordinate activities in everyday life, but do not examine in 
psychology. Also the more comprehensive a survey is in collecting 
examples from different media, the more likely it is that the limitations of time, 
perspective and traditional methods in psychology· can be overcome (see 
chapter 4 also for the lack of attention paid to culture). Moreover, aspects of 
the type of conventional distinctions revealed by a survey can be informally 
"tested" and refined in practical conversations with others and thus assessed 
for their representativeness. 
2.2 A Wittgensteinian treatment of psychological 
reflexivity a.nd the denial of objectivity 
The rigours of scientific methodology have traditionally been invoked to 
guarantee an objective account of the world that is independent of 
individuals as observers (Gergen & Gergen, 1991, p. 76). In this context, 
recognizing the importance of psychological reflexivity is thought to 
undermine objectivity because the ostensibly independent relation between 
"knower and known" presupposes some participation by both in shared 
cultural and linguistic practices. However, the aim is not to focus on 
objectivity in the general sense of certainties that seem to hold fast despite 
cultural and theoretical differences (see chapter 3, section 3.1) since this is 
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the more general question of whether realists should be "forced to abandon 
epistemic objectivity because [of] arguments developed by relativist 
philosophers of science that have been generalized by social 
constructionists to the social psychological domain" (Greenwood, 1991, p. 
103, brackets added). Rather, a Wittgensteinian account will be presented 
of how best to represent the linguistic interdependence of so-called 
"objective phenomena" - especially about such language-dependent 
psychological phenomena as emotion and personal reflexivity - when 
recognition and acceptance of psychological reflexivity seem to entail that 
knowledge is a social and linguistic construct. 
Problems in the social constructionist-realist debate about 
linguistic reflexivity and objectivity 
A considerable challenge for the present task is whether it is possible to 
make a Wittgensteinian contribution to debates about objectivity in 
psychology. More specifically it is interesting to examine how realists and 
social constructionists picture the debate, in part because they reject the 
positivist view that psychology should be like physics in its objectivity (ct. PI, 
§571). For example, social constructionists such as Shotter (1992) argue 
that we cannot talk of individuals in an objective and external world without 
presupposing a shared language. In contrast, realists who are exemplified 
by Greenwood assert the possibility of epistemological objectivity - there is 
not always "a multiplicity of competing theories that are epistemologically 
viable with respect to any empirical domain" (1992, p. 188) - and therefore 
conclude that many theories in psychology are linguistically objective (i.e., 
where this later notion suggests that theoretical descriptions can refer to 
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postulated entities regardless of whether these are the very terms and 
"descriptions that participants offer of their own social psychological lives" 
(p. 185)). Given these conceptualizations, the interest in psychological 
reflexivity and the potential application to emotion and personal reflexivity, it 
may be asked whether a telling Wittgensteinian perspective can be adopted 
towards this debate. 
An initial Wittgensteinian point relevant to the contrast between 
positions that emphasize psychological reflexivity or objectivity comes from 
ah extension of the game analogy and a further remark on mathematics: 
. . . what a mathematician is inclined to say about the 
objectivity and reality of mathematical facts, is not a philosophy 
of mathematics, but something for philosophical treatment. (PI, 
§254) 
An appropriate extension of Wittgenstein's analogy to psychology is that it is 
clearly mistaken for psychologists to state that their "game" is about the 
study of "objective psychological phenomena". In part, a philosophical 
treatment of objectivity in psychology can begin with a restatement of the 
aims of the practice. We could also engage with the sort of pictures and 
arguments that tempts us all to adopt a general approach that resembles 
Greenwood's (1991, 1992) emphasis on "epistemic objectivity". However, 
there seems to be less disagreement between realists and social 
constructionists in recent work about the material constraints and persistent 
regularities in the world that form the background and basis of our 
judgements about "objective certainties" (see chapters 3 and 4 for an 
alternative treatment of general accounts of the relations between our 
concepts and certainties in everyday life which could be described as very 
general facts of nature). 
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Instead, the relevant issue for psychology is that there are a number 
of cases where recognition of psychological reflexivity is thought to 
undermine what we are usually tempted to say about the objectivity and 
reality of psychological facts. That is, where linguistic interdependence 
seems to undermine the claim that the reality of psychological phenomena, 
like mathematical truth, is "independent of whether human beings know it or 
notl" (PI, p. 226). The point is directly analogous to contemporary problems 
in psychology except that in order to inform the debate between realists and 
social constructionists, the problem is changed to whether psychological 
truth is "independent of whether human beings talk about it or not". For 
example, Greenwood (1991) wants to maintain that theoretical descriptions 
of psychological reality are "linguistically objective". In contrast, social 
constructionists such as Potter (1992) deny linguistic objectivity and argue 
that "the central trope of realism ... is the constructed distinction between 
'the phenomenon' and 'the description'" (p. 132). Realists therefore want to 
claim that there are independent properties which exist without (or despite) 
our descriptions of them, whereas social constructionists argue that this 
distinction is simply another linguistic construction, regardless of how we 
picture it as independent of language (and, more specifically, the language 
used to describe it). 
Does Wittgenstein's analogy resolve this problem? In a dense series 
of remarks concerned with this issue, Wittgenstein redescribes the debate 
about the proposition that "mathematical truth is independent of whether 
human beings know it or not", moving it away from a useless picture of an 
extra-linguistic objective reality to the more reasonable (and accurate) 
description of the sort of statements that would actually be made. For 
example, it is more helpful to imagine metamathematicians arguing about 
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the propositions "human beings believe that twice two is four" and "twice two 
is four" in terms of the circumstances in which they are used. This approach 
dismisses the unanswerable issue of whether mathematicians have 
managed to discover pre-existing truths and replaces it with more 
appropriate examples of what mathematicians discuss. Clearly, in this 
context the word "believe" might be replaced in the proposition mentioned 
above with a more obviously discursive word. The result would then be an 
examination of the proposition "human beings say with conviction that twice 
two is four". Also we could make a number of points, as Wittgenstein does, 
about the "kind of certainty" involved in the "kind of language-game" in 
which an individual may ask: "Am I less certain that this man is in pain than 
that twice two is four?" (PI, p. 224). But the more general focus remains, for 
the moment, the most relevant to the explication of psychological reflexivity 
as a "problem" (Le., so it does not matter whether we use "believe" or "say 
with conviction"). 
Given a general focus, we may ask what is an analogous example for 
psychology that may inform the debate about reflexivity and language as it is 
construed by realists and social constructionists? The argument adopted 
here is that realism can provide support for psychologists who believe that 
the "game" is about studying objective psychological phenomena in contrast 
to social constructionists' overemphasis on the constructive role of 
language. In this respect, the distinction between the two propositions 
identified by Wittgenstein and the suggestion of different contexts in which 
they are used is consistent with the analogous account of the different roles 
of philosophers and psychologists in chapter 1, section 1.2. The implication 
of Wittgenstein's analysis for psychology is that if independence is a part of 
a useful description, it should point to the fact that the two propositions 
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clearly have different uses. The result is to replace the broad picture of the 
relations between mathematical propositions and an independent reality 
with the view that these two more reasonable propositions have different 
uses. 
Since these different uses are appropriate to their respective 
contexts, the first proposition that "human beings believe that twice two is 
four" is part of a metamathematical investigation and is therefore a potential 
subject for philosophical treatment. In contrast, the statement "twice two is 
four" is used within the practice of mathematics itself and is comparable, in 
some respects, with psychological language-games in which we ascribe 
pain to others. Attention will initially be focused on the first proposition 
because it is similar to metapsychological points made - and supposedly 
generalized by - social constructionists: namely, equivalent arguments 
about the psychological truth, reality or objectivity that is supposedly 
independent regardless of whether human beings talk about it or not (e.g., 
the certainty that "this man is in pain"). The relevance of the analogy to 
psychology is difficult to demonstrate because no one participating in the 
realist-social constructionist debate exemplifies the move from "knowledge 
of an independent reality" to "human belief in a particular proposition" (see 
Parker, 1998). However, it is reasonable to suppose that this shift could 
appear in the metapsychological literature since, for example, the position 
that hUman beings have constructed the truth is an argument Greenwood 
(1992) attributes to all social constructionists. 
Interestingly, Wittgenstein's treatment of any temptation towards 
meta psychological theorizing of a social constructionist form is stopped by 
further clarification that his remark about what humans believe only means 
something like "human beings have arrived at the mathematical proposition" 
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(p. 24). Remarkably, if this extension of Wittgenstein's remarks to 
psychology is defensible then it would seem to make sense to say that 
human beings have similarly "arrived at" particular forms of psychological 
description. The implication is that social constructionism and its emphasis 
on the constitutive role of language is subject to Wittgensteinian criticism. In 
contrast to remarks made by Potter (1992) about the constructed nature of 
the distinction between "the phenomenon" and "the description", the 
Wittgensteinian position is that "we" have "arrived at" equivalent 
p"ropositions to "twice two equals four" in psychology. This is presumably 
why Wittgenstein is careful not to use such expressions as "constructs" or 
"invents", in contrast to phrases that social constructionists commonly 
employ in remarks about psychology (and the potential for changes in 
language to supposedly change the background of psychology as will be 
examined in chapter 4). 
Greenwood's (1991) realist criticism of Potter's form of social 
constructionism might therefore seem to be consistent with Wittgenstein's 
philosophical position, but is it? In terms of the framework already 
described, it is reasonable for Greenwood to conclude that "the 
metatheoretical or philosophical claim that many forms of human action and 
social practice (such as psychology) are constituted by our social discourse 
about them has nothing to recommend it" (p. 24, brackets added). This point 
is examined more fully in the next section because it is very close to a point 
about the dependence of emotions and forms of personal reflexivity on 
language (e.g., the application to emotion of Howard's (1985) recognition 
that "humans are language users, and the most striking feature of a 
language user is the ability to monitor the control of his or her own actions" 
(p. 260)). However, while Greenwood's brand of realism seems to have 
119 
Wittgensteinian support, the issue that Wittgenstein raises is what would 
happen for psychology if there were a shared change in beliefs or, in this 
case, its related language. That is, the analogous case to "human beings 
believe that twice two is five" invites us to speculate what would happen if 
particular forms of psychological description (and linguistic distinction) were 
made quite differently. 
Although Wittgenstein supplies the example of pain, it is more relevant 
to examine a case where the "language system" (Gergen, 1991, p. 80) that 
supports psychological concepts such as jealousy changes so that a 
particular objective description of personal reflexivity and emotion no longer 
seems to exist (Le., due to a linguistic change)10. For it is possible that 
similar changes might lead us to realize that some objective fact about a 
psychological phenomenon is not as independent of language - and 
therefore immune from revision - as it might seem. For example, while it 
might be said that "human beings believe that a positive emotional response 
and personal success constitutes pride", the same proposition would be 
treated quite differently within, for example, the "language system" of a 
religious framework (see chapter 4, section 2.4.2 for a cultural example of a 
debate in which the question "is there no objectivity?" can be given a 
Wittgensteinian answer). It is relatively easy to imagine us "arriving at" the 
proposition mentioned above only to have it change to "a positive emotional 
response and personal success constitutes arrogance". But is this possibility 
a legitimate analogy to a change in circumstances that results in everyone 
believing, for example, that '1wice two is five"? 
Baker and Hacker (1985) suggest that if the proposition "twice two is 
10 Although jealousy is not a reflexive emotion it is connected with personal reflexivity due to 
the fact that it is often regarded as an emotion to be controlled and, moreover, it also is not 
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five" were "part of a system of internally related propositions, it would be a 
nonsense to insist that it would nevertheless still be four, since we would be 
talking about a different calculus or technique" (p. 293). That is, while from 
the pOint of view of the old game or calculus one might want to claim that 
"twice two really still is four", it would be correct to describe "twice two is five" 
as odd, for example, but not "less objective" (PI, p. 227). The relevant pOint 
to psychology is that social, moral and historical changes might render some 
propositions about psychological phenomena in psychology less useful 
rather than "less objective". To use the example of a "language system" that 
has changed, it would similarly be wrong to claim from the perspective of the 
old game that "a positive emotional reaction and personal success really still 
constitutes pride" and the statement "a positive emotional reaction and 
personal success constitutes arrogance" is "less objective". 
To reiterate, dismissal of the view that psychology is a game "about" 
the study of objective psychological phenomena led to a consideration of an 
analogous treatment of the notion that mathematical truth is "independent of 
whether we human beings know it or not", Wittgenstein's response is to 
reject immediately the misleading general picture and focus on more specific 
• 
and reasonable examples of what metamathematicians and 
mathematicians, respectively, would be likely to say "human beings believe 
that twice two is four" and "twice two is four". The former example is changed 
by Wittgenstein to the view that we have "arrived at" such a proposition and 
an analogous psychological case of "a positive emotional response and 
personal success constitutes pride" was explored. The issue of principal 
interest was that a change in circumstances might mean that the proposition 
consciously cultivated (which is indicated by the fact that very few individuals set out to make 
themselves painfully jealous). 
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also changes, so that we might be tempted to say that "a positive emotional 
reaction and personal success really still constitutes pride" even though 
what we used to call pride is now described as arrogance. In this case, it 
would be mistaken to say that arrogance was "less objective" and the 
implication for the social-constructionist-realist debate is provisional 
acceptance of Greenwood's approach, that is, pending a more detailed 
treatment of Greenwood's view of "linguistic objectivity" as approaching a 
psychological phenomenon from a legitimately fashioned "distance". 
Wittgensteinian remarks on objectivity as independence and 
distance 
Since on the Wittgensteinian view it makes no sense to claim that there is an 
outside, independent reality to be discovered - even about our own 
psychological phenomena - nothing is given up by denying this claim. 
However, there is still potential confusion about alternative accounts 
because it may seem as if social constructionists wish to do away with any 
picture of objectivity as independence. The debate between social 
constructionists and realists will be examined by focusing briefly on some 
Wittgensteinian remarks on measurement. This account should help to 
assess Greenwood's (1991, 1992) realist account of "linguistic objectivity" 
and his view that use of a common language by psychologists and their 
subjects does not undermine an epistemologically significant "distance" 
between psychological theories and the phenomena they describe. The 
section will also examine the contrasting social constructionist position on 
psychological reflexivity in which it is thought that the terms of psychological 
theories must eventually be evaluated and "made intelligible in ordinary 
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language in the same way that they (ordinary people) do" (Shotter, 1992, p. 
179). 
While it was suggested that emotions such as pride and jealousy are 
described in a language system that might change, the example of pride 
changing to arrogance was used to undermine the view that something 
objective has become "less objective". It is interesting to consider the picture 
of objectivity that appeals to many philosophers and psychologists because 
it resembles a similar image evoked by Wittgenstein in relation to the 
p'ractice of measurement. In particular, Wittgenstein highlights a widely 
shared temptation to compare "'ever more accurate measurement of length' 
with the nearer and nearer approach to an object" (PI, IIxi, p. 225). His 
example can be extended to studies of psychological phenomena because it 
can be argued that refinements in description and measurement similarly (or 
inevitably) move closer to what is "really there". Moreover, a radical 
extension of this view occurs when philosophers and psychologists stress 
the eventual elimination of our ordinary language psychological concepts by 
theoretical descriptions of underlying cognitive and neurophysiological 
processes (Hacker, 1996). Although the realist account of psychology has 
undergone much development (see Collier 1998; Willig, 1998), it 
nevertheless seems that the picture of theoretical descriptions referring to 
objective phenomena has a strong hold in many areas of psychology. 
What is the realist position and is there any social constructionist 
alternative? In a statement that bears a striking resemblance to 
Wittgenstein's remarks about mathematicians, Greenwood (1991) argues 
theoretical descriptions in psychology are linguistically objective because 
they can be true or false "independent of whether anyone employs these 
descriptions, or represents reality in terms of them" (p. 9). While we might try 
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to convert this statement to a form analogous to "human beings believe that 
twice two is four", a recurring difficulty is the lack of a convincing advocate of 
this position within psychology. Nevertheless, the account presented in the 
previous section is relevant because of a further remark by Greenwood 
(1992): 
In order to understand how theoretical descriptions can 
correspond to or fail to correspond to reality, one need only 
grasp the meaning of theoretical descriptions: what it means 
to ascribe helical structure to DNA, or shame to a person. (p. 
187) 
To make a small argumentative leap, if we can accept that pride and 
arrogance are similar to shame then, on Greenwood's view, we would 
demonstrate understanding of these theoretical descriptions when we find 
"that reality has or has not the properties ascribed to it by such descriptions" 
(p. 187). 
Furthermore, this position allows Greenwood to claim a: 
... clear division between the constitution of the meaning of 
actions by participants and analysts: how participants 
constitute the sense of an action is quite independent· of how 
analysts constitute that meaning. (p. 144) 
In other words, linguistic objectivity (or independence) for Greenwood is 
secured where the same word or theoretical description is not necessarily 
used by subjects in a psychological study. But in the case of pride or shame 
some initial problems present themselves before further issues bearing on 
psychological reflexivity can be addressed. First, it seems unreasonable for 
Greenwood to imply that ascriptions of pride and shame to a person are 
instances of theoretical description (Le., of the same form as helical structure 
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to DNA). If we allow Greenwood the picture of entities that are separate from 
us perhaps referring to an individual who is physically isolated - then we 
might accept, for example, a person hiding in a corner with her head bowed 
could confirm our tentative ascription of shame (Le., because if she were 
smiling and strolling around the description would obviously "fail to 
correspond to reality" (p. 187». In this respect, we might at least want to say 
that we have good grounds for ascribing the complicated concept of shame 
to a person although we could also be wrong (hence the theoretical aspect 
of the ascription). 
However, Wittgensteinians such as Hacker (1996) contest the 
theoretical nature of third person ascriptions, even when the concepts 
involved are highly conceptual and, therefore, potentially subject to error. 
There are also disanalogies between third person ascription and theoretical 
description, such as the fact that we do not normally make ascriptions on the 
basis of inferences from other people's behaviour. For example, it is 
sometimes the case that we react almost instantaneously to a person's 
remarks or actions, as Wittgenstein noted, with a complementary or 
contrasting reaction (Le., in a manner that seems to accord with the social 
constructionist emphasis on relational-responsive aspects of people's 
actions (Shotter, 1996». Moreover, Greenwood's presentation of linguistic 
objectivity undermines social constructionists' emphasis on psychological 
reflexivity and its attendant imperative to "formulate accounts of the real 
politico-moral transactions people conduct between themselves" (Shotter, 
1992, p. 179). Greenwood's (1992) reply is that there is no reason to deny 
that the theoretical descriptions offered by a psychologist "might not be the 
very descriptions participants offer of their own social psychological lives" (p. 
185). But again Greenwood is only concerned with what people have to say 
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when they potentially provide the "best theoretical account" (p. 185). In 
contrast, Shotter (1992) implores Greenwood and other realists to go further: 
"And (to be really radical) why not seek a meaning for such accounts back in 
the activities from which they were drawn" (p. 179). 
In the case of the individual pictured by the account of physical 
isolation, however, it may be that the only way of confirming our theoretical 
description (Le., the properties ascribed to her by the statement "she's 
obviously ashamed") may only be confirmed by the person. Sometimes the 
o"nly way we can know that someone is feeling a particular emotion (or the 
beginning of one that is suppressed) is to ask the person. In the case of the 
individual in the room, her confirmation is probably crucial: an obvious point 
to which has nevertheless been a persistent problem in psychology of 
determining and articulating how people's private, subjective or internal 
states are expressed in and created through conversation. A Wittgenstein-
inspired position will not always give precedence to people's accounts over 
theoretical redescriptions offered in psychology or, for that matter, the 
elaborate and sometimes contrary interpretations of literary and cultural 
theorists. However, it is important to represent clearly the detail of people's 
lives and the way in which psychologists negotiate a to and fro movement 
between theoretical descriptions and everyday use of psychological 
concepts. In this regard, a criticism of the "distance by theoretical discourse" 
account is its devaluation of an enduring need to attain a clear view of 
current use of concepts and to address related conceptual problems in 
psychology through the detail of conversation. 
Does Greenwood maintain the notion of linguistic objectivity of 
theoretical description in psychology by, for example, relying on a metaphor 
of the "nearer and nearer approach to an object"? In this respect, 
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Greenwood's account of theoretical description creates a sense of distance 
which not only deprivileges people's accounts, clarifications and 
explanations but also provides for better approximations of particular 
phenomena. Because analysts are not compelled to use the same 
discourse as research participants the need for participants to understand 
the theoretical account of their actions is diminished. On Greenwood's view, 
distance is therefore created and theoretical descriptions are able to 
approach the psychological phenomenon of interest more closely (Le., 
descriptions which also have the potential to identify the overarching or 
underlying causes of people's meaningful interactions; see next section). 
At this point it is useful to draw upon Bowers' (1991) relevant and 
critical account of this distancing process as revealed by cognitive 
psychologists' rhetorical devices for responding to and avoiding the problem 
of reflexivity. As identified by Bowers, realist-cognitive scientists often 
provide a superficial defence against conceptual criticisms offered by 
philosophers and others by claiming that these "outsider critiques" are 
irrelevant to cognitive science as a knowledge-producing practice. 
However, a Wittgensteinian approach may nevertheless describe ways in 
which cognitive scientists attempt to avoid engaging with the topic of 
reflexivity by a number of more or less complicated devices. An instance of 
the latter is described by Bowers as cognitive scientists' "manipulation of 
time" response to reflexivity as a "methodological horror" (Le., a problem 
which if 11rue" would otherwise undermine the possibility of objective 
knowledge about forms of individualistic and internal processes). Not 
surprisingly, Bowers realizes that the distancing between subject and object 
emphasized in the activity of creating theoretical descriptions is often 
regarded as a mark of good science. But his particular concern is how 
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objectivity as "distance" is created by employing a discourse of temporality 
(e.g., discursive moves which are easy to imagine when we consider studies 
of psychological phenomena in other historical periods rather than cognitive 
processes in the laboratory). 
According to Bowers, psychology can learn from practices such as 
anthropology in which strategies of investigation often involve a sense in 
which "the subject/object of research is projected into a different time and a 
different space from the researcher" (p. 557). Bowers highlights the 
tendency in psychology to create a sense of objectivity by making the past 
seem distant. In this manner psychology can claim to examine events that 
have already happened without any sense of a continuing interaction with 
(or participation in) those events. More specifically, manipulation of time in 
presentations of specific psychological studies such as cognitive 
experiments maintains the sense of distance because it suggests "there can 
be no back-and forth process, none of the disruptive to-ing and fro-ing which 
reflexivity implies" (p. 557; e.g., in taking the provisional, emerging 
knowledge back to the participants). Additionally, we can also examine the 
way in which the realist-cognitive account invokes a sophisticated "nearer 
and nearer approach of an object" picture in psychology (especially in 
relation to emotion and personal reIlexivity research). Reflexivity is therefore 
deferred when researchers participate in events by examining psychological 
phenomena which occupy a different "space". The combination of rhetorical 
techniques seems to add legitimacy to a realist-cognitive view in which many 
important psychological phenomena are inaccessible to research 
participants (hence essential aspects of phenomena can be described in 
terms which are not used or necessarily understood by the subjects of 
psychological research). Through such complicated pictures and their 
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application in the practices of psychology, hidden levels of psychological 
phenomena can be regarded as real properties that correspond with 
theoretical descriptions and which also have an existence independent of 
any clarification an individual could offer about the significance or meaning 
of their experiences. 
This section examined different responses to reflexivity and their 
implications for social constructionist and realist-cognitive positions on 
objectivity. Wittgenstein's account of objectivity as the "nearer and nearer 
a'pproach of an object" was introduced before identifying similar pictures in 
Greenwood's (1991, 1992) realist-cognitive account. Greenwood dismisses 
the importance of psychological reflexivity because it seems possible to 
achieve "linguistic objectivity" for theoretical descriptions which ascribe 
properties to independent objects. Greenwood also devalues participants' 
accounts of their activities and suggests they are only important where 
explanations in ordinary language have the potential to agree with or 
improve psychologist's theoretical descriptions. It was then argued that 
linguistic objectivity occurs by two contestable forms of distancing which 
supposedly allow theories to become better approximations of particular 
psychological phenomenona. On this view, psychologists can use terms that 
isolated research subjects do not necessarily agree with, use or even 
understand (despite the obvious importance of a participant's clarification or 
admission to the confirmation of the existence of many psychological 
phenomena). The second form of distancing found in the realist-cognitive 
avoidance of psychological re'flexivity is expressed as the view that 
theoretical descriptions refer to objects that occupy a different time or space 
to the researcher (see section 3.3 for a further discussion of a different space 
in relation to talk of hidden levels of phenomena in the study of cognitive 
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abilities). The major point to emerge from this Wittgensteinian 
reconsideration of a persistent debate is that linguistic objectivity does not 
provide an adequate case for denying a reflexive to and fro dialogue 
between researchers and participants. 
The criterion of intelligibility and the objectivity of reflexive 
abilities 
The previous section demonstrated the importance of a reflexive to and fro 
movement between the descriptions, whether theoretical or otherwise, of 
participants and the accounts of those participants in psychology. In many 
cases it is what individuals say that will help to solve the problem of an 
ascription that might otherwise seem to be hypothetical or theoretical. 
However, the issue to be addressed here is not whether social 
constructionists have made a mistake by dismissing as unintelligible the 
notion that "theoretical propositions can provide accurate descriptions of an 
independent reality" (Shotter, 1992, p. 178). Instead, a Wittgensteinian 
account will be offered of a further issue that separates social constructionist 
and realist-cognitive accounts of such psychological phenomena as emotion 
and instances of personal reflexivity: whether the temptation to view many 
individual psychological attributes of people as objective, autonomous and 
independent is undermined by the view that to "exist" as conversational 
realities they must be intelligible within a wider linguistic community. 
Wittgenstein's contribution to this debate is to clarify issues arising in 
the social constructionist and realist-cognitive debate. The aim is to achieve 
conceptual clarity rather than address more specific agendas within 
psychology such as those identified by Bowers (1991) around cognitive 
psychology: 
... each side is trying to institute its version of the social, the 
cognitive, the phenomenological, etc., against other disputants, 
not report on the nature of an independently existing 
phenomenon plain for all to see. (p. 548) 
130 
A Wittgensteinian focus on intelligibility can avoid both the problem of 
assessing competing theories with evidence in psychology and making 
realist assumptions, a point that is especially important with regard to the 
work on emotion and personal reflexivity carried out in Part 2 as well as the 
temptation to think that Wittgenstein's work might help to produce a 
predominantly social account of pride which is consistent with social 
constructionism (i.e., in contrast to an individual account of pride that is 
consistent with a realist-cognitive position). Focusing on the issue of 
intelligibility, however, does not necessarily avoid Wittgensteinian exegetical 
disagreements. Indeed, a debate similar to the social-individual contrast in 
psychology has occurred also in the exegesis of Wittgenstein's account of 
rules and rule-following. For example, Bloor (1997) provides an account of 
the debate between collectivist and individualist accounts of rules and, in 
particular, the support for the latter position: 
The individualist analysis of rule following is sustained by the 
intuition that a person who is physically isolated can still follow 
a rule. This alone seems to prove that there must be 
something wrong with any collectivist account. (p. 91) 
Although this issue is topical in contemporary philosophy and may seem to 
connect with theoretical perspectives in psychology, it should not distract us 
to the point that a broad account of collectivism and the criterion of 
intelligibility is essential. 
Instead, the importance of intelligibility to determining the meaning 
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and existence of many psychological phenomena can be addressed 
through the detail of Wittgenstein's remarks and relevant examples of 
psychological concepts (I.e., rather than assessing contrasting arguments). 
It is clear that without use of a shared or potentially sharable language, it 
would be difficult to determine whether the criteria for a particular 
psychological phenomenon such as pride had been exhibited by "me" or 
another individual. It is often only when individuals use particular words that 
the content of their private experiences and evaluations can be judged, a 
point which indicates that privacy and individuality occur against a 
background of common understanding. As Wittgenstein notes, a person 
simply cannot create a language that supposedly refers to private states 
without presupposing a public language that is already set up. Accordingly, 
there is no sense in which an individual could construct a private language 
in the sense that it is a discourse only that person could understand. 
Instead, if a first person expression were uttered in circumstances quite 
different from the usual ones it would not be clear that this individual was 
even talking the same language (I.e., despite the fact that similar words were 
used). 
These Wittgenstein-inspired remarks are relevant to the treatment of 
emotion and personal reflexivity because as already suggested they are 
ascribed only to beings that use language. More specifically, the issue is 
whether many of these forms of personal reflexivity such as emotional 
identification must accord with the criteria of a particular linguistic 
community. For example, it might seem as if phenomena such as reflexive 
speech-acts of praising or blaming oneself, reflexive emotions such as 
pride, or other reflexive skills such as commenting self-consciously on 
particular private "states" do not have an objective existence because they 
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are constituted by a shared language. Wittgenstein's explicit considerations 
of the potential of some "reflexive phenomena" to develop within a 
community is therefore relevant to the social constructionist view, in 
particular, that all psychological phenomena are discursive products: 
A human being can encourage himself, give himself orders, 
obey, blame and punish himself; he can ask himself a 
question and answer it. We could even imagine human 
beings who spoke only in monologue; who accompanied their 
activities by talking to themselves.-An explorer who watched 
them and listened to their talk might succeed in translating 
their language into ours. (This would enable him to predict 
these people's actions correctly, for he also hears them 
making resolutions and decisions.) (PI, §243) 
The crucial point, as Hacker (1990) notes, is that Wittgenstein does not claim 
that "reflexive speech-acts are essentially parasitic on non-reflexive 
communicative ones" (p. 38). And as Bloor (1997) more specifically 
suggests, it is important to note that many activities can occur "by oneself" 
but not "with oneself" (Le., as Wittgenstein illustrates with the example of an 
individual who is not engaging in commerce when he hands himself a note 
(PI, §268)). 
Hacker's analysis is useful because it implies that Wittgensteinians 
should not be concerned with the attempt to prove that reflexive speech-acts 
like language in general should be regarded as "essentially, logically, social 
- like trade and barter" (p. 38). Wittgenstein avoids the notion that all forms 
of language-use and rule-following are dependent on a community (and 
thus should lead to the conclusion that language-based emotions such as 
pride are "essentially social"). Wittgenstein continues this line of thought: 
But could we also imagine a language in which a person could 
write down or give vocal expression to his inner 
experiences-his feelings, moods, and the rest-for his private 
use?-Well, can't we do so in our ordinary language?-But 
that is not what I mean. The individual words of this language 
are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; 
to his immediate private sensations. So another person 
cannot understand the language. (PI, §243) 
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Wittgenstein's philosophical target is "the idea of an unsharable language, 
one which cannot, in principle, be made intelligible to anyone other than its 
speaker" (Hacker, 1990, p. 38). Theoretical debates about the dependence 
of particular forms of emotion and personal reflexivity on a linguistic 
community should not therefore be conflated with the results of 
Wittgenstein's philosophical clarification. 
Recognition of the linguistic nature of psychological reflexivity - that 
a shared language is assumed - also needs to be contrasted with a further 
claim. It is undeniable that many forms of personal reflexivity and emotion 
are dependent on both language and culture, as social constructionists and 
critical psychologists recognize. But does recognition of the dependence of 
psychological reflexivity on language entail the further view, which Harre 
(1992) claims is common to all the various positions that constitute social 
constructionism, that "all the psychological phenomena and the beings in 
which they are realized are produced discursively" (p. 154)? In this respect 
an important point of clarification can be taken from Bloor's (1997) treatment 
of collectivist and individualist accounts of rules: 
... physical isolation is a different phenomenon from social 
isolation. Total physical isolation, from birth to death, would 
entail social isolation, but physical isolation, as such does not 
entail social isolation. (p. 92) 
In the latter case, it is likely that possibilities would exist for physically 
isolated individuals to demonstrate their ability to accord with community-
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based rules for the use of psychological concepts (e.g.,' such, as correctly 
distinguishing happiness from sadness). A more important point is that 
there are obviously degrees of difference with regard to particular 
phenomena and that each case has to be carefully examined (Le., in order 
to avoid reproducing the social-individual division that is prominent in 
psychology (Parker, 1989)). Thus while it is logically possible that an 
individual might develop a form of rule-governed, language-like expression 
in social and physical isolation that is translatable as "pride" in our linguistic 
cbmmunity, the matter of determining which forms of our pride will occur at 
particular points of individual development is a matter for research within 
psychology (see Part 2, chapter 8). 
The relevant Wittgensteinian point is that the concepts used by 
psychologists to produce objective observations and descriptions would not 
be intelligible without a common or shared language. In other words, the 
possibility of objectivity in psychology presupposes shared concepts, 
conventions, and actions (and intelligibility is the potential for these concepts 
to be shared). Nevertheless, realists such as Greenwood (1991) pursue a 
further criticism of social constructionists in which their denials of linguistic 
objectivity are based on the claim "our psychological discourse - our 
discourse putatively about psychological states - is simply not descriptive" 
(p. 44). Greenwood's rejection of this point implies social constructionist 
acceptance of the view that description of another person somehow creates 
the phenomenon involved. It seems more reasonable to allow that the 
individual speech-acts, re'flexive speech-acts and other activities of 
individuals who are not trained in any culture may inadvertently accord with 
the words and phrases of our linguistic community or achieve aims that are 
similar through their discursive acts (Le., both achievements do not 
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necessarily imply that we always give their words and actions meaning). To 
use the example of pride, an empirical issue is the extent to which some 
forms of pride would not occur in an individual who developed in social and 
physical isolation from birth, in contrast to the fact that someone from our 
culture would probably retain the ability to distinguish correctly and express 
their own feelings of pride and happiness even when physically isolated 
from other people for an extended period of time. 
However, this last example does get to the heart of the debate 
b'etween social constructionists and realist-cognitivists about the objectivity 
of persistent, meaningful individual abilities that presumably developed in 
our linguistic community. Greenwood's (1991) move from individual abilities 
that develop and are judged on the shared criteria of a collective to a focus 
on individual "properties" can also be found elsewhere. Gadenne (1989) 
provides a similar view of cognitive abilities in which "the ability to perform 
them ... is a property of an individual person" so that we are supposed to 
conclude: "the last survivor on earth can have a property of this kind" (p. 
459). With regard to a critical treatment of forms of language-related 
personal reflexivity and emotion, this "picture" can be seen to support the 
view that many forms of persistent individual psychological phenomena are 
best accounted for as objective cognitive properties. Admittedly, social 
constructionist accounts of phenomena described as "cognitive" have been 
refined since Harre's (1989) illustration of the thoroughly linguistic nature of 
calculation in his debate with Gadenne (Le., see Harre & Gillett, 1994). 
Moreover, while many social constructionists do not accept that all 
psychological phenomena are produced and maintained by linguistic 
participation, they are able to demonstrate particular conceptual problems. 
For example, emotions such as pride, shame and guilt need not be 
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described as the product of internal comparisons between an individual's 
actions and his or her internalized representation of a standard, rule or goal 
(Lewis, 1993; see Part 2, chapter 7). 
Social constructionists instead seek to determine how many forms of 
personal reflexivity and emotion involve conversation: to highlight, for 
example, the way in which people's complicated thoughtful reactions and 
attempts to change their own psychological states are closely related to 
language-use, linguistic skills and conversation-based activities. On this 
view not all cognitive activity should be regarded as public conversation by 
an individual rendered private (and perhaps also automated) through 
practice or silent self-control. But social constructionists emphasize the 
personal transformations and possibilities that occur through individual 
mastery of particular forms of rule-governed discourse. Is there, after all, a 
connection with the sense in which Gadenne argues that to know a rule in 
the sense that it has been internalized, privatized or mastered is for that rule 
to playa causal role in that individual's activities? At this juncture the debate 
surrounding intelligibility diverges into issues of causation and ontology. 
The relevant Wittgensteinian approach is to emphasise that the debate 
between social constructionists and realists is not more clearly understood 
by asking, for example, whether self-evaluation is the cognitive property 
essential to the emotion of pride because it must continue to exist in a 
physically isolated individual? Instead we need to show why a focus on 
inferred, hidden but nevertheless real cognitive structures is not necessarily 
wrong but, instead, is often irrelevant to a clear view of an individual's 
participation in social practices. 
In summary, a Wittgensteinian examination of the "objectivity of 
psychological phenomena" between social constructionists and realists was 
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provided through the issue of the intelligibility of individual language-use 
and activities. The realist-cognitive position represents individual cognitive 
abilities as embodied, objective properties which persist even during 
periods of physical isolation from a linguistic community. In contrast, social 
constructionists emphasize the linguistic and conversational nature of 
emotion and forms of personal reflexivity to the point that they seem to claim 
that all psychological phenomena must be the products of discursive and 
conversational activities (e.g., the privatization, internalization or mastery of 
rClles). This position was rejected in a manner that separates an 
investigation of the logical possibilities of psychological concepts and their 
potential intelligibility from empirical studies of the complicated degrees of 
dependence or independence of particular psychological phenomena 'from 
prior participation in the conversational practices of a linguistic community. 
The realist-cognitive position was also avoided in favour of a detailed 
examination of the importance of language to particular forms of personal 
reflexivity such as emotional identification. Wittgenstein's remarks suggest 
the importance of actual or potential intelligibility of putatively objective and 
individualistic uses of a language and linguistically-related abilities. More 
specifically, autonomous forms of human action in social and physical 
isolation do not require us to adopt a realist-cognitive ontology or translate 
ordinary linguistic practices into a discourse of objective psychological 
properties. The criterion of actual or potential intelligibility therefore 
indicates why stUdies of individual embodied cognitive properties and, in the 
next section, "hidden" levels of psychological phenomena are not 
necessarily wrong but irrelevant when attempting to understand the 
meaning and significance of particular linguistic acts and the consequences 
of other forms of discursive participation. 
2.3 Social constructionist ontology and its 
problems: a Wittgensteinian account 
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The Wittgensteinian treatment of divisive social constructionist and realist-
cognitive positions has, to this point, been given in predominantly meta-
methodological and epistemological terms. However, social constructionists 
provide a new twist to the debate and its relevance to emotion and personal 
reflexivity by arguing that conversation is "the primary human reality" 
(Shotter, 1992, p. 176). As Shotter indicates, the centrality of language, in 
general, and conversation, more specifically, presents psychologists with an 
ontological issue: 
While realists may not want to bother with their own ontology, 
the better to pay attention to the ontology of their surroundings, 
social constructionists loop the circle of reflexivity around onto 
themselves. From our point of view, it thus becomes a 
problem as to why, at this moment in history, we account for 
ourselves in the way we do-as if we all existed from birth as 
separate, isolated individuals, containing wholly within 
ourselves 'minds' or mentalities, set over against a material 
world itself devoid of any mental processes. (p. 177) 
Given this view and its possible consequences, an important question is 
whether there is a Wittgensteinian treatment of new discoveries in 
psychology that supports or is critical of the social constructionist ontology. 
For example, is it possible to describe potential studies of levels of reality 
other than the discursive or conversational while, at the same time, avoiding 
the problems that plague talk of cognitive models and discoveries? And can 
talk of hidden and new levels of psychological reality be assessed by re-
presenting our conversational use of social and psychological concepts? 
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Conversational reality and the status of hidden phenomena in 
psychology 
On the realist view, for psychology to be a science it must go beyond our 
everyday concepts to reveal the structures and patterns of different levels of 
reality: what may be described as phenomena of importance to psychology 
that are hidden from the "level" of everyday conversational reality. 
Reinforcing this view are a variety of ostensibly legitimate technological 
means of getting beyond shared ''form of life" limitations provided by 
cultural-linguistic practices and individual perceptual abilities. Of course, 
there are many challenging discoveries in psychology that do have the 
distinct feel of stripping away levels of preconception and revealing 
fundamental processes. Emotions, for example, can be described in 
neurophysiological and social-functional terms and forms of personal 
reflexivity can be seen to serve the needs of supra-conversational and 
agentive social forces and institutions11 • However, given our recognition of 
the inescapability of language as well as the more specific social 
constructionist emphasis on conversation as the "primary human reality", a 
Wittgensteinian account is required of how hidden phenomena can be 
revealed (e.g., on the basis of sense-extension from the conceptual-
discursive practices of reflexive psychologists). 
A point of fundamental importance to a Wittgensteinian perspective is 
that "there is no semantic exit from this language, either upwards into a 
hierarchy of meta-languages, or downwards to reality" (Glock, 1996, p. 246). 
By working within the complicated linguistic practices of psychology as they 
11 Willig's (1998) critical realist position is relevant in this regard because she is: 
... concerned with finding a method of analysis which is historically and 
linguistically reflexive, and which is also capable of guiding active intervention 
in ideological and material struggles. (p. 92) 
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have been, presently are and could be, we fashion concepts and practices 
that highlight important features of psychological phenomena. 
Wittgenstein's philosophy provides an outsider's perspective on psychology 
without producing a metalanguage (e.g., for describing the structures that 
underlie historical and cultural change). And, as already mentioned, the 
notion of a surview provides a comprehensive conceptual-discursive survey 
without being regarded as the "level" of "real data" that we must descend to 
from theory or, for that matter, use as the basis for theory building. We are, 
therefore, surrounded and constituted by conceptual-discursive activities: 
the phenomena of psychology cannot exist independently of our language 
and concepts except in what largely seem to be less complicated but not 
necessarily primitive forms of life (see chapter 3). 
The sense in which the conversational reality and practices of 
psychology exist in relation to psychology has already been described in 
terms of the game analogy (Le., different roles and skills for philosophers 
and psychologists rather than different levels of knowledge). There is an 
additional sense of levels that it is tempting to adopt and which is 
demonstrated by Averill's (1992) presentation of social, psychological and 
biological perspectives on emotion (see chapter 1, section 1.3). However, 
Averill argues that the investigation of levels of possible emotion studies 
"does not imply a hierarchy, for example, with the biological more 
fundamental than the psychological, and the psychological more 
fundamental than the social" (p. 4). Rather, Averill's metatheoretical point is 
to describe the different possible theory-based approaches to emotion (an 
issue which will be examined in the next section). However, his own 
approach to the "structural bases" of emotion obscures Glock's point as well 
as the lesson from the surview account that the "linguistic data" of everyday 
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life surround and constitute us: we manifest emotion and person discourses 
repeatedly in our commitments, we contribute to supporting practices and 
institutions by participating in conversational activities and we also 
misrepresent linguistic practices through our theories. 
However, it is only through a number of misconceptions that an anti-
realist psychological science can be formed on the basis of Wittgenstein's 
argument that important features of our lives are hidden through the 
misrepresentation of language. For example, a conceptual-discursive 
surview from the position of conversational reality seems to accord with 
Wittgenstein's view: 
Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither 
explains nor deduces anything.-Since everything lies open to 
view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for 
example, is of no interest to us. (PI, §126) 
Although the aim here is not to use Wittgenstein's remarks to mediate 
between social constructionist and realist positions, there is confusion about 
Wittgenstein's target. It is important to remind ourselves that Wittgenstein is 
writing primarily about philosophy and, moreover, follows the above remark 
with the further point: "one might also give the name 'philosophy' to what is 
possible before all new discoveries and inventions" (PI, §126). The 
interpretation of these remarks is significant because social constructionists 
such as Shotter (1992, 1996) have used them to argue against explanatory 
theories in psychology and, potentially, to social science (see chapter 3). 
However, there are good reasons for thinking that Wittgenstein's remarks 
were aimed more towards the problems of his earlier view of philosophy in 
the Tractatus rather than what are now described as different varieties of 
realism. Accordingly, Wittgenstein does not deny that theoretical 
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understanding of possibilities drive the development of further models, 
methods, techniques and findings in science (Hooker, 1987), but instead 
wants to identify specific instances where this attitude leads to conceptual 
entanglement (especially within psychology). 
If we accepted Shotter's interpretation we would be forced back 
towards the broad habit, developed in the context of realism and relativism 
debates, of asking such questions as "is there a 'real' beyond the text, or is 
language and discourse all there can be?" (Burr, 1998, pp. 14-15). The 
latter position is deeply problematic and yet it seems to be all that is 
available to social constructionists if Wittgenstein is rightly taken to rule out 
all theoretical speculation about objects or processes beyond 
conversational appearances (because everything important in psychology is 
already open to view or at least potentially open to view by rearrangement). 
However, it is clear from an examination of Wittgenstein's work that 
philosophy can describe those areas of psychology in which scientific 
discoveries open up new realms of phenomena such as class conflicts and 
neural pathways. More specifically, reflexive work from within our 
"conversational reality" requires us to say something about significant 
aspects of our life that are, to put it crudely, not immediately obvious 
because they are bigger and smaller than ourselves. For this reason, the 
following remark by Wittgenstein resembles a different kind of reflexive 
approach in psychology that can survey language while still producing a 
challenging perspective: 
The aspects of things that are most important to us are hidden 
because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to 
notice something-because it is always before one's eyes.) 
The real foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all. 
Unless that fact has at some time struck him.-And this means: 
we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and 
powerful. (PI, §129) 
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Without implying that Wittgenstein's philosophical method can be used to 
achieve the same results as a reflexive psychological inquiry, this position 
can be extended to a treatment of what were called social concepts in 
chapter 1: namely, the predicates connected with first person, second 
person and third person plural uses of language that suggest broader 
issues about the relations of individuals to collectives (and perhaps even the 
effects and consequences of different forms of personal reflexivity in 
collective terms). 
A conceptual-discursive account is therefore possible of the 
conversational means by which judgements about broad collective 
phenomena are examined, understood, articulated, and expressed in 
everyday life (Le., without arguing that the cultural practices and social 
arrangements we have "arrived at" are social constructions). An example is 
the notion of individual descriptions and judgements of collective 
phenomenon such as the "emotional climate" of a group or nation (de 
Rivera, 1992). While it may be relatively easy, for example, on a particular 
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occasion to summarize a shared feeling (e.g, a specific instance of family 
pride), on other occasions remarks about what "we" share appear to be 
generalizations that are difficult to substantiate: they are broad and 
sweeping statements that test the limits of normal conversational practices 
and abilities. For example, is a protesting crowd motivated by a deep sense 
of national pride or is it a dangerous mob that is threatening disorder? In 
such cases, the judgements involved are complicated and many 
psychologists would cede at this point of potential explanation to the 
disciplines of history, sociology and anthropology. Thus one means by 
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wbich we are able to articulate and judge these broader concerns is 
theoretical and may involve points about the broad organization of our 
social lives only when particular, cultural events occur. For example, the 
grief surrounding Princess Diana's funeral provided a unique and revealing 
opportunity for many social scientists to ''test'' and revise generalizations 
about people's underlying emotions, the effects of shared feelings and ways 
in which collective manifestations of grief can have unpredictable features. 
One of the reasons for problems with social concepts is that the 
individual seems to be unimportant and the effects of important events are 
usually intangible (Le., an increase in group pride may have occurred for 
some reason without necessarily being immediate obvious to other 
individuals). It is important to examine the way in which this information is 
constructed, common means of summarizing it, how particular judgements 
are formed and the various positions of individuals who represent or 
express a common feeling (or simply are supposed to speak on behalf of the 
groups that they belong to). These are all conversational practices that 
create, articulate and extend a sense of the wider feeling of a community 
and the institutions that shape society. The argument here is not to project 
the notion of theoretical description of properties onto these broader 
institutions and issues, beyond a normal sense of our connection to these 
issues (or, for example, the function of related emotions). But this is why 
Oatley (1993) presumably describes a contrasting sense of social 
constructionism to Shotter's in which people are offered "views below the 
surface of our emotional interactions" and which also suggest "purposes for 
emotions that other approaches wou Id find hard to accommodate" (p. 351) 12. 
12 The aim of some of the relevant sections of Part 2 is not to talk of social structures and focus 
on their hidden features, but rather to represent clearly the foundations of our inquiries that 
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A further sense of hidden phenomena (or aspects of phenomena) 
from the perspective of "conversational reality" is the entirely ordinary sense 
of privacy in conversation. The relevant issue here is the potential of the 
emphasis upon hidden psychological states and mental processes to imply 
a realist-cognitive ontology: that is, to treat private experiences and 
unobservable (by normal perceptual means) changes as if they are objects 
with some of the properties ascribed to them by theoretical descriptions. 
Wittgenstein provides an ordinary sense of hidden that is applicable to 
another direction in which we may move from conversation and possibly, 
seek to represent the privacy and embodiment of our individual judgements, 
reactions and experiences. Although Wittgenstein offers many examples 
the following is relevant to the realist-cognitive emphasis on hidden 
processes (I.e., given the treatment of reflexive speech-acts): 
"What anyone says to himself within himself is hidden from 
me" might of course also mean that I can for the most part not 
guess it, nor can I read it off from, for example, the movement of 
his throat (which would be a possibility). (PI, Ilxi, p. 221) 
While Wittgenstein seems to allow the possibility of empirical studies of 
psychological phenomena that employ some of the "sense extending 
instruments" Greenwood (1991) and others argue are necessary for a 
science of psychology, it is also clear that he is more interested in an 
everyday sense in which phenomena of interest to psychologists can be 
hidden. What Wittgenstein therefore hints at are problems surrounding 
privacy and individuality that require a normative understanding through 
conversational engagement rather than a scientific sense of revealing 
come from participating in and potentially contributing towards pre-existing cultural and social 
arrangements. 
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hidden processes or structures (e.g., where we seek to understand the 
cultural and personal significance of linguistic practices such as a 
confession rather than the discovery of concomitant neurophysiological 
processes) . 
Wittgenstein also implies that when information about psychological 
phenomena becomes more distant from and less useful in our 
conversational reality, issues relating to the significance and meaning of 
those actions and reactions are more likely to be bypassed. Accordingly, 
social constructionism needs to provide a convincing account of how 
descriptions of hidden phenomena and the technology responsible for them 
find their way back into cultural practices and ordinary language. Although it 
is more interesting to explore the use of such phrases as "I just felt a surge of 
adrenalin" than obscure references to unperceived physiological 
components such as "there's probably a great deal of activity in my 
hypothalamus", both examples demonstrate the limits of "searching for 
traces of the real in the manifestations which compose the actual world as 
we conceive it" (Brown, Pujol & Curt, 1998, p. 79). Instead of using 
Wittgenstein's remarks and authority to end debate about the proper 
"objects" (or subjects) of psychology, reminders can be assembled about the 
use of technology to investigate and, in some cases, localize hidden 
processes. For example, when concomitant physiological measures are 
used to infer the "real processes" responsible for psychological phenomena, 
their use also confirms what Wittgenstein describes as ''the fluctuation of 
scientific definitions: what to-day counts as an observed concomitant of a 
phenomenon will to-morrow be used to define it" (PI, §79). 
An empirical correlation from an underlying or accompanying level to 
an observable action may therefore be used tentatively at first, and then, so 
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to speak, definitively. But in the process it is important to resist identity 
claims which are often the product of familiarity with a new theoretical 
concept and its specific criteria. For example, while technological sense-
extension has added the concept of adrenalin to the everyday vocabulary 
for expressing emotions, it can hardly be said that the expression "I feel a 
burst of adrenalin" indicates that an individual's introspective abilities have 
been "extended" to include previously inaccessible physiological changes. 
This is not to deny that investigations of hidden phenomena often provide us 
with information that contributes towards specific practices and improved 
self-knowledge (e.g., knowledge that panic attacks are fuelled by 
overbreathing can be comforting to a client and may also provide the basis 
for specific psychological intervention). However, the point here has been to 
avoid essentialism with regard to individual psychological phenomena and 
to resist the argument that any useful reference to hidden processes 
necessarily involves a realm of real processes that underlie the "surface" of 
our social relations and personal activities. 
To reiterate, on the Wittgensteinian view there is not semantic escape 
from language to a metalanguage or "down" to a reality that is not 
fundamentally conversational. However, the realist-cognitive view that the 
phenomena of real interest to psychologists are hidden is not as inimical to 
Wittgenstein's philosophy as social constructionists suggest. For example, 
Wittgenstein suggests that important aspects of phenomena are hidden from 
"conversational reality" because of simplicity and familiarity. Wittgenstein's 
grammatical approach was extended to show that the conceptual-discursive 
detail of many social concepts can highlight important features of the 
foundations of our inquiry (Le., what might otherwise be presented as 
hidden social structures that are best examined through theoretical 
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descriptions derived from other disciplines). An ordinary sense of "hidden" 
thoughts and feelings, for example, also needs to be retained in the other 
direction away from "conversational reality" (Le., towards hidden 
neurophysiological and physiological processes). In this latter case, it is 
also clear that a general ontology of real processes that are of more interest 
than social relations and personal activities can be rejected along with 
broad social constructionist dismissals of specific hidden aspects of 
phenomena. 
The potential to describe possible studies and levels of 
psychological phenomena 
Earlier remarks were made about general theories and the gestalt or whole 
of which particular types of theories from different disciplines seem to 
highlight only aspects. From the perspective of psychology, it is tempting to 
describe potential investigations of psychological phenomena in terms of 
different levels (Le., the potential social and historical studies of emotion and 
personal reflexivity, psychological studies, and cognitive-biological studies). 
Consistent with the "gestalt" view explored in chapter 1, it may seem as if the 
resulting collection of theories of a particular phenomenon will provide a 
"'seamless' picture of reality" and its "levels" of explanation in a mutually 
consistent set of theories (Munro, 1992, p. 109). Although recognition of 
important in principle limits to complete theorizing in psychology have 
already been emphasized, it is important to see what advantages and 
disadvantages arise from the possibility of describing the levels of possible 
studies in psychology (especially when a Wittgensteinian framework is 
used). 
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A metatheoretical summary of levels of possible investigations of a 
psychological phenomenon is often regarded as a useful means of 
describing potential areas of investigation, driving possible theoretical 
advances and indicating likely empirical discoveries with regard to a 
particular psychological phenomenon. A relevant example of such a 
perspective is provided by Averill's (1992) account of the entire domain of 
possible studies of emotion and, in particular, the argument that we must 
examine social, psychological and biological "levels" of emotion because 
"any analysis that remains on only one level must ... be incomplete" (Averill, 
1992, p. 20). A Wittgensteinian position can be adopted on Averill's account 
which also has the benefit of extending remarks made in the previous 
section about hidden phenomena (Le., the role of theories and technology in 
"making real" otherwise intangible or underlying properties of social and 
personal phenomena). In this context, a comprehensive conceptual-
discursive survey can be taken to represent the pretheoretical whole that 
emotion and personal reflexivity studies attempt to explain (or highlight 
"gaps" in our knowledge which seem to require the collection of more 
empirical information). Moreover, to continue the argument that Wittgenstein 
, 
inverts the usual sense of theory and data in psychology, the levels 
described by Averill can be regarded as an attempt to summarize "the 
'possibilities' of phenomena" in the same sense in which we can use 
Wittgenstein's philosophy to "remind ourselves ... of the kind of statement 
that we make about phenomena" (PI, §90). 
The position that Averill advocates can therefore be described as 
similar to a surview except that the account moves in the other direction: 
namely, "down" to empirically-oriented attempts to represent psychological 
phenomena rather than "up" towards theory and metatheory (or a 
150 
philosophy in which such moves are questionable). However, Averill does 
imply that for a study of a particular phenomenon such as pride, it is not 
sufficient to examine only the social, psychological and biological levels. 
And in a move which is similar to the outcome of a comprehensive 
investigation of a psychological concept used in all pronoun forms, Averill 
argues that we should examine both collective and individual sense of 
social, psychological and biological levels. In this manner, it may seem as if 
Averill has described possible studies Wittgenstein may not have 
considered relevant to psychology. In this respect, a description of possible 
studies is important because it can be used to indicate novel directions for 
further research (thus indicating a further connection between creativity, 
psychological reflexivity and Wittgenstein's descriptive approach). For 
example, this view not only indicates how some of the more radical features 
of social constructionist accounts of emotions must have been "discovered" 
by earlier theorists, it also suggests possible combinations of levels of 
interest in both general and particular phenomena. An obvious example is 
where both collective structural variables of society (or culture) and biology 
(species differences) are combined to form a comprehensive account of our 
history, prehistory and natural history (I.e., in a manner that may be 
especially relevant to the development of more "intellectual" and human 
emotions such as hope and pride; see Part 2, chapter 5). 
In addition, when talk of structures interacting at such broad collective 
levels is examined over time, it is difficult to disentangle important features of 
the potential investigation of the genesis of particular psychological 
phenomena. For example, the relations between cultural and biological 
levels may involve self-feedback or circular loops with which emerging 
forms of culture created further selection pressures for particular skills and 
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abilities in early humans (Wills, 1993; ct. Dennett, 1995 in Part 2, chapter 5). 
In a point which will be explained in the next chapter, studies of evolutionary 
processes and other broader patterns of human existence may also confront 
"form of life" limitations (although speculation here is close to doing work 
within the discipline, a point that philosophers such as Dennett (1995) are 
well aware of). Creative directions for research which would require 
evidence to be assembled about particular forms of development might 
include those features of individual autonomy important to the emergence of 
emotion and forms of personal reflexivity (i.e., where the differences 
between humans and other close genetic relatives are placed within a 
cultural-evolutionary framework along with the potential for individuals in our 
species' natural history to provide a point of innovation for their collective). 
Interestingly, the relevance of Wittgensteinian approach even with 
regard to speculative theoretical work is to demonstrate the importance of 
clarity about any potential imposition or projection upon prehistorical 
investigations and inferences (i.e., what is mistakenly regarded as natural 
from the perspective of our current cultural practices). For Wittgenstein 
examined many issues related to the use of psychological concepts such as 
thought and emotion in their surrounding cultural practices. For example, 
Wittgenstein identifies a picture that seems to inform our understanding of 
the emergence of personal emotions in our evolutionary past. And although 
his remarks refer to the "evolution of the higher animals and of man, and the 
awakening of consciousness at a particular level" (PI, vii, p. 184), the 
relevant point is still the influence of the picture that "one day man opens his 
seeing eye, and there is light" (PI, vii, p. 184). 
We can extend this example to relevant instances of personal 
reflexivity and emotion such as self-consciousness about an emotion and 
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the possible significance of this for our species: "one day an individual turns 
his thoughts inwards and begins to try to change his or her most private 
feelings". Acknowledging that our language about the origin of definitively 
human phenomena contains this picture, Wittgensteinians turn their 
attention towards its use or misuse. As Wittgenstein notes: 
What is to be done with the picture, how it is to be used, is still 
obscure. Quite clearly, however, it must be explored if we want 
to understand the sense of what we are saying. But the picture 
seems to spare us this work: it already points to a particular 
use. This is how it takes us in. (PI, vii, p. 184) 
Whether one agrees with this criticism or not, it is possible to see how broad 
talk of the evolution of the human potential for forms of personal reflexivity 
and emotion could easily provide the basis for seriously misleading 
investigations of the collective and natural historical "level" of a 
psychological phenomenon. 
Description of possible studies is also important because it highlights 
limits to the "big" theories and smaller studies that attempt to open up new 
research areas and potential realms of "objects". In this respect, 
Wittgenstein's remarks ·about the "foundations" of our inquiry (PI, §129) and 
recognition that we may confront ''form of life" limitations are both relevant 
because creative combinations of particular levels may also seem to 
produce nonsense. A creative example that has already been mentioned is 
de Rivera's (1992) notion of "emotional climates" which could be regarded 
as supra-conversational "objects" with "properties" that are more easily 
sensed than they are accurately described. In another case, a combination 
of social and biological levels in relation to the study of individuals implies a 
field of social neurophysiology (Le., without the sort of extra or intervening 
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"level" that characterizes cognitive psychology; see next section). And, 
pace Bowers' (1991) account of how cognitive science avoids reflexivity by 
discursive and practical manipulation of time and space, the unfolding of an 
emotion syndrome can be slowed down by technology and, thus re-present 
to us the course of emotion expressions in minute detail. The last example, 
however, illustrates that an extension to the "form of life" foundation of an 
inquiry (Le., our normal perceptual abilities) can have both revealing and 
nonsensical results. The point is that when we examine the unfolding 
changes that contribute towards a spontaneous expression of emotion 
through a slowed down recording, the results reveal underlying processes 
while at the same time they render the emotion unrecognizable13• 
To summarize, the view that all the levels of possible emotion studies 
can be described approximates the notion of a surview. On the 
Wittgensteinian view adopted here it is similar to, but not the same as, the 
investigation of logical possibilities of our psychological concepts. Where 
the social, psychological and biological possibilities of emotion and 
personal reflexivity are examined in terms of individual and collective 
changes over time, it is possible to investigate possible new and novel 
combinations of types of variables in order to fill in gaps in our knowledge. 
The role of Wittgenstein's philosophy with respect to such novel lines of 
investigation is to counter any misleading pictures that inform the studies 
13 The view that we have examined all of the logical possibilities that might, in this case, relate 
to possible studies of emotion and personal reflexivity also suggests a further point. 
Although a surview provides examples that may allow us to highlight conceptual comparisons 
and similarities that have disguised by our forms of language, the same activity may also reveal 
sites of possible interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary innovation. While it may seem as if the 
logical possibilities of psychological concepts can be filled out by investigations of time and 
social, psychological and biological/eve/s of reality, we can also consider future changes that 
may further alter the domain of emotion. For example, we can imagine cultural and 
technological changes in the future that may render many of our present studies obsolete. 
This may involve considering the development and possible effects of the technologies that 
we have developed to control, change and alter our emotions (even though their purpose 
may not be represented in this fashion) as well as future evolutionary changes to our species. 
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involved. Moreover, it is entirely possible that speculation about future 
changes may indicate new research directions and possible forms of 
theorizing that have yet to be considered. In this respect, a further useful 
similarity was established between Wittgenstein's philosophy and reflexive 
studies in psychology that attempt to inspire creative and challenging 
directions for future research. 
Wittgensteinian criticisms of accounts at the cognitive level: the 
example of emotion and reflexive cognition 
An important issue connecting Wittgensteinian philosophy with actual and 
potential investigations of emotion and personal reflexivity is whether it is 
appropriate to use specific philosophical remarks to counter the prevalent 
discourse in psychology of a hidden level of cognitive objects. While 
Bowers' (1991) account of the "outsider critiques" offered by 
Wittgensteinians and the "insider dealing" of cognitive scientists to avoid 
reflexive problems by cognitive scientists has been included, a remaining 
issue is whether there are some Wittgensteinian points of clarification that 
bear on the attempt by both sides to institute their versions of the cognitive 
aspects of phenomena. It is important to consider this issue not only 
because it provides a last point of contrast between social constructionist 
and realist-cognitive accounts in psychology, but also because failure to 
offer some clarification would obscure the consideration of cognitive aspects 
of pride in Part 2. 
In accord with the issues examined to this point, it is possible to 
examine the problem of theoretical descriptions that refer to hidden 
cognitive aspects of psychological phenomena at collective-evolutionary 
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and individual-biological "levels". With regard to the first issue and broad 
comparisons with other species, it is clear that humans have many 
embodied cognitive abilities and potentialities which are not shared by other 
animals. Although accepting this point seems to concede little, as 
subsequent examples will show there is considerable potential for cognitive 
theorists to provide a confused account of the evolution of emotion and 
forms of personal reflexivity. A initial critique of cognitive accounts at the 
evolutionary "level" can be derived from Wittgenstein's account of pictures 
that suggest a realm of possible objects for investigation which are not 
easily dismissed as nonsensical. Another reason for exploring a 
Wittgensteinian position with respect to the cognitive ontology is the 
implication that some highly theoretical explanations in psychology pose 
similar problems to the concepts of set theory because: 
A picture is conjured which seems to fix the sense 
unambiguously. The actual use, compared with that suggested 
by the picture, seems like something muddied. Here again we 
get the same thing as in set theory: the form of the expression 
we use seems to have been designed for a god, who knows 
what we cannot know; he sees the whole of each of those 
infinite series and he sees into human consciousness. For us, 
of course, these,forms of expression are like pontificals which 
we may put on, but cannot do much with, since we lack the 
effective power that would give these vestments meaning and 
purpose (PI, §426). 
The conclusion that Wittgenstein draws is, not surprisingly, that a clear 
representation of language or, in postmodern parlance, conversational 
activities, is required because "in the actual use of expressions we make 
detours, we go by side-roads" (PI, §426). Pictures that map out the research 
agenda for psychology (in this case exemplified by cognitive psychology) 
can therefore be treated as similar to the case in which "we see the straight 
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highway before us, but of course, we cannot use it, because it is 
permanently closed" (PI, §246). On this view, attempts to make the program 
of cognitive science work as well as to recognize its limits involve 
recognizing that the route (the ideal) is closed. The Wittgensteinian 
suggestion is therefore similar to the approach that Bowers (1991) argues 
has been taken towards cognitive science in general, but with one addition: 
the fact that cognitive psychology "may well turn out to be impossible" (p. 52) 
does not rule out the right of psychologists to pursue a nonsensical research 
program. 
The deep appeal of the type of picture identified by Wittgenstein can 
be seen in theoretical descriptions of cognitive phenomena as a collective, 
evolutionary development. This issue is important because it suggests the 
relevance of alternative connections between culture, language, identity and 
emotion emphasized by social constructionists. Mandler (1992), for 
example, clearly allies himself with the picture that supports the cognitive 
ontology with his argument that the evolution of cognitive abilities underlying 
distinctly human forms of emotion and personal reflexivity "took place before 
the emergence of verbal language and its particularly powerful ability to 
encode and communicate evaluations and values" (p. 105). Mandler also 
fills out the details of the picture with speculation about the next crucial 
development towards humanity after that of specific response tendencies 
and action syndromes: "the next evolutionary step was probably the 
emergence of mental representations of these actions, what are the 
'affective', cognitive evaluation of actions and situations" (p. 105). 
For the present purposes, it is not essential that we deterrnine 
whether these remarks are correct or incorrect since some theorists are 
content to think "cognition" can be taken to mean an ontologically neutral 
157 
sense of representation (e.g., Greenwood's (1991) treatment of mental 
representation does not make any claims about the real nature of the 
properties described). Instead, the main target is the picture of a preceding 
level of cognitive changes and the critical treatment of it is a combination of 
Wittgenstein's remarks and an extension of Harre's (1989) Wittgenstein-
inspired presentation of an alternative dual ontology. Harre's account is 
relevant because even with collective human developments, describing a 
biological change as a cognitive difference has unnecessary ontological 
implications; indeed, as shall be demonstrated below, such an account of 
phylogenetic development may recapitulate similar arguments about the 
ontogeny of individual pride and self-evaluative properties or abilities. But is 
it reasonable to attack a cognitive account of the complicated biological 
changes that ground human language use in this fashion? 
An indication that this extended form of realist-cognitive account is 
problematic is provided by other accounts of the embodiment of 
psychological phenomena. For example, Dennett's (1995) account of the 
evolution of individual representation seems very similar to social 
constructionist accounts of personal reflexive abilities as internalized 
conversation. Harre's (1989) dual ontology is also useful in this regard 
because of its implied criticism of an intervening level of cognitive 
phenomena between cultural practices such as the family and the 
supposedly universal biological prerequisites which provide the basis for 
specifically human and individual psychological phenomena. Wittgenstein-
inspired alternatives such as distinguishing between language and proto-
linguistic behaviour can be explored (Le., instead of focusing on crucial 
cognitive developments when reconstructing the evolution of differences 
between humans and other animals; see Part 2, chapter 5). More specific 
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accounts of the development of distinctly human phenomena such as 
Weisfeld and Beresford's (1982) account of the biological bases of pride 
and shame may then put into context: 
If man's capacity for pride and shame-his concern about his 
social status in the broadest sense-evolved from primate 
dominance and submission behaviours, respectively, then 
perhaps homologies in the neural bases of these behaviours 
can be demonstrated (p. 126) 
However disagreeable Weisfeld and Beresford's (1982) talk of a biological 
basis for self-evaluative emotions is, it is preferable to invoking a cognitive 
explanatory level. Of course, inferred cognitive processes could be 
regarded as overlaid on existing neurophysiological structures thus 
providing a form of description capable of empirical confirmation (except 
where the issue is the natural history of emotions such as pride provided by 
anthropological studies; see chapter 5, section 5.4). It is theoretically 
possible that an account could be offered of the neurophysiological 
developments that have made the development of culture-specific and 
language-dependent forms of emotion and personal reflexivity possible (Le., 
the way in which changes in brain structure and function have "built up", 
therefore making further forms of evolution possible and contrasting forms of 
emotional expression and display less likely). 
However, it is usually when examining the relations between 
psychological and biological "levels" that problems arise with an ontology of 
real intermediary cognitive processes. At this point, consideration of a 
social constructionist alternative is important, because if Harre's (1989) dual 
ontology is, so to speak, grammatically ratified and theoretically neutral, 
many conversation-based skills and dispositions can be said to be 
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biologically grounded without ignoring their conventional aspects. And, 
more specifically, theories that encourage investigations of an intervening 
(or overlaid) cognitive "level" in order to render intelligible the relation 
between the physiology of the brain can be redescribed in terms of 
individually realized, autonomous and potentially private conversational 
skills. The resulting account should provide the basis for specific attempts 
within psychology to explain the ontogenetic transformation that allows 
"basically organismic emotions" (Rosenberg, 1990) such as happiness to be 
refined into more refined and complicated adult emotional forms. 
The ontology of a cognitive "level" can be seen as an extension of the 
everyday nature of theoretical descriptions of hidden psychological 
phenomena (e.g., as indicated by Greenwood's account of an ascription of 
shame as a theoretical description). But Kaplan (1986) demonstrates how 
positing hidden processes can be conflated with everyday talk of 
conventionally private thoughts and feelings when he remarks self-
evidently: "others do not directly perceive the subject's self-conceiving and 
self-feeling activities" (p. 3). In order to offset the slide towards positing 
cognitive "objects", it is crucial to clarify how privacy is created and 
, 
maintained with respect to a phenomenon such as pride (Le., when people 
guess the thoughts and feelings of others they do not adopt an ontology of 
hidden objects or intervening processes (PI, Ilxi, p. 223)). Wertsch (1993) is 
an example of another psychologist who argues that very little is lost by 
resisting the use of such expressions as "internalizing a skill", "structure", or 
"concept" (p. 169). It is crucial to avoid the picture that accompanies 
internalization accounts in which an increasingly complicated "level" of 
internal processes is used to explain many context-specific and language-
related developmental changes. Accordingly, when armed with a 
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conceptual-discursive means of countering the "pitfalls encouraged by the 
metaphor of internalization" (Wertsch, 1993, p. 169), it is possible to 
reinterpret cognitive accounts of psychological changes that do occur in 
connection with such highly conceptual and linguistic forms of emotion and 
personal reflexivity. 
However, we still need to determine the significance of empirical 
work in psychology that aims to reveal facts about the individual 
embodiment and neurophysiological limits of many psychological and 
reflexive abilities (e.g., such as the limits of self-control or self-
consciousness). Interestingly, Mandler (1992) also suggests that an 
important 20th century attitude in psychology which is exemplified by the 
field of emotion has been to show how "unitary subjective experiences" are 
"the result of specific underlying (usually unconscious) mechanisms and 
processes" (p. 98). As a result, the investigation of a phenomenon like pride 
may only seem to be appropriately explained by a theoretical inference of 
self-evaluative processes and mechanisms (Le., because theorists such as 
Kaplan (1986) claim to provide a cognitive scientific extension of the 
commonsense view that emotions are the result of a stimulus-interpretation-
affect-behaviour sequence). The notion that progress in our understanding 
of emotion is most likely to occur on the basis of revealing more hidden 
detail is evident in a remark by Ellsworth (1991) that is directed towards the 
earlier approach of Kaplan and others: 
. . . appraisal theories, by breaking down the interpretation 
process into components, suggest that the stages implied by 
these theories are far too global. (p. 157) 
Accordingly, while it is important not to deny that there are psychological 
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changes in the individual that occur when skills, techniques and concepts 
are mastered (as well as changes in facial expression and bodily responses 
that we are not aware of), there seems to be no advantage in adopting an 
realist-cognitive ontology. 
However, if many forms of personal reflexivity can be described as 
cognitive phenomena, this may seem to create a problem about their 
appropriate treatment. For example, can cases of pride be distinguished 
from those of joy because they rely on different (and perhaps discretely 
embodied) cognitive processes? One conceptual approach to this 
ontological problem is provided by an extension of Wittgenstein's 
analogous interest in the differences between a practised and an 
unpractised reader. For Wittgenstein considers the temptation to think that 
when there is "no difference in what they happen to be conscious of", we 
must instead investigate a difference: 
... in the unconscious workings of their mind, or, again, in the 
brain.-So we should like to say: There are at all events two 
different mechanisms at work here. And what goes on in them 
must distinguish reading from not reading. (PI, § 156) 
However, Wittgenstein's reply is to note that "these mechanisms are only 
hypotheses, models designed to explain, to sum up, what you observe" (PI, 
§ 156). The need to provide a form of representation to sum up the detail 
that has discovered should not be taken as evidence for a whole new level 
of mysteriolJs psychological objects. Obviously, cognitive changes are often 
posited to explain changes in social behaviour and its biological 
underpinnings (especially where development suggests an ontogenetic 
equivalent of the phylogenetic argument examined above). For example, 
Stipek, Recchia, & McClintic (1992) use the occurrence . of . people's 
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emotional behaviour to infer, study and even "see" the underlying cognitive 
processes. However, whether the phenomenon of interest is reading skills 
or different emotions, the danger in both cases is that the use of emotions or 
"emotional behaviour" such as pride to infer cognitive processes and 
explore the "real process" of self-evaluation (Lewis, 1993, p. 86) may 
eventually become more important than the phenomenon we set out to 
study. In other words, by the time these forms of theoretical sense-extension 
and description of detail have been exhausted, the result is often that the 
phenomenon that was initially of interest is no longer recognizable14• 
To reiterate, from a Wittgensteinian perspective it is easy to 
misrepresent the nature and significance of statements about levels of real 
cognitive intermediaries, changes and prerequisites, especially in relation to 
the phylogeny and ontogeny of distinctly human psychological phenomena. 
An initial Wittgensteinian criticism centred on pictures that inform the 
temptation to posit collective cognitive developments as crucial to our 
species' forms of emotion and personal reflexivity. After advocating a 
careful focus on cultural, linguistic and biological evolutionary changes, a 
similar position was adopted towards psychological accounts of individual 
development. Accordingly, the development of emotions such as pride and 
shame can be viewed in terms of conversation-based skills and grounded in 
embodied dispositions. Moreover, Wittgenstein's remarks and Harre's dual 
14 In other cases it is an empirical matter as to whether more precise information about 
particular areas of brain activity and function could be used to erode privacy or gain control 
over these processes (see section 2.3.3). But it is important to recognize the conventional 
nature of the limits on psychologists' attempts to discover the manner in which underlying 
physiological processes provide the basis for conversation-based abilities (Le., such as those 
of personal reflexivity). For example, Scherer (1992) notes that expanding "our knowledge of 
the substratum, particularly the localization, of cognitive processing" will provide "important 
insights into the nature and temporal unfolding of these processes" (p. 140). But this 
enthusiasm is qualified by the fact that the provision of more detail only has a one-way use. 
Thus it seems that "even the most fine-grained analysis of regional blood flow or 
electrochemical activity in the brain is unlikely to provide detailed information about the 
content and the context of the cognitive processes under study" (p. 140). 
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ontology were used to show why we should not feel compelled to produce 
additional summaries of significant psychological changes either in terms of 
a cognitive "overlaying" of "basically organismic foundations" or as the result 
of different mechanisms in the "unconscious workings" of the mind or brain. 
Summary 
In chapter 2 several complicated issues which surround discussions of 
psychological reflexivity and distinguish social constructionists from their 
realist-cognitive opponents were examined. The first issue to be addressed 
was the difficulty of representing "grammar" from within when our language 
can be regarded as both arbitary and autonomous. The latter point was 
illustrated by Wittgenstein's treatment of the difficulties of introducing new 
psychological concepts in the remarks that constitute the "Private Language 
Argument". While attempts by psychologists to achieve a surview of a part of 
grammar seem to depend upon their ability to be reflexive, this simply 
means that they should represent all of the relevant forms of discourse that 
can be found the linguistic practices available within their culture. This 
approach does not entail that Wittgenstein's philosophical means of 
achieving a surview of psychological concepts provides a new method for 
psychologists since Wittgenstein's own remarks highlight the limits of 
conceptual-discursive investigation. Although an examination of concepts 
does not substitute for a practical mastery of the practices in which those 
concepts are used, a comprehensive conceptual-discursive survey may still 
resemble reflexive studies in psychology because it highlights features of 
our discursive practices that would otherwise be ignored. Thus 
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Wittgenstein's philosophical method can assemble useful and challenging 
reminders of everyday discourse for psychologists without necessitating the 
adoption of this method within psychology as a poor substitute for empirical 
investigation and further theory construction. 
The Wittgensteinian reconsideration of psychological reflexivity was 
then strengthened by an examination of the view that the truth about 
psychological phenomena is "independent of whether we human beings 
know it or not". When applied to psychology, Wittgenstein's analysis 
suggested that talk of objectivity as a social "construct" should instead be 
viewed as practices we have "arrived at". Also it is possible that our cultural 
and linguistic practices may change so that previous descriptions of 
psychological phenomena are no longer useful (i.e., rather than "less 
objective"). While this Wittgensteinian reconsideration of psychological 
reflexivity seemed to support a realist account, Greenwood's account of 
"linguistic objectivity" as approaching psychological phenomena from a 
legitimately fashioned "distance" was criticized. Greenwood's realist attack 
on reflexivity and linguistic interdependence is based on an argument that 
participant's accounts are only important where they agree with theoretical 
descriptions offered by psychologists. More specifically, linguistic objectivity 
involves two contestable forms of distancing: psychologists' use of terms 
that "isolated" research participants need not understand and theoretical 
descriptions which refer to objects that occupy a different time or space to 
that of the researcher. Both approaches presuppose the intelligibility of 
abilities which, although dependent on a linguistic community, can persist in 
an embodied fashion during periods of social and physical isolation. 
However, Wittgenstein's philosophical remarks do not support the view that 
all psychological phenomena must be the products of discursive and 
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conversational activities. Thus the dependence or independence of 
particular forms of personal reflexivity and emotion, for example, on the 
conversational practices of a linguistic community should be decided within 
psychology. 
A critical account was then provided of problems with the social 
constructionist ontology focusing on conversation as the "primary human 
reality" and attempts to examine "levels" of phenomena beyond what is 
regarded as conversational/psychological reality. Examples of collective 
and individual aspects of phenomena were explored in order to 
demonstrate why it is important even for a conceptual-discursive approach 
to explore statements and judgements about processes and structures that 
are, to put it simply, bigger and smaller than individuals. It is therefore not 
enough to use Wittgenstein's "nothing is hidden" remark in philosophy to 
avoid the issue of "sense-extension" to other levels of psychological 
phenomena. However, when an exhaustive account of possible levels of 
investigation is provided with the additional "dimension" of time, it may 
resemble a Wittgenstein investigation of the "possibilities of phenomena" 
(Le., without identifying "gaps" in our knowledge or suggesting creative 
combinations of variables from otherwise different "levels"). It is also 
possible to provide Wittgensteinian criticisms of realist-cognitive approaches 
to the phylogeny and ontogeny of distinctly human psychological 
phenomena. Accordingly, Harre's dual ontology was extended to counter 
the view that a level of real cognitive objects or structures underlies 
significant developments of our species. Collective evolutionary changes 
responsible for the development of conversation-based forms of emotion 
and personal reflexivity can be therefore described as biologically grounded 
without recourse to a mediating level of cognitive objects. Individual 
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cognitive accounts of the development of emotions such as pride and 
improvement of socially important skills were similarly reconsidered in 
Wittgensteinian terms. The results suggest we can examine the empirical 
detail of psychological changes without feeling compelled to accept that real 
cognitive processes and mechanisms have been (or will eventually be) 
found in the "unconscious workings" of the mind or brain. 
CHAPTER 3: Wittgensteinian description and its 
potential to augment existing self-
critical psychological positions 
Introduction 
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To this point, the consequences and limits of psychological reflexivity have 
been examined in terms of the following specific issues: the relations 
between Wittgensteinian philosophy and psychology, the role of conceptual-
discursive investigations, problems with pictures of objectivity, and the need 
to clarify the contribution of studies of hidden levels of psychological 
phenomena. In this chapter, psychological reflexivity again provides the 
conceptual impetus to examine a further range of problems centred on 
explanation. Wittgenstein's descriptive philosophical remarks are used to 
criticize and, potentially, to augment social constructionist alternatives. The 
issues to be examined include: criticisms of broad explanations in 
psychology I the importance of highlighting and challenging the assumptions 
of explanatory systems, critical work on the role of causal explanations in 
psychology, the possibility of using Wittgenstein's philosophy to train 
psychologists towards "greater reflexivity", and the relations between 
psychological explanations and everyday practices. 
The Wittgensteinian account of psychological reflexivity and relevant 
issues about explanation and explanatory systems in psychology will take 
the following form. Section 3.1 provides a Wittgensteinian account of why 
reflexive work within psychology should not necessarily lead to broad forms 
of general, theoretical and causal explanation. Some of Wittgenstein's 
remarks from On Certainty are explored in order to show why background 
and theory in psychology can be described as asymmetrical. Section 3.2 
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examines the limits that Wittgensteinian description places on reflexive, 
revealing and challenging forms of theoretical and explanatory work within 
psychology. Specific examples are provided of the way in which causal 
explanations of collective and individual phenomena themselves produce 
conceptual obfuscation. This section also explores difficulties facing any 
attempt to incorporate Wittgenstein's philosophical remarks and methods in 
the training of a "more reflexive" psychology (Le., especially early in a 
psychological researcher's "reflexive career"). Section 3.3 examines the 
issue of psychological explanations and their relation to everyday concepts 
and practices. The analysis centres on useful alternatives to theoretical 
explanation proposed by social constructionists. As with many of these 
other sections, the aim is to highlight problems to be avoided in the critical 
study of emotion and personal reflexivity to be undertaken in Part 2. 
3.1 Wittgenstein's form of descriptive philosophy 
and self-critical work in psychology 
One of the problems with reflexive work in psychology is that it may lead 
psychologists to philosophy in order to provide "an account of and 
foundations for the relationship between mind, language, and the world" 
(Stein, 1993, p. 182). But the need to produce such an account especially in 
the form of an abstract, broad and general explanatory theory can be 
challenged. More specifically, issues suggested by the need to be reflexive 
about explanation and explanatory systems in psychology can be used to 
demonstrate the utility of remarks from Wittgenstein's Philosophical 
Investigations and On Certainty (Le., parts of Wittgenstein's philosophy 
which have, until recently, been overlooked by social constructionists, 
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realists and critical psychologists). The result should demonstrate the 
potential of Wittgensteinian approach to describe the background of cultural-
linguistic practices and the limits of comprehensive forms of theoretical 
explanation in psychology. 
Wittgenstein on "world-pictures" and the limits of general, 
theoretical explanation 
An example of one of Wittgenstein's synoptic analogies that is at odds with 
an interest in the construction of general theories is the way in which forms 
of representation may lead to a shift in what he describes as the "river-bed of 
thoughts" (DC, §97). In other words, we must distinguish a theory that is so 
broad that it includes ourselves and our practices from the inalterable "hard 
rock" of the "river-bank" on which it rests (DC, §99). More specifically, the 
"river-bank" can be taken to mean the foundation for "our" practices that 
provides a complicated background of actions, activities, proclivities and 
customs that we act against. An example of a theory that attempts to 
describe the relation between science and this "river-bank" while also 
suggesting a broad aim for reflexive, social scientific work is provided by 
Hooker (1987). Hooker's account is worth examining because he claims 
that his evolutionary naturalistic realism is an "emerging scientific theory of 
human kind, the evolutionary theory of self-organizing systems" (p. 174). 
The questions we must consider are whether Wittgenstein's position is 
subsumed by Hooker's account and, more importantly, what criticisms of this 
type of theory are available to reflexive social scientists? 
The example of Hooker's (1987) attempt to describe the background 
of our practices and, more specifically, the success of science suggests that 
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the achievement of a general theoretical explanation should be a goal for 
reflexive social scientific work. From a Wittgensteinian perspective, however, 
Hooker can be described as producing a general evolutionary theory that 
resembles what Wittgenstein described as a "world-picture" (DC, §95). 
Wittgenstein's point about such a "world-picture" is that it is so broad that it 
may even become the basis for our everyday reasoning. However, we 
should not aspire to produce "world-pictures" through theory construction 
because, as Baker and Hacker (1985) note, "when it misfires, it is prone to 
create scientific mythology" (p. 540). An example in psychology is 
psychoanalytic theory and, perhaps, any other approach that similarly views 
much of our behaviour as determined by unconscious forces. Reflexive 
work that begins within psychology should challenge theories that include 
psychology and aim to achieve such a comprehensive global view. One 
possible Wittgensteinian criticism, if Hooker's comprehensive account is 
indeed a world-picture, is that it should not be extended beyond its scientific 
use. In other words, it is important that accounts such as Hooker's should 
not be regarded as so comprehensive that they can provide a new 
background to our scientific and everyday reasoning (DC, §95). 
Wittgenstein does not rule out the possibility of broad forms of theory 
construction, theory-inspired change in everyday practices, or evolutionary 
accounts of human behaviour. Reflexive work in psychology seems to 
establish a connection with Wittgenstein's work where his remarks can be 
used to counter an impulse to construct or contribute towards positions that 
are so comprehensive they can be described as creating a "world-picture". 
Wittgenstein's alternative is to examine the type of question that tempts us 
towards a very broad theoretical explanation. For example, an explanation 
of the sort that might not necessarily change our everyday reasoning but 
171 
may nevertheless demonstrate the importance of explaining the relations 
between language and the world: 
If the formation of concepts can be explained by facts of nature, 
should we not be interested, not in grammar, but rather in that 
in nature which is the basis of grammar? (PI, xii, p. 230) 
The reply to this self-posed question is revealing because it suggests the 
appeal of general theories and world~pictures (especially where the latter 
i~cludes us as researchers and as people or what Stein (1993) refers to as 
"mind" in the explanandum of "mind, language, and the world"): 
Our interest certainly includes the correspondence between 
concepts and very general facts of nature. (Such facts as 
mostly do not strike us because of their generality.) But our 
interest does not fall back upon these possible causes of the 
formation of concepts; we are not doing natural science; nor 
yet natural history-since we also invent fictitious natural 
history for our purposes (PI, xii, p. 230). 
The relevant philosophical task is not to provide comprehensive pictures of 
our concepts and practices or, more specifically, to condone the application 
of evolutionary thinking to every problem. Instead, Wittgenstein suggests 
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that it is important for philosophy to assemble revealing descriptive remarks 
in a manner that differs from the organization of observations and facts into 
a broad theory. 
Wittgenstein's remarks are also interesting because his reasoning 
mimics the different kind of revealing account offered by individuals 
adopting a reflexive orientation towards the background of our practices. 
He implies that general theories hide the fact that it is possible and often 
useful to imagine circumstances in which many of the concepts of our 
linguistic community would no longer be useful. Accordingly, Wittgenstein 
clarifies his aim: 
I am not saying: if such-and-such facts of nature were different 
people would have different concepts (in the sense of a 
hypothesis). But: if anyone believes that certain concepts are 
absolutely the correct ones, and that having different ones 
would mean not realizing something that we realize-then let 
him imagine certain very general facts of nature to be different 
from what we are used to, and the formation of concepts 
different from the usual ones will become intelligible to him. 
(PI, xii, p. 230e) 
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In particular, we could imagine examples from other cultures that were 
analogous to situations in which we apply our social and psychological 
concepts. More simply, cases of contact with other cultures could be 
assembled, especially those in which we were struck by activities that 
resemble ours only to reveal a fundamental difference upon subsequent 
investigation (LFM, XXI, p. 203; see chapter 5, section 5.1 for examples). 
The aim of this assembling of reminders is for psychologists engaging in 
critical work to discover that they do not feel compelled to explain - in the 
sense of offering hypotheses - why a particular culture does not have 
concepts that are analogous to those of Western culture (or science). For 
example, there is no compulsion to explain by way of theory why another 
culture has arrived at nothing comparable to many of our psychological 
concepts and expressions. 
A Wittgensteinian philosophical approach to the cultural and 
linguistic practices of "mankind" is capable of drawing on the sort of 
imaginary examples and intermediate cases that plausible novels and 
accurate autobiographies may provide. Wittgenstein also offers more 
specific remarks about what it is that philosophy can reveal about 
psychological phenomena in their cultural and linguistic surroundings: 
What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history 
of human beings; we are not contributing curiosities however, 
but observations which no one has doubted, but which have 
escaped remark only because they are always before our eyes. 
(PI, §415) 
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But it is difficult to know which criteria would help us to distinguish between 
"curiosities" and more important examples that we might be "struck by" 
(Shotter & Katz, 1996). 
One answer is that examples of greater importance will provide a 
basis for further exploration and investigation especially where the variation 
is not trivial. For example, Wittgenstein imagines the possible outcome if 
we met "the people of a tribe [who] were brought up from early youth to give 
no expression of feeling of any kind' (Z, §383). It would obviously be 
ridiculous to say that these people did not have the potential for emotions or, 
at some stage perhaps, the need to control or express their feelings (e.g., as 
infants). Nevertheless a difficulty for us would be that they would "have 
nothing human about them" (Z, §390) in many of the respects that we regard 
as important. Thus while they would be a collective "who in other respects 
were human", still it is probable that "we could not possibly make ourselves 
understood to them" (Z, §390). 
One point to emerge from these considerations is that we begin to see 
part of the background of our present psychological concepts and practices. 
For example, with regard to the categories of emotion and personal 
reflexivity and emotion, we find that the reflexive processes regarded by 
Rosenberg (1990) as important to emotional identification, display and 
experience are not universal features of human existence. This issue is also 
obvious in relation to the cluster of concepts surrounding pride because 
although there seem to be many cross-cultural similarities, there are also 
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vast differences that make us reluctant to think that our clusters of concepts 
could be projected wholesale onto other groups. Of course, the aim of a 
Wittgensteinian approach is not to encourage armchair anthropology, but 
Wittgenstein suggest a problem that Oatley (1993) entertains in more explicit 
and practical terms: 
... the extent to which we can understand another culture by 
becoming part of it in imagination or in fact is always partial 
and open to question. (p. 346) 
Here the role of imagination at least helps us to consider the possibility that 
quite different linguistic distinctions may be made in other cultures for 
reasons that may be obscure. And, as noted, it is important to be sceptical 
of theories that supposedly highlight the "foundation" upon which we may 
understand and misunderstand the practices and individuals of other 
cultures. Faced with these problems, one practical measure is to examine 
the texts and accounts of people from "outside" who have come into our 
culture or, in other cases, translations of the individuals who have had 
contact with it (or its predecessors). However, this approach contains an 
unexamined assumption that there are few barriers to prevent us from 
accessing the discourse of "outsiders" to what can be regarded as "our 
culture" (hence the need to address this issue in chapter 4). 
In summary, more detail was added to Wittgenstein's view of 
philosophy as description and its relevance to forms of psychological 
reflexivity. The argument adopted was that psychological reflexivity should 
not lead to attempts to produce broad, general theories that might seem 
capable of explaining the background relations between mind, language 
and the world. A brief account was offered of "world-pictures" which can be 
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regarded as theories or pictures provided by science that are so broad they 
may seem to inform both scientific and everyday reasoning. In response to 
the potential for scientific theorizing to lead to world-pictures or myths, some 
specific Wittgensteinian remarks were used to indicate why we should not 
seek to explain the grammar of our concepts in relation to facts of nature. 
Instead, we should attempt to highlight aspects of our natural history that 
might prevent us from describing important similarities and differences with 
other cultures. Moreover, although the remarks that help us to see what we 
have overlooked may rely on imagining other possibilities, it is also 
important to examine the accounts of "outsiders" with respect to our forms of 
emotional identification, display and experience. 
Psychological reflexivity and crossing from explanation to 
description 
As noted earlier, Wittgenstein's later rejection of the view that philosophy is 
explanatory and highlights what is hidden (PI, §126; PI, §89) owes more to 
recognition of the philosophical errors of the earlier Tractatus than any 
, 
desire to find a replacement for scientific explanation. Wittgenstein himself 
remarked that the philosophical mistakes of the Tractatus arose "not from an 
interest in the facts of nature, nor from a need to grasp causal connexions" 
(PI, §89). Nevertheless, it is easy to take parts of Wittgenstein's philosophy 
in isolation from the whole framework when crossing, so to speak, from the 
explanatory work of particular disciplines with the aim of forming useful 
connections. A particular example of a reflexive approach which attempts to 
connect with Wittgenstein's rejection of explanation in philosophy is the view 
that Wittgenstein offers a method of "social poetics" for psychology (Shotter, 
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1996; Shotter & Katz, 1996). While the "social poetics" account challenges 
the view that Wittgenstein merely offers a form of philosophical description, it 
nevertheless creates confusion about the relations between philosophy and 
psychology that needs to be clarified (e.g, such as how Wittgenstein can 
criticize theoretical explanations in psychology). 
An important distinction between philosophy and psychology has 
been maintained to this point based on Wittgenstein's philosophical remark 
that "we must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take 
its place" (PI, § 109). However, this remark has created confusion in 
psychology about the extent to which it includes or excludes social 
scientists. In contrast to Wittgenstein's comments about the problems of 
psychology and his use of "us" to describe a kind of general faith in 
psychology as a source of insight and knowledge (see chapter 1, section 
1.1), many psychologists generalize the attack on theory in philosophy to 
psychology. But should Wittgenstein's use of "we" be taken to indicate that 
description is a replacement for particular forms of theoretical explanation 
and empirical investigation? 
Shotter (1992a, 1996) says yes and can see no objections to the use 
of Wittgenstein's philosophical methods within psychology to compete 
against empirical methods and complement hermeneutic approaches15. 
Shotter also suggests that Wittgenstein's methods achieve many of the 
same ends as theory construction and empirical work in psychology but 
without conceptual obfuscation and abstraction from our everyday, 
15 Support for the latter connection presumably comes from Wittgenstein's remark: 
We want to understand something that is already in plain view. For this is 
what we seem in some sense not to understand. (PI, §89) 
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relational-responsive practices (see section 3.3 for a more detailed 
treatment of the use of Wittgenstein's non-theoretical methods within 
psychology). Building upon these arguments, Shotter and Katz (1996) 
maintain Wittgenstein's philosophy is relevant to psychology because it 
shows that understanding and an ordinary sense of explanation must not 
always proceed through a theory (or theories). Wittgenstein's philosophy 
can therefore be used to show that theoretical explanations are "beside the 
point, in that they hide from us the actual forms of life 'from within which our 
talk makes sense" (p. 229). Moreover, they also claim that theories: 
... divert our attention away from those fleeting moments in 
which the essentially ethical and political struggles are (or 
would be) at work in their initial formation - struggles that are 
not prelinguistic, by the way, but that have to do with 
establishing new forms of life within old forms. (pp. 229-230) 
In the position developed to this point, there are many similarities with 
Shotter and Katz's general position (e.g., a similar argument is explored 
which provides a criticism against Wittgenstein in chapter 4 and also some 
of the examples of pride and political issues in Part 2, chapter 5 support this 
view). With regard to ,Wittgenstein, however, it would appear that his aim 
was to describe such changes from a philosophical perspective and pursue 
what he thought to be a good life, rather than to struggle for political and 
ethical change (Monk, 1990). 
While the work of Shotter and Katz clearly provides a richer account 
of Wittgenstein's method (or methods) than the phrase "philosophical 
description" suggests, their account raises some difficult problems. For 
example, if the interpretation of explanation does refer to a scientific rather 
than a philosophical or everyday sense of theorizing, then the following 
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remark in On Certainty suggests a descriptive end to explanatory work 
within a discipline: "at some point one has to pass from explanation to mere 
description" (Oe, §189). Wittgenstein's remark could therefore be extended 
to cover critical reflexive work in psychology in a manner that is more 
consistent with the whole philosophy than Shotter's interpretation of 
Wittgenstein's methods replacing theoretical explanations. Further support 
also comes from a similar statement made by Smedslund (1985): that is, for 
psychology a focus on description is "a reasonable first step since 
e~xplanation, prediction, intervention, and criticism all presuppose 
description" (p. 75). Thus despite problems with the detail of Smedslund's 
"psycho-logic" project, his general remarks are consistent with this 
Wittgensteinian position on the relevance and limits of philosophy to critical, 
reflexive work in psychology: "consideration of reflexivity and its 
implications leads directly to recognition of the role of that which is 
presupposed in psychology, namely culture and language" (p. 76; the issue 
of whether Wittgenstein's philosophical description adequately addresses 
cultural issues, however, will be examined in chapter 4). 
On Smedslund's view the end product of a consideration of reflexivity 
in psychology can be described as "the science of descriptions of behaviour 
and the science of criticisms of descriptions of behaviour" (p. 74). However, 
philosophy seems to play no role in this account as much of the reflexive 
work is argued to be a "scientific/professional activity within psychology" (p. 
74). More specifically, Smedslund argues that to state "psychology is 
reflexive" is "to say that if something is a scientific/professional activity within 
psychology with a subject matter, then it follows that this activity can itself be 
the subject matter of a scientific/professional activity within psychology" (p. 
74). Smedslund therefore notes that since the term "scientific/professional 
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activity within psychology includes such categories as psychological 
description, explanation, prediction and intervention" it is possible to say that 
each of these categories can itself "be the possible subject matter of 
psychological description, explanation, prediction, and intervention" (p. 74). 
The relevant point is that if we restrict Smedlund's remarks to the topic of 
being reflexive about explanations in psychology, he implies that there is no 
need to pass, at some stage, from explanation to description by philosophy. 
Similar problems about the role of philosophy conceived in 
descriptive terms also occur with Shotter and Katz's (1996) view of the 
relevance of Wittgenstein's philosophy to psychology. Their interest in 
potential uses of Wittgenstein's remarks and methods within psychology is 
stated as "whether what Wittgenstein has to say, can be of any help [to] us in 
grasping how we might develop new professional practices from within the 
context of our old ones" (p. 224). But as already noted, a Wittgensteinian 
perspective involves describing the relations between the descriptions, 
explanations, predictions, and interventions of psychology and its subjects. 
Any additional interest in using Wittgenstein's philosophy to inspire 
particular changes in psychology is a possible activity, but only in the sense 
that psychologists could take the ideas of any philosopher and develop 
them in ways that could not be envisaged or condoned in philosophy. 
The importance of retaining an outsider perspective on psychology 
and knowing that at some stage we must pass from explanation to 
description is indicated by the meaning that some psychologists and social 
scientists take from Wittgenstein's concepts of language-games and forms of 
life (Le., the potential for these concepts to be viewed as rudimentary 
theories). The attempt to work within a "form of life", of course, can be 
described as part of the recognition that there is "no way to step outside the 
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various vocabularies we have employed and find a metavocabulary which 
somehow takes account of all possible vocabularies, all possible ways of 
judging and feeling" (Rorty, 1989, p. xvi). But it is tempting to adopt a 
perspective where the word "form" in the expression "form of life" suggests 
the search for underlying, universal structures should be redescribed. 
Although Rorty's alternative solidarity-oriented account will not be 
examined, a further remark is relevant to this potential misunderstanding: 
"much of the rhetoric of contemporary intellectual life takes for granted that 
tne goal of scientific inquiry into man is to understand 'underlying structures', 
or 'culturally invariant factors', or 'biologically determined patterns'" (p. 22). 
Even if we consider the notion of form of life more broadly, it is still important 
to recognize that "the one mistake we must not make is to try to squeeze the 
form of life concept into such terms as culture, biology, or historY' (Finch, 
1995, p. 53). 
Wittgenstein's point is that we start understanding cultures and their 
ways of judging, feeling, thinking, and talking from our current practices 
before any more specific theories can be offered. Moreover, Wittgenstein 
argues that "commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting, are as much a 
part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing" (PI, §25). 
These activities form the "common behaviour of mankind" and the "system of 
reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language" (PI, §206). 
Wittgenstein's view is that it is important to describe this common behaviour 
through considerations such as the following: 
Can only those hope who can talk? Only those who have 
mastered the use of a language. That is to say, the 
phenomena of hope are modes of this complicated form o'f life. 
(PI, i, p. 174) 
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All that "form of life" describes here is the fact that '"grief''' describes a pattern 
which recurs, with different variations, in the weave of our life" (PI, i, p. 174). 
Wittgenstein is not, therefore, offering an explanation of the universality of 
grief or evaluating the proposition that "some of the symptoms of grief 
appear to be universal in the human species" (Averill, 1979, p. 343). This is 
evident in the fact that Wittgenstein prefers to imagine other possible forms 
of life that we could not understand, let alone explain: 
If a man's bodily expression of sorrow and of joy alternated, 
say with the ticking of a clock, here we should not have the 
characteristic formation of the pattern or sorrow or of the 
pattern of joy. (PI, i, p. 174) 
In such a case there would not seem to be enough similarities with grief as it 
is manifest in our form of life even to project talk of private thoughts and 
feelings onto this person (Le., aspects of grief that we might subsequently 
want to explain). 
In summary, Wittgenstein's remarks against explanation and the 
emphasis on description in philosophy were introduced. In contrast to 
Shotter and Katz's position, it was argued that reflexivity should lead us to 
cross from explanation in psychology to description by philosophy (Le., 
rather than replacement of explanations in psychology with Wittgenstein's 
methods and remarks). This interpretation of Wittgenstein's relevance to 
psychology was supported by Smedslund's argument that reflexivity in 
psychology should lead to descriptions of language and culture (although 
Smedslund seems to allow no role for philosophy as this practice is 
presented as a professional/scientific activity within psychology). Similarly, 
while Shotter and Katz show that "philosophical description" is an 
inadequate account of the remarks and methods that constitute 
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Wittgenstein's later philosophy, their main aim is to use these remarks and 
methods to do the work of psychology (Le., to change its practices). The 
section concluded with a brief examination of the importance of describing 
our "form of life" in relation to others. 
Psychology and the asymmetry of theory and background 
One of Wittgenstein's most important realizations in the later philosophy is 
the fundamental contrast between the practices in which theoretical 
explanations are produced and the background to those practices. The 
latter, of course, is what Wittgenstein attempted to summarize with the 
notions of language~game and forms of life (and the former can go too far 
when it produces world-pictures or a scientific mythology). However, the 
important point for psychologists to recognize is that theory and background 
are asymmetrical. For example, concepts such as explanation, justification, 
causation, choice and construction cannot be equally applied within a 
practice and at the further "level" of remarks about that practice. While this 
point is likely to be accepted for causal explanations, it is worth exploring the 
broader sense in which reflexive work calls on psychologists to "explain 
themselves" . 
The power of the descriptive approach rests with the recognition that 
many of the concepts used in a practice or system cannot be equally applied 
to the background of that practice or system. Wittgenstein's descriptive 
approach does not allow him to contradict ordinary language and practices 
by imposing "a conceptual model upon human behaviour and 
communication" (Strom, 1994, p. 146). As already noted, Wittgenstein's 
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notions of form of life and language~games are not explanations of what our 
linguistic community must have in common with other linguistic communities 
in order to understand them. A form of life instead describes "part of the 
framework within which our language~games are played, not parts of the 
games themselves" (Baker & Hacker, 1985, p. 229). As Monk (1990) notes: 
... we cannot make sense of anything without some sort of 
framework, and with any particular framework there has to be a 
distinction between propositions that, using that framework, 
describe the world, and those that describe the framework 
itself, though this distinction is not fixed at the same place for 
ever (p. 571). 
Thus although reflexive work of the social sciences can connect with 
Wittgenstein's form of philosophical description, it is important to recognize 
the nature and limits of Wittgenstein's approach. 
Wittgenstein's position therefore seems to correspond with the spirit of 
one of the earliest remarks on reflexivity in psychology (Le., that at least 
used the word reflexivity): 
It is not that every psychologist theorize about these things, or 
investigate all of them directly, but that he remind himself from 
time to time that whatever makes it possible for him to engage 
in scientific activity is part of his ultimate supject matter. (Oliver 
& Land-field, 1962, p. 121) 
But how far, according to a Wittgensteinian account, should psychologists 
and other social scientists go in their attempts to "explain themselves"? 
While Smedslund (1985) argues that "any adequate psychology must 
account for itself" (p. 73), a less theoretical and more ordinary sense of 
explanation seems to be required (a point which is not inconsistent with the 
treatment of Shotter in the previous section). Thus, the unrealistically high 
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requirement that a complete form of explanation in psychology must include 
an account of its own origin can be replaced with recognition of the 
occasional need to engage in philosophical description. 
These considerations lead to the issue of social constructionism and 
whether attempts by psychologists to account in a reflexive manner for their 
own behaviour are consistent with a Wittgensteinian position? Gergen 
(1985), for example, suggests that a result of taking a reflexive approach in 
psychology is that "the study of social process could become generic for 
understanding the nature of knowledge itself" (p. 266). Interestingly, this 
position also seems to be consistent with Wittgenstein's descriptive 
approach because "epistemological inquiry along with the philosophy of 
science could both give way, or become subsumed by, social inquiry" (p. 
266). Psychology should be able to account for the knowledge it produces 
by social inquiry presumably without worrying about potential 
Wittgensteinian criticisms. For example, the third part of section 3.2 provides 
a Wittgensteinian treatment of becoming a "more reflexive" researcher which 
closely resembles social constructionist accounts of teaching and training in 
explanatory systems. 
However, until recently, many of Wittgenstein's remarks from On 
Certainty have been ignored despite the fact that they provide a consistent 
extension of Wittgenstein's earlier position that "the theory of knowledge is 
the philosophy of psychology" (T, §4.1121). Although Wittgenstein 
subsequently rejected any form of theorizing the remarks contained in On 
Certainty still address epistemological themes, admittedly in a novel and 
challenging manner. Whether it is appropriate to describe Wittgenstein's 
work as the study of social processes will, of course, be addressed in 
another section. It is interesting that Greenwood (1992), Harre (1989) and 
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Shotter (1992, 1996) have all attempted to work through the details of 
Wittgenstein's later remarks with varying degrees of success. Shotter's 
(1993b) remarks are perhaps the most useful in this context because he 
articulates some of the different ways is which the background of our 
theories may be understood : 
... there is a 'basis' for our talk, a 'background' from within 
which we make sense of our lives, a realm of knowledgeable 
activity which is sustained, not simply by a form of practical-
technical knowledge, nor by a form of theoretical-conceptual 
knowledge, but a third kind of practical-moral knowledge of the 
non-conceptual kind. (p. 477) 
The barest beginnings of an attempt to detail in full the relevance of 
Wittgenstein's remarks from On Certainty - as well as to extend its style of 
analysis to contemporary interest in a non-theoretical reflexive work - will 
be attempted here. Some of these remarks, initially, will be applied to the 
understanding of the background of psychology that Gergen's version of 
social constructionism and radical reflexivity implies before aspects of the 
other variations are also examined. 
The application to Gergen's (1985) attempt to account for his own 
work does not lead from causal explanation or hermeneutic interpretation 
within psychology to philosophical description, but instead to doubt. In 
particular, Gergen's version of social constructionism offers a form of 
reflexivity that involves a "radical doubt in the taken-for-g,ranted world -
whether in the sciences or daily life - and in a specialized way acts as a 
form of social criticism" (p. 267). Gergen's position therefore exemplifies the 
asymmetry of theory and background because although it is important to be 
critical of both ordinary and scientific forms of explanation (amongst other 
aspects of psychology), the result need not be extreme uncertainty. The 
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problem with Gergen's description of psychologist's attempts to provide an 
account of their activities is its failure to recognize that "it belongs to the logic 
of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted" 
(OC, §342). Thus Gergen's criticism of psychology does not offer a path 
from explanations of our actions as psychologists to a clear description of 
our activities. 
Moreover, by equating a reflexive approach in psychology with a form 
of sceptical social inquiry, Gergen's early version of social constructionism is 
revealing in an unexpected manner. In particular, Gergen's radical doubt in 
psychology can be regarded as a presuppositional paradox because it: 
... involves some sort of tension or incompatibility between 
what is presupposed as background information when a 
statement is made and what is explicitly asserted by the 
statement. (Strom, 1994, p. 13) 
Such a presuppositional paradox is closely connected with reflexive work 
that requires a philosophical response; in this case, the conceptual 
correction that Wittgenstein provides is that legitimate doubts within a 
scientific practice should not be so widespread as to undermine that 
practice. 
The challenge of responding to Gergen's account is also that it 
suggests the status of the social process of making explicit the 
presuppositions of psychological practices. The a.im could either be to avoid 
contradicting a presupposition that has not been made explicit in a 
theoretical explanation or to engage in part of the social process of creative 
work. Interestingly, a further example is available in Wittgenstein's work that 
highlights this theme of requiring good reasons to doubt what a description, 
in this case of a psychological experiment, "presupposes": 
I describe a psychological experiment: the apparatus, the 
questions of the experimenter, the actions and replies of the 
subject-and then I say that it is a scene in a play.-Now 
everything is different. So it will be said: If this experiment 
were described in the same way in a book on psychology, then 
the behaviour described would be understood as the 
expression of something mental just because it is 
presupposed that the subject is not taking us in, hasn't learnt 
the replies by heart, and other things of the kind.-So we are 
making a presupposition? (PI, liv, p. 180e) 
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Wittgenstein's point is to challenge the view that "What we do in our 
language-game always rests on a tacit presupposition" (PI, liv, p. 17ge). Its 
relevance to psychology is that is reduces any compulsion to feel that we 
must always be able to articulate the basis for our practices (Le, either in 
theoretical or more ordinary terms). Wittgenstein therefore asks "doesn't a 
presupposition imply a doubt?" and answers that "doubt may be entirely 
lacking. Doubting has an end" (PI, liv, p. 180e). 
Social constructionism is clearly committed to challenging the 
unstated assumptions of mainstream, empirical psychology and to exploiting 
in a creative manner any alternative, radical viewpoints. Gergen's (1985) 
version of social constructionism challenges the ubiquity of psychological 
experiments and related forms of theoretical explanation by regarding the 
social situation of a psychological experiment as similar to acting out 
rehearsed roles in a play. In this sense, it is interesting to find that 
Wittgenstein did not envisage the direction that psychological research has 
taken even though these new directions are often explicitly connected with 
his remarks. For example, Parker (1994b) describes the results of early 
critiques in the following manner: 
... the linguistic turn and then the reflexive turn in social 
psychology are part of an understandable humanist 
response to the traditional 'old paradigm' methods in which 
people were not treated as if they were human beings. (p. 
528) 
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It is also worth noting that because subjects in psychological experiments 
are perfectly capable of deception, it is important that people's explanations 
for their own actions are understood as part of the social process of gaining 
useful results from a social scientific investigation. However, Wittgenstein's 
overall point is that when explanations can no longer be offered "the end is 
n'ot an ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting" (DC, 
§ 11 O). Explanations therefore reach an end in agreement in action and 
judgements that need to be described (PI, §242) , rather than further 
statements that seem to provide the foundation for our actions. The 
implication for social constructionism is that although we should not doubt 
everything, presenting a rival to mainstream forms of experimentation and 
explanation does not merely lead to a new, theoretically articulated 
presupposition. Instead, it leads us, as psychologists, to view subjects in 
psychological research in a manner that makes us talk and act differently 
toward them (Le., a creative response that Wittgenstein did not seem to 
anticipate). 
In this section, Wittgenstein's important realization that theory and 
background are asymmetrical was described from the perspective of 
reflexive work in psychology. Concepts used with psychology should not 
also be employed to describe the foundation or background on which those 
practices are based. But it still seems appropriate to social constructionists 
such as Smedslund and Gergen that psychologists should "explain 
themselves" through an account of social processes. However, Gergen's 
social criticism contradicts the type of practical-moral basis to our practices 
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that Wittgenstein and Shotter describe. Remarks from On Certainty were 
used to show that explanations come to an end in the kind of foundation that 
can be described as "ungrounded action". These remarks were backed up 
by further detail from Wittgenstein's treatment of the view that psychological 
experiments need not rest on tacit presuppositions (e.g., that an experiment 
is not like a play). Although Gergen's form of social constructionism does 
view experiments in psychology as similar to the enactment of a play, this 
view need not be described as contradicting a tacit presupposition (Le., 
which provides the basis for a psychological experiment). Instead, a view is 
presented of the potential of human activity which, in the process, makes us 
act differently towards subjects in psychological research. 
3.2 Wittgensteinian remarks on explanation, 
theories and training in psychology 
Asking critical, reflexive questions about explanations in psychology leads 
to more specific considerations about the potential of Wittgenstein's 
philosophy to augment social constructionist alternatives. For example, 
where general explanations of complicated psychological phenomena can 
be regarded as rules that form only the fragments of a system, a Wittgenstein 
question emerges: is there any gap between the rules and their application 
as described by Wittgenstein's philosophy? The answer, to extend the 
game analogy, is that where a "gap" seems to exist between rules in 
psychology and their application, it is training and an ordinary sense of 
explanation that provides the appropriate "bridge" (Baker & Hacker, 1983, p. 
51). In this section, further Wittgensteinian remarks will be used to 
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supplement critical, reflexive and social constructionist accounts of 
psychology with the following: a description of Wittgensteinian challenges 
to explanatory systems in psychology, a brief critical account of causal 
explanation and some Wittgensteinian remarks about the potential for 
psychologists to be trained to be "more reflexive". 
Wittgensteinian challenges to the reflexively revealed 
assumptions of systems of explanation 
To this point a number of Wittgensteinian challenges to explanatory systems 
have been examined. These include the attempt to produce complete 
theories of psychological phenomena and to view Wittgensteinian remarks 
as part of a "new paradigm" of less theory-oriented research. The previous 
sections established that Wittgenstein was not against all forms of 
explanation in psychology and could even be taken to suggest that 
reflexivity involves a to and fro movement between forms of explanation in 
psychology and philosophical description. In this section, it is important to 
examine whether more Wittgensteinian comments may augment social 
constructionist criticisms of explanatory systems and any of their reflexively-
revealed assumptions. 
An emphasis on historical and metatheoretical reflection in the social 
sciences has been accompanied by a greater interest in challenging 
accounts of psychology's current context and previous history. For example, 
Ash (1993) suggests that the renaissance in the historiography of 
psychology has produced research programs "all of which have in common 
the conversion of formerly unqueried textbook generalities into questions for 
research" (p. 49). In particular, he suggests two aspects of this research 
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"might be called the critical contextualizing and reflexivity approaches" (p. 
49). Ash argues that the former is pursued by historians and sociologists of 
science in order to emphasize "the historical rootedness of psychological 
concepts, research priorities, and institutions in specific societal and cultural 
settings" (p. 49). Thus although the reflexivity approach is "pursued almost 
entirely by psychologists by also relying on sophisticated archival research 
and other historians' methods", it is different because its practitioners regard 
"contextualizing not as an end, but as a means of encouraging 
psychologists to reconsider present disciplinary structures and practices" (p. 
49). 
The use of Kuhn's (1970) notion of a paradigm within psychology 
demonstrates both the benefits and problems of a reflexive, contextualizing 
approach. Parker (1989) states, for example, that much of the work in social 
psychology that emerged out of its Uidentity crisis" was self-consciously 
couched in the terms "old paradigm", "new paradigm" and "paradigm shift" 
(see chapter 1, section 1.3). This "rhetorical construction" still exists as 
social constructionists such as Harre (1989) and Shotter (1996) lead other 
psychologists to assume that contributing toward new paradigm work is an 
appropriate goal. More specifically, Harre, Shotter, Gergen and others also 
seek to assert that continuity of thought exists with Vygotsky's (1986) and 
Mead's (1934) seminal social and linguistic studies. This continuity 
strengthens the case for social constructionism as an interdisciplinary 
approach and also invites an account of how mainstream, empirical studies 
have continued to dominate psychology. However, concepts such as 
"paradigm" derived from philosophy of science do not necessarily achieve a 
clear view of psychology even though they help to reconstruct the 
discipline's history. Ash's account of a reflexivity approach can be extended 
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to accounts of changes in the explanatory systems or theories of 
psychology. The most important feature of historical accounts of 
psychology, therefore, is that they help psychologists to avoid making the 
same mistakes, assumptions and oversights that can be identified in the 
history of the discipline. 
One difficulty with the attempt to avoid past mistakes, or future errors, 
is that the wider values in which society operates are not considered (Le., 
what Parker (1989) described as wider constraints on a "gestalt switch" that 
might occur with a change in theories or paradigms). Howard (1985) notes, 
for example, that: 
. . . any discussion of human reflexivity begins with a 
consideration of language as the mechanism underlying the 
operation of the phenomenon and ends with the role of values 
in steering reflexive human action. These steering values are 
often embedded in one's culture and influence not only 
individuals' everyday actions, but science as well. (p. 261) 
The increasing value placed on reflexive research suggests the potential to 
provide accounts of the manner in which specific evaluative criteria in 
psychology are informed by practical-moral concerns. In other words, the 
. 
point is not to argue that specific epistemic and theoretical values such as 
the coherence, unity and simplicity of an explanatory theory are determined 
by a broader moral-practical changes. Rather it is to note that one of the 
reasons for an increase in reflexive research is that we are no longer 
prepared to overlook many of the political and cultural factors that led many 
legitimate subject areas to be excluded from psychological research in the 
past. For example, White (1993) and other theorists therefore suggest that 
"in line with the increasingly reflexive stance of social theory today, the 
anth ropological critique of emotion theory turns the interpretative spotlight 
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back upon assumptions that guide research" (p. 30). With respect to 
Rosenberg's (1990) reflexivity and emotion theory, it can be criticized as an 
individualistic and apolitical position which has little interest in engaging 
with the detail of our own and others' cultural and linguistic practices (see 
chapter 4, section 4.2). 
The importance attached to revealing cultural, moral-practical and 
language-based assumptions seems to stem from what Wittgenstein 
described as the importance of attaining a knowledge of the diversity of 
human forms of life (Le., social arrangements, practices, institutions, types of 
personhood, etc.). A Wittgensteinian challenge to approaches that assume 
a narrow perspective on humanity is therefore possible in a manner that 
augments social constructionist criticisms. Evolutionary psychology, in 
particular, provides a good example of the way in which a position can be 
built upon striking similarities between different peoples as well as between 
people and animals (Oatley, 1993; cf. Shotter & Katz (1996) in section 3.3). 
Further examples could be offered of explanatory systems that psychologists 
could be trained in (or seek only to contribute towards) that result in 
blindness to other possible forms of life. But the most important general 
point to emerge from this Wittgensteinian treatment is that psychology must 
"construct a science of humans built upon an image of humanity that reflects 
and reveres human nature in all its diversity, complexity, and subtlety" 
(Howard, 1985, p. 264). 
Wittgenstein's philosophy is also relevant to explanatory systems that 
are based on pictures deeply wedded to the use of particular concepts and 
expressions. Shanker (1991) notes, for example, that one of the more 
difficult conceptual problems for cognitive scientists to overcome is to 
dismiss the "picture" of "determined behaviour" from investigations of 
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psychological phenomena. By cha.llenging the language that is associated 
with, for example, a mechanistic picture of particular psychological 
phenomena, Wittgenstein is able to prevent making "determinism a property 
of the system of explanations of behaviour" (Baker & Hacker, 1985, p. 17). It 
is simplistic, of course, to dismiss cognitive science as offering a diminished 
picture of human possibilities through mechanistic pictures which, in turn, 
create the conditions in which causal accounts are easier to apply. Instead, 
the main point is that such a potential criticism of an explanatory system 
should not be limited to cognitive science. 
A Wittgensteinian position should be able to criticize any position that 
allows conceptual distortion to occur through its pictures, statements or 
slogans. This is why it is possible to imagine that a moral-practical position 
that favoured people's accounts over causal explanations might also allow 
a form of dogmatism to become a property of its psychological approach. 
For example, it is hoped that a Wittgensteinian challenge would connect 
with critical work in psychology if a rule such as the following were used to 
guide research practice: "Every thing's (sic.) got a moral, if only you can find 
it" (Carroll, 1865/1973, p. 141). We must therefore continue to be very 
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careful about how rigorously we use philosophy to explore alternatives to 
existing explanatory systems since the imagined form of moral-practical 
psychology based on the statement from Alice in Wonderland would not 
seem to be just another case of "anything goes" social constructionist work 
(i.e., the position Gergen (1985) supposedly argues for by widening the 
evaluative criteria of psychological studies). 
The Wittgensteinian argument in the face of potentially restrictive 
explanations of human action from evolutionary psychology, cognitive 
science or any other area of psychology is to note that there is considerable 
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continuity in the use and misuse of psychological concepts (GV, p. 15). For 
example, explanations based on metaphors that favour mechanistic 
accounts and computer simulations of the properties of individuals hide the 
fact that a clear view has not been achieved of existing psychological 
concepts and practices (Shanker, 1991). Hacker (1996) similarly addresses 
this point in terms of our temptation to think that new concepts from a variety 
of sources may solve our problems: 
No conceptual confusion can be resolved by the substitution of 
new concepts for existing ones-at best, the conceptual 
confusion will be swept under the carpet by such manoeuvres, 
and there can be no guarantee that it will not emerge later to 
wreak more havoc. (p. 409) 
In this respect, social constructionism attempts to connect with Wittgenstein's 
interest in enduring conceptual problems, rather than pursue issues in 
psychology that could eventually appear temporal, dated, or bound up in 
particular theoretical fashions. 
Wittgensteinians and social constructionists therefore argue that there 
is no guarantee that theories, models, and concepts from "new paradigms of 
science" in physics, computer science and engineering will continue to 
provide fruitful theories for psychology (Lewis & Haviland, 1993, p. ix; ct. 
chapter 2, section 2.3 and the topic of "sense-extension"). For example, 
chaos theory, systems theory and cybernetic models may provide some 
insights into the details of reflexive agency and reflexive cognition relevant 
to emotion. But they may also provide other misleading parallels, especially 
when we are regarded as beset by mechanistic emotions or regarded as 
individual systems rather than people. An indication of Wittgenstein's point 
on such importation of concepts can be extrapolated from his statement that 
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it is easier to attain a surview of the terms of mechanics than our use of 
psychological concepts (RPP II, §20). The importation of concepts from 
other explanatory systems and sciences should therefore be challenged 
where projection onto psychological phenomena occurs without appropriate 
screening for conceptual baggage. 
In summary, further Wittgensteinian remarks were presented to 
augment social constructionist accounts and criticisms of explanatory 
systems. The section began with the view that contextualizing psychology is 
used to provide a history for psychology as well as to inform its present 
practices. The notion that social constructionism offers a new paradigm for 
psychology establishes continuity with similar early theoretical perspectives 
and, more importantly, actively seeks to avoid the oversights, assumptions 
and errors of other explanatory systems. The rising interest in reflexive work 
is also potentially explicable as re1:lecting wider concerns with cultural 
differences and the possibilities of human action. However, while pictures 
that accompany the language of causal explanation can make determinism 
a property of a system of explanations, it is also important to realize that 
moral-practical alternatives might be similarly dogmatic. The relevance of a 
Wittgensteinian perspective was also demonstrated by the example of 
conceptual confusions that continue to arise when theories, models and 
concepts from other scientific explanatory systems are imported into 
psychology and projected onto particular phenomena. 
A critical account of the roles of causal explanation an d 
theoretical description in psychology 
One of the enduring problems for psychologists interested in challenging 
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mainstream psychological practices is how to challenge the notion and 
ideal of causal explanation? More specifically, how can Wittgenstein's 
philosophy be used to challenge the ubiquity of causal explanations in 
psychology? Wittgenstein's descriptive approach is relevant where it shows 
how causal explanations obscure and misrepresent internal relations 
between concepts. However, the point about internal conceptual relations 
is not necessarily to argue that all psychological concepts are "internally 
related" to institutions or social context (Harre, 1993, p. 39; Jost, 1995, p. 9; 
Trigg, 1991, p. 217; Le., since, as already noted, such broad accounts have 
the potential to produce conceptual distortion despite their "steering 
values"). Instead, in this section specific Wittgensteinian remarks are 
presented in order to counter the view that causal explanation is always an 
important goal for psychology. As with other sections, examples of personal 
reflexivity and emotion are examined although here the purpose is to 
demonstrate how a continuing emphaSis on causal explanation needs to be 
"upset" (RPP I, §905). 
An important feature of science is not merely to describe phenomena 
but to create concepts that have the potential to unify a domain of 
observation. As Baker and Hacker (1985) note: 
... in the case of science, whether at the early classificatory 
stage or at the stage of explanation and discovery, a 
paradigmatic schema or model may, by creating internal 
relations, afford such insights as will yield a surview and hence 
a fruitful morphological, explanatory, or predictive theory. (p. 
540) 
This point builds on remarks already examined about the role of a 
conceptual-discursive surview and the view that reflexive research should 
not be aiming just to produce another theory. Two particular Wittgensteinian 
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targets identified by Baker and Hacker (1985) have the potential to connect 
with critical psychological studies: 
Wittgenstein emphasized that he was trying to effect a change 
in style of thought. It is plausible to take this as a pointer to the 
significance of analogical thinking, produced by comprehensive 
survey of similarities (and dissimilarities), and a repudiation of 
the ubiquity of causal or genetic explanation. (p. 540) 
Accordingly, Wittgenstein cannot be taken to deny causal explanations, for 
example, in psychology or an interest in the genesis of a particular 
phenomenon. Instead, it is more important to challenge the "ubiquitous 
applicability to all questions" (p. 540) of both types of explanation and, in 
this particular section, the continuing importance attached to causal 
explanation. 
On Wittgenstein's view, an understanding of the internal relations 
between concepts should not be confused with the identification of external, 
causal relations between objects or levels of phenomena. The internal 
relations between concepts are drawn out by conceptual investigation 
although they may also, in some everyday and scientific sense, be created 
by a theory or type of comparison (see Baker & Hacker (1985) above). Use 
of a proposition to assert a relation between two parts or "levels" of a 
psychological phenomenon is therefore "not describing objects but 
constructing concepts" (LFM, VII, p. 73). Accordingly, where a particular 
theory exploits a causal similarity, for example, between pride and another 
emotion as the basis for potential empirical investigation, it may be 
reasonable to claim that the "dawning of an aspect is not a property of the 
object, but an internal relation between it and other objects" (PI, p. 212). For 
example, Lewis (1993) claims that pride, shame and guilt are reflexive 
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emotions because their common cause is an "internal comparison" between 
an individual's actions and the representation of a rule, standard or goal. If 
this case represents other causal explanations in psychology, such 
theoretical propositions that seem to highlight fundamental similarities are 
perhaps not the discovery "of a true theory, but of a fruitful new aspect" 
(Baker and Hacker, 1985, p. 536). 
The utility of a conceptual investigation of the internal relations 
between concepts in relation to the problems of causal explanation is also 
a'pparent in many of Wittgenstein's remarks on rules and rule-following. The 
remarks that precede the "Private Language Argument" in the Philosophical 
Investigations draw out the pictures and philosophical prejudices that inform 
views such as Lewis' cognitive theory of pride, shame and guilt. 
Wittgenstein provides several examples of the internal relation between 
understanding a rule - what might be called its cognitive aspects - and 
his preference for showing how this understanding is manifest in 
subsequent actions and reactions. An example O'f how an internal relation 
occurs in everyday life is where a person claims to understand a rule but 
then subsequently acts against it. There are various reasons (or perhaps 
causes) that explain why a person does not accord with a rule, but the 
important philosophical point to emerge from such a case is that any 
statement by the person about understanding the rule would become 
meaningless if their actions and reactions did not also accord. 
However, the intention here is not to provide an account of rules and 
rule-following to counteract the emphasis on causal explanation in 
psychology. It would be possible to establish many conceptual connections 
between Wittgenstein's account of rule-following and Rosenberg's (1990) 
interest in reflexive agency, re'flexive cognition and emotion. This task might 
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even establish internal relations between these concepts so that it would be 
important to explain, for example, all the connections between remarks on 
rule-following and attempts to understand, control, identify and cope with 
personal emotions. But the type of problem that is more relevant to a critical 
study of personal reflexivity and emotion is the role of remarks such as the 
following: "if a person knows a rule and decides to follow it, these mental 
states become causes of her action" (Gadenne, 1989, p. 460). Gadenne 
speculates that "this is perhaps what social scientists mean when they 
s'peak of rules as causes" (p. 460) and the example is relevant because we 
want to know how participating in normative cultural and linguistic practices, 
voluntarily according with rules and actively pursuing standards and goals 
may "generate" particular emotions (Le., emotions that may then need to be 
controlled, embellished or understood). 
Moreover, it is worth examining the wider surroundings of emotions in 
relation to the issue of causation. Is it always the case, for example, that an 
absence of reflexive agency or cognition can be regarded as a causally 
determined action? More specifically, is the problem with emotions - and 
therefore our failure to understand the limits of causal accounts of emotion 
- that people "adopt the strategy of attempting to control the causes of 
these experiences" (p. 11). In other words, apart from the limitations of 
Rosenberg's view that these causes are found in the mind and in the body, 
it is important to examine the limits of reflexive agency and reflexive 
cognition with respect to emotion. Although Rosenberg would prob'ably 
argue the more general point along with Greenwood (1991) that some of the 
"(human) powers that are referenced in causal explanations of human 
action may be under the control of some (human) agents" (p. 5), we need to 
know which powers, when and what their limits are. 
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In the present circumstances we want to begin to examine this issue 
in a manner that does not produce conceptual distortion: hence, it is 
important to provide some Wittgensteinian remarks on the problems of 
causal explanations as they relate to both the collective and individual limits 
on forms of reflexive agency and cognition. With regard to the issue of 
collective limits we need to see whether a conceptual account can be used 
to counter causal explanations, which Harre (1993) argues occur when 
collectivist points of view treat the relations between people and social 
structures in external, causal terms. One example is where a particular 
individual becomes an object of pride for a group and can therefore be said 
to have caused an increase in the positive feelings within that group. 
Moreover, the collective effect of these individual experiences and 
expressions may have unique and unpredictable consequences within a 
culture (e.g., sales of national flags increase, etc.). Even this specific 
example demonstrates that aspects of cultural surroundings and people's 
relations to them "become what they are partly because of numerous 
coincidences" (Smedslund, 1985, p. 80). Smedslund's point is worth noting 
because studying closely the conceptual-discursive detail of the relations 
between individuals and collectives admits further subtleties: for instance, 
"both the particular life situations encountered by each individual and the 
features of the surrounding culture are historical events" (p. 80). An 
important feature of these events is that they are "resistant to explanation 
and prediction in terms of general theory" because they are "the confluence 
of mutually independent casual chains" (p. 80). Thus even ostensibly 
external and causal aspects of people's lives can be revealed in a less 
deterministic light by a conceptual-discursive survey (see also Harre's 
(1993) discussion of how we often create a coherent, purposeful history out 
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of the chaotic events we live through). 
A similar point about the importance of representing conceptual 
relations is indicated by the fact that understanding emotional reactions 
such as an increase in a nation's pride would be distorted if it were 
regarded as a product of "economic causation" (Stearns, 1993). For 
example, Rose (1984) argues that after an international humiliation or 
defeat one of the best means of "causing" an increase in pride is economic 
success. Again, such a complicated confluence of events should not be 
taken to undermine a conceptual-discursive investigation and the fact that it 
can indicate other occasions in which national pride is spontaneously 
expressed and collectively manifested. Recovery of national pride may 
occur, for example, in conjunction with economic recovery but should not 
necessarily be regarded as causally determined by economic changes 
(Rose, 1984, p. 23). For an analysis may also include changes in standards 
and values that seem to compel quite different assessments of appropriate 
statements, expressions and actions by individuals with regard to the mood 
of a group, region, or nation. Although it may be difficult for individuals to 
account for such broad changes without being tempted to produce some 
form of rudimentary social theory, a closer examination of the circumstances 
in which such statements are made and the basis for them may still reveal 
that any use of the word "because" in them is still "not the 'because' of 
causation" (Harre, 1993, p. 41). 
And there are further examples of the potential for a Wittgensteinian 
conceptual-discursive surview to prevent a focus on causal explanation 
from providing distorted accounts of psychological phenomena. For 
instance, the event that "caused" a particular emotion (or emotion-related 
response such as excessive pride or a jealous rage) is seen in its context so 
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that the object of that emotion is not misunderstood (Le., who that rage is 
directed towards or how it is expressed). Attending carefully to the reactions 
and responses of people in everyday life therefore prevents the kind of error 
(and partial self-correction) that can occur particularly with social 
transgressions such as where we might be tempted to state, as Polonius did 
of Hamlet: "Mad let us grant him, then: And now remains. That we find out 
the cause of this effect. Or rather say, the cause of this defed' 
(Shakespeare, n.d'/1992, p. 798). The internal relation between 
transgressing actions and their context is hidden by the attempt to find the 
cause or causal prerequisites of the "effect". Thus by focusing too closely on 
the causal explanation of particular actions, it is possible to bypass the fact 
that we are explaining cases of individuals breaking rules rather than 
according with them (and also not examining the type of highly conceptual 
and often social means by which judgements about transgressions are 
formed). 
The fact that there may be no effect of a transgression without the 
"uptake" of others also helps us to understand cases where it is tempting to 
highlight problems that occur with individual experiences of social 
confirmation or approbation. For example, when a child is said to be proud 
because she was the "cause" of her own success this can be taken to mean 
that she was responsible for it. However, attribution theorists such as 
Weiner (1986) are often misled by the picture that the individual concerned 
has mysteriously produced her own emotion by way of an internalized 
judgement. As Weiner suggests in a rather muddled account of attribution 
theory, it is the child's cognitive recognition that she was the cause of her 
own success (or failure) that then causes (or at least augments) an affective 
reaction. If we were captured by this emphasis on causes and causal 
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explanation it might suggest further research about the way in which such 
occasions become incorporated and represented in the long-term emotional 
dispositions and attribution-style of a particular individual. But it is more 
important to represent the detail and surroundings of individual experiences 
and expressions of such emotions with regard to tests, refinements and 
confirmations of various abilities, skills and attributes in culturally specific 
situations. 
However, Weiner's account does raise a point that Gadenne, 
Greenwood, Rosenberg and Hochschild also regard as important to 
understanding the limits of reflexive agency and cognition: underlying and 
developmentally earlier cognitive abilities such as memory, attention, 
evaluation, and other processes need to be present before they can then 
"be brought to bear upon the self as an object" (Rosenberg, 1990, p. 3). 
Accordingly, we might focus on underlying, embodied changes that produce 
unpredictable and sometimes uncontrollable emotional effects even when 
individuals are participating freely in an activity. When such reactions occur 
in social situations, it is tempting to describe the causal relation between an 
object or person in the world and the effect on the brain and body as 
cognitively mediated. Moreover, if this event persists for some reason in the 
life of the individual it is possible for a conceptual interest in the role of 
memory, attention, evaluation, analysis and so on to slide quickly to talk of 
the internal cognitive components necessary for particular emotions 
(Rosenberg, 1990). Thus cognitive psychologists are tempted to argue that 
"global events like speech acts or other social actions presuppose cognitive 
mechanisms specified by general causal hypotheses" (Gadenne, 1989, p. 
459). 
It is obviously important that some account of the neurophysiological 
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grounding of many speech-acts (and reflexive speech-acts) is provided 
(perhaps as localized by different forms of "sense-extension" technology; 
see chapter 2, section 2.3)). But we still need to know what Wittgensteinian 
criticisms there are, if any, of such causal accounts of emotion and personal 
reflexivity. One possibility is that we should examine how emotions, for 
example, can be described as "colouring" particular thoughts (RPP II, §160) 
because this position contrasts with general hypotheses about how reflexive 
agency and reflexive cognition "work over" an internal state of arousal (Le., 
so that "the emotion comes to be mixed with elements that are separate from 
the physiological experience" (Rosenberg, 1990, pp. 3-4)). A further 
response is also to recognize that mediating cognitive events and 
"unconscious mental events ... are introduced because we wish to say that 
there must be causes of human action" (Baker & Hacker, 1985, p. 17; see 
previous section for other pictures and assumptions that support causal 
explanations in psychology). It is important that we examine closely how 
people "cause themselves" to have particular emotions or, in Rosenberg's 
equally dubious terms, try to control in an indirect manner the "causes" of 
their emotions. But the overall point is that searching for the causes of 
, 
emotions in every case may obscure occasions when genuinely 
spontaneous responses become personally and socially significant. 
Wittgenstein also inspires a critical treatment of other cases where 
conceptualizing the relations between cognition and emotion in causal 
terms is problematic (e.g., such as where a child feels proud of some activity 
he has completed or skill he has demonstrated while isolated from others; 
see chapter 8 for further detail). As noted above, it often seems reasonable 
to think that speech-acts presuppose more specific, neurophysiologically 
grounded "abilities" of memory, attention and consciousness. For example, 
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Ellsworth (1991) provides an account of cognition and emotion that moves 
'from a description of the dimensions of appraisal that differentiate emotional 
experiences to the conclusion: 
... there is general agreement that the emotions ... can be 
broken down into smaller appraisal components, and that 
many of these components correspond to cognitive appraisals. 
(p. 145) 
However, Shanker (1993) argues from a Wittgensteinian perspective that 
sllch an explanation is: 
... a confusion born from an inappropriate causal picture: 
from the feeling that we can only predict his behaviour so 
accurately because we have broken down parts of the 
machine, can see why x causes y causes z. (p. 225) 
Even though Ellsworth's approach appears to be rigorous, the concern here 
is instead to focus on how we spontaneously create such possibilities by 
active participation in cultural and linguistic practices. Thus if a conceptual-
discursive surview assembles detail about our use of psychological 
concepts that "upsets our concepts of causality" (RPP I, §905) it seems 
reasonable to also concur with Wittgenstein's conclusion: "then it is high 
time they were upset" (Joc. cit.). 
To summarize, explanations of psychology that focus on the possible 
causes of psychological phenomena set a standard which can, in the 
process of its pursuit, distort the internal relations between concepts. 
Problems with causal accounts of personal reflexivity and emotion should 
reject any view that the phenomena explained are causally determined. 
The importance of examining the internal relations between concepts was 
further illustrated with examples of the relations between collectives and 
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individuals, the potential obfuscation of social transgressions, the 
importance of concepts such as responsibility and spontaneity, as well as 
the need to be careful about people's attempts to control or change the 
causes of emotion in their minds or bodies. It was concluded that when 
attempts to represent the internal relations between concepts provide 
important and relevant details, it is reasonable to "upset" psychology's 
enduring conceptions of causality and causal explanation. 
Can psychologists be trained to carry out reflexive, anti-
theoretical, non-explanatory work? 
An important point mentioned by Wittgenstein which can include our 
concerns with reflexivity in psychology is "any explanation has its foundation 
in training" (RPP II, §327). The issue raised by considerations of 
psychological reflexivity in this context is not whether a causal account of 
training in psychology is valid16. Nor is it to ask if psychologists' preferences 
for particular types of explanatory approach can themselves be explained in 
terms of their training. Instead, it is more important to determine when and 
how psychologists begin to question that training and freely pursue a more 
reflective and reflexive stance. This issue is relevant to a reconsideration of 
the links between Wittgenstein's philosophy and psychological reflexivity 
because it is not obvious that psychologists can be trained (or systematically 
taught) to adopt a critical, reflexive attitude towards theories, explanations 
and explanatory systems. Thus where social constructionists have 
attempted to make psychologists "more reflexive" it is important to examine 
16 For a Wittgensteinian criticism of a causal explanation of learning and understanding music 
that could easily be extended to training and teaching in psychology see Schulte (1993, p. 
43). 
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whether Wittgensteinian methods and remarks can provide more material 
for training in the discipline. 
The growing value placed on reflexive research in psychology 
suggests a further problem about the nature of achieving a critical 
perspective. Critical perspectives on psychology can obviously come from 
outside the discipline, as the enduring relevance of Wittgenstein's 
philosophy indicates. But there is also the potential for confusion to arise 
about the appropriate point at which psychologists might begin to become 
more reflexive. For example, social constructionists have argued that 
Wittgenstein's remarks and methods may be inserted into the practice of 
psychology in order to provide alternatives to theory construction. Does it 
make sense, therefore, to say that psychologists can be trained to be more 
reflexive? Moreover, could this training appropriately be described as 
Wittgensteinian if it is to be used within psychology? 
As we have seen, philosophy and psychology are quite different tasks 
on Wittgenstein's view. While the concern has mainly been with reflexive 
work within psychology that connects with Wittgenstein's philosophy, the 
extent to which an individual may master and participate in both practices is 
an open question. Clearly, it is important to recognize disciplinary, 
institutional and social constraints that contribute towards the specialization 
that an individual may choose. It is also possible that philosophical 
problems may come to dominate the thoughts of a reflexive psychologist or, 
in contrast, a philosopher may become too concerned with the aims and 
activities of psychological practice. The point is not to identify an in principle 
objection to the possibility that a Wittgensteinian approach can be self-
exemplifying in crossing between philosophy and psychology (I.e., since 
achieving a surview seems to provide the most appropriate crossing point). 
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However, there are good reasons for thinking that Wittgenstein's philosophy 
cannot easily become part of the training of psychology. For example, there 
is an important sense in which a student cannot be trained to see the value 
of Wittgenstein's later philosophy to psychology. This is simply because 
such training would, paradoxically, undermine the freedom that leads 
psychologists to view many of the conceptual problems identified by 
Wittgenstein as their own. Moreover, it is only after students have mastered 
many of the concepts and methods of psychology that they begin to be truly 
critical of them. Mastering the complicated language-game of talking about 
paradigms, for example, does not substitute for the skills and insights that 
can come from working within the "new paradigm" to explore other possible 
research methods and subjects. Rather, it is only later in what can be called 
a psychologist's "reflexive career" that it is possible to see a connection with 
Wittgenstein's philosophy. 
However, this account differs markedly from the "social poetics" 
account of the use of Wittgenstein's methods to develop a reflective practice 
from within and counter theory-based training in psychology (Katz & Shotter, 
1996; Shotter, 1996; Shotter & Katz, 1996). The central argument of the 
"social poetics" account is that understanding should not proceed through 
theories because this approach bypasses much of the ordinary conceptual-
discursive detail provided by our moral-practical participation in everyday 
life. It should be noted that Shotter and Katz remain open to the possibility 
that the results of a comprehensive conceptual-discursive surview might 
eventually afford limited theory-based organization and explanation. 
Nevertheless, this is one of a number of activities they list as occurring later 
rather than earlier in a psychologist's training: 
To send messages; to fully understand each other; to think 
conceptually; to discourse routinely and skillfully upon a 
subject; to be able to 'reach out,' so to speak, from within a 
language-game and talk about the 'contacts' one has made, 
and to formulate 'theories' about the nature of what is 'out 
there' - all these and more are abilities that are, or can be, 
later developments. (p. 227) 
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Since these theory-oriented and "traditional" ways of pursuing reflexive work 
in psychology are bypassed by Shotter and Katz, the only other way of 
connecting with Wittgenstein's philosophy is to use his methods within 
psychology. 
Not surprisingly, there are several problems with Shotter and Katz's 
presentation as it pertains to the achievement of a reflexive perspective on 
psychology. One major problem is that the social poetics account does not 
involve an account of the need for a to and fro movement between 
philosophy and psychology. Instead, Wittgenstein's methods are presented 
in a manner that removes the need for psychologists to engage with 
Wittgenstein's philosophy and to work out particular conceptual problems for 
themselves. In this manner, it not only presents a version of Wittgenstein's 
philosophy that makes it possible to train others in his methods, but more 
problematically seems, to counteract one of Wittgenstein's major concerns 
about readings of his philosophy: 
I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of 
thinking. But, if possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of 
his own. (PI, p. vi) 
It may seem odd that Shotter and Katz are being criticized for disseminating 
an account of Wittgenstein that is close to the letter and spirit of 
Wittgenstein's methods and remarks. However, while Shotter and Katz 
could be argued to present a laudable view that much of the teaching and 
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training of psychology should not be theory-first, nevertheless there are 
important reasons why theory should not be bypassed or left until much later 
in the reflexive career of psychologists. The main reason is that the freedom 
to create theories and lines of investigation that may lead to new advances 
or conceptual entanglement in psychology would be undermined by 
including Wittgenstein's methods within the training of psychology. 
A further problem is that the training psychologists receive in 
particular concepts, methods, types of explanatory theories and systems 
provides the basis both to adopt the pictures of an obfuscating theoretical-
linguistic practice and also to use philosophy to remove the resulting "knots 
in our thinking" (PR, I, §2)17. To put this issue in another way, it is only when 
other perspectives seem to be closed to a psychologist within a particular 
explanatory system that it is possible to be reacquainted with the detail and 
variation of possible human activities (and thus to break the hold of a 
particular theory). This includes the potential also to be critical of many 
aspects of the discipline in a useful way that removes conceptual 
confusions, highlights the narrow preoccupation with data and 
measurement in empirical studies and assembles reminders of the 
conceptual-discursive detail of phenomena. By presenting an account of 
Wittgenstein's methods and remarks that can be used in the practices of 
psychology, Shotter and Katz may prevent psychologists from being trained 
in the sort of perspectives from which free engagement with Wittgenstein's 
philosophy will prove to be most profitable and rewarding. 
17 The whole of Wittgenstein's remark - which is provided because it contrasts with Shotter 
and Katz's (1996) interpretation of Wittgenstein's relevance to psychology - is: 
Philosophy unties the knots in our thinking which we have tangled up in an 
absurd way; but to do that it must make movements which are just as 
complicated as the knots. Although the result of philosophy is simple, its 
methods for arriving there cannot be so. (PR, I, §2) 
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A problem identified by Ash (1993) is also relevant to this 
Wittgensteinian consideration of Shotter and Katz's view that Wittgenstein's 
methods and remarks provide the appropriate approach for anyone 
concerned with conducting reflexive research: 
... asking all psychologists to perform such reflexive moves. . 
. means asking them to jump over their own shadows - to 
question the institutionalized presuppositions on which their 
careers appear to depend, perhaps even before those careers 
have even begun. (p. 54) 
Ash's remark is relevant because it points to the dilemma of wanting to 
encourage reflexive work in psychology but also realizing that many 
psychologists will not attempt to make themselves familiar with the detail of 
Wittgenstein's work (Le., especially in regard to other areas of traditional and 
postmodern philosophy). The danger is that by suggesting this alternative 
without allowing those students of psychology the opportunity to find 
themselves entangled in similar problems, the psychologists produced by 
this training will not have learnt for themselves how to stop pursuing a 
particular line of confused thought and to reveal disguised nonsense. 
An indication of this problem is provided by an imaginary example of 
a sceptical student who uses Wittgenstein's philosophy to adopt what seems 
to be a reflexive perspective in psychology. The example is an extension of 
Wittgenstein's case of a pupil who refuses to believe a particular 
mathematical proposition. Wittgenstein notes of the student's doubt that "we 
should say he had no grounds for this suspicion" (Oe, §322). Extending this 
example to psychology, we might imagine a student who expresses 
scepticism that previous generations of humans beyond, for example, 
10,000 years had emotions that are as complicated as ours. In this case, it 
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the proposition they were contradicting formed an explicit part of the 
student's training in psychology, it could be regarded as what describes as a 
"hinge proposition": 
That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts 
depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from 
doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn. (OC, 
341 ) 
While the student's contradiction of this proposition might possibly prefigure 
an important discovery, the point is that unless this contradiction of a hinge 
proposition is backed up by a whole alternative system or rival theory it 
could not be exploited in a creative manner18• 
However, the contrast drawn between a psychologist or other relevant 
practitioner who is advanced in his or her "reflexive career" and a sceptical 
student helps to introduce the notion of reflexivity that was examined in 
terms of psychologist's attempts to "explain themselves". In particular, 
Gergen (1985) argued that an examination of social processes (or social 
inquiry) could provide an account of psychology's knowledge practices. It 
seems reasonable to think that Gergen's account could be extended 
towards the possibility that psychologists could become "more reflexive" of 
what is presently regarded as the discipline's knowledge19. In other words, 
18 It is a general point that any psychologist must have grounds to create scientific doubt -
rather than the sort of doubt that requires philosophical treatment - and provide an 
appropriate challenge to the assumptions of a particular explanatory system. Interestingly, the 
example of contradicting a hinge proposition does highlight an issue of relevance to 
Wittgensteinian reconsideration of psychological reflexivity: it suggests that asking what 
appear to be reflexive questions may, in a strange sense, complete an individual's training in 
psychology. That is, by asking particular questions it may promote mastery of a psychological 
theory and the internal relations between its concepts in a manner that does not necessarily 
require philosophical clarification. 
19 It is interesting to note that Jenkins (1995) provides an account of the attempt to 
encourage "greater reflexivity" in sociology that is applicable to psychology. According to 
Jenkins, reflexivity involves training in social skills that researchers may use to overcome 
biases and oversights that occur mostly in the interaction between researcher and subject(s). 
Jenkins also provides good epistemological reasons for generic training in reflexivity which 
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the social process view seems to have the potential to connect with some of 
Wittgenstein's remarks. But why should the resulting combination augment 
social constructionist accounts of how it is that psychologists advance in 
their "reflexive careers"? 
One answer is provided by giving more detail of the notion of a 
"reflexive career" in contrast to the notion that psychologists should provide 
an account of how they can become more reflective. Bruffee (1993), for 
example, uses a social constructionist account to show that adopting a 
critical perspective in disciplines such as psychology is a collaborative 
achievement. The position agrees with Katz and Shotter's (1996) attempt to 
provide detail about the use of Wittgenstein's methods to establish a kind of 
reflective practice. The benefit of this account is its focus on the 
development of the skills of a reflexive researcher and its avoidance of the 
view that achieving a reflexive perspective is a private, individual 
achievement. Reflexivity about the systems of explanation in which we have 
all, at some stage, been trained is only achieved through conversation with 
others at particular points in a reflexive career. Although Bruffee 
unfortunately adopts the simplistic view that thought is internalized 
conversation, his remarks provide an important contrast with cognitive 
attempts to explain how psychologists become more reflexive. Thus Bruffee 
provides an account of how psychologists might adopt a critical reflexive 
stance on, for example, a particular explanation without adopting the sort of 
picture that is evident in cognitive accounts of successively general 
abstraction and the refinement of a largely private, individual and 
should include specific conversation-based "sending" and "receiving" skills. However, it is 
also important to note that Jenkins does not answer the broader issue raised by the self-
posed question: is this "teaching reflexivity?" (see also chapter 4, section 4.3 for an account 
of psychological reflexivity that recognizes its potential equivocation with forms of personal 
reflexivity). 
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decontextualized competence (e.g., Biggs, 1987, 1991). 
A further possible connection between the social constructionist 
account of how psychologists "explain themselves" and Wittgenstein's 
philosophy is that an account can be provided of the sort of "seeing as" 
experience that can seem to provide new perspectives to students in their 
early training. For example, it might seem that a functional explanation of 
emotions (Averill, 1989) might provide a novel account of our experiences. 
The experiences of individuals in being taught and trained in new ways of 
representing (and therefore seeing) human action or practices is often one 
of the most rewarding features of learning psychological systems and 
theories. But individuals such as Greenwood (1991) are tempted to adopt a 
private-cognitive account of this training that presents it as the extension of 
existing, widely shared theories in everyday life: "what one sees is held to 
depend upon what one sees it as, and what one sees it as is held to 
depend upon one's prior theories" (p. 92). However, Wittgenstein suggests 
that where it is tempting to rely on an individual explanation it is crucial to 
note that what underlies the experience of "seeing as" is not a cognitive or 
other form of causal substratum but is instead "the mastery of a technique" 
(PI, p. 208). And even Wittgenstein realizes how strange it is for the mastery 
of a technique to be "the logical condition of someone's having such-and-
such an experience!" (PI, p. 208). Nevertheless, where it may be tempting to 
think that there is a cognitive explanation for the differences in skills 
between what one trained psychologist can "see" and another cannot, the 
point stands that "it is only if someone can do, has learnt, is master of, such-
and-such, that it makes sense to say he has had this experience" (PI, p. 
209). 
To reiterate, the type of conceptual problems that lead reflexive 
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researchers in psychology towards philosophy are persistent. In accord with 
the view that reflexive psychologists need to cross between psychology and 
philosophy in a to and 'fro manner, it was argued that reflexive studies are 
only possible after mastering the concepts, theories, methods and 
techniques of psychology conceptual problems. Pace Shotter and Katz 
(1996), training in psychology (and, more specifically, many of its theories) is 
required before it is possible to attempt a reflexive and possibly 
Wittgensteinian disentanglement from conceptual errors. AlthoL1gh the 
result of reflexive work may sometimes be appropriately regarded as 
completing our training or contributing a rival theory to others, it is also 
possible that we can understand how psychologists might be trained to be 
"more reflexive". Social constructionist accounts seem to indicate the 
collaborative, conversational and public nature of achieving a reflexive 
position in contrast to private, cognitive accounts. The temptation to view 
reflexivity as either a collaborative-dialogical or cognitive-private 
achievement was resisted by examining some Wittgensteinian remarks 
about the experiences of "seeing as" that can help to attract neophyte 
psychologists towards a particular approach or explanatory system. Thus 
, 
the "reflexive careers" of psychologists that connect with philosophical 
description do much more than indicate to other psychologists that they are 
simply completing their training in the discipline. 
3.3 Psychological explanations and thei r relation 
to ordinary practices and concepts 
One of the temptations in presenting a critical account of psychological 
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explanation and training is to survey the remarks of novices and other 
individuals who are free of the explanatory concerns and theoretical 
concepts of contemporary psychology. Yet in most cases, a potential 
psychologist will share much common understanding with individuals who 
have been trained in a particular explanatory system. Indeed, research 
subjects often have more experience and insights than traditional forms of 
psychological investigation such as experimentation and surveys allow. But 
psychological reflexivity in this context is the question of the possible 
relation between such an explanatory system and the other "system", as 
Smedslund (1985) mistakenly describes it, that people already have "for 
describing, explaining, and so on, the behaviour of persons, namely 
commonsense psychology" (p. 78). The relevance of Wittgenstein's 
philosophy is that his remarks seem to encourage a commonsense, ordinary 
language approach within psychology that social constructionists have 
perhaps taken too far in the name of psychological reflexivity. 
The limits of revision and the importance of participation 
The view that psychologists who test their abstruse theories and engage in 
particular studies presuppose the same language of psychological concepts 
used by their subjects is an issue that has already been examined in terms 
of "linguistic objectivity" and creating "distance" (see chapter 2). Although 
the issue seems to have been addressed, further issues remain in relation to 
the potential Wittgensteinian remarks and methods to correct and augment 
some aspects of social constructionism. Two particular issues will be 
reconsidered which pertain to psychological reflexivity within linguistic and 
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cultural contexts and, more specifically, the idea that its recognition 
supposedly entails that the language used by psychologists to talk about 
psychological phenomena must be the same as (or potentially translated 
into) ordinary language (Smedslund, 1985). The first issue is that 
Wittgenstein helps to provide a perspective on the limits of psychologists' 
revisions of ordinary language. Secondly, we can evaluate the relevance of 
an alternative Wittgensteinian account of psychologists' participation in 
cultural and linguistic practices. 
One of the problems faced by psychologists who attempt to 
demonstrate the enduring relevance of Wittgenstein's philosophy to 
psychology is that Wittgenstein's work is still dismissed by many as "ordinary 
language" philosophy. For example, Hacker (1996) argues that 
Wittgenstein's later philosophy is unfairly associated with the ordinary 
language philosophy said to be inspired by his methods and remarks. More 
specifically, Parker (1989) argues that the "linguistic turn" in philosophy is 
increasingly being left behind by other important developments in 
postmodern philosophy (the extent to which Wittgenstein produced a richer 
account of culture than any strict focus on linguistic details will be examined 
in chapter 4). However, it is important to resist the conception that 
Wittgenstein was only interested in describing ordinary language: hence 
the broad argument that Wittgenstein's philosophy seems to support an 
untenable epistemology in which description of the use of psychological 
concepts in ordinary language and practices is the foundation for all 
psychological investigations. 
Such a position is evident in Shotter's (1992a) remarks that 
psychological theories must inevitably "be made intelligible in ordinary 
language" and evaluated "in the same way that they (ordinary people) do" 
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(p. 179). In this Wittgenstein-inspired position, Shotter also finds good 
reasons for resisting forms of realism: 
... it is this reflexive turn that has a number of consequences 
unpalatable to scientists of the external world: because 
theories and models do not have immediate intelligibility in 
everyday life in their own terms, social constructionists have 
become more interested in accounts, narratives and the use of 
discursive repertoires. (p. 179) 
The problem with Shotter's pOSition is not only that it gives individuals in 
everyday life the power, at least in principle, to evaluate a theory, but also is 
an important part of an ostensibly Wittgensteinian alternative to 
psychological theorizing. This is despite the fact that Wittgenstein did not 
want his philosophy to relate to ordinary language use of psychological 
concepts in a manner that could be described as producing only a "certain 
jargon" (LFM, XXXI, p. 293; see Rorty (1989) p. 88 in chapter 1). 
Wittgenstein's philosophical aim was not to restate the use of ordinary 
psychological concepts when faced with problems caused by the concepts 
and theories of psychological science. The private language argument, for 
example, engages with misconceptions about private experiences in 
everyday life, but can also be extended to remarks made by psychologists in 
describing the results of their theoretical and empirical studies (see 
examples from Rosenberg (1990) in Part 2). Wittgenstein's clarification of 
ordinary forms of explanation is concerned with highlighting "idle language" 
in everyday life, but without interfering directly to reform language (Le., either 
with regard to everyday or more technical matters (PI, §§124, 132; LFM, I, 
pp. 14-15)). But what sort of description does Wittgenstein offer of the 
relations between psychology and people's cultural and linguistic practices? 
First, it is important to note that the ordinary language use of 
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psychological concepts that Wittgenstein describes is not static and fixed. 
Although Wittgenstein's implication that the grammar of psychological 
concepts is autonomous, psychology does have the potential to revise many 
expressions, remarks and accounts in everyday life. In other words, this 
grammatical autonomy is not undermined by the fact that terms used within 
areas of psychology such as psychoanalytic theory are often taken up and 
used in everyday life (i.e., thus suggesting a broad cultural sense in which 
psychology reflects back upon and changes the phenomena it investigates). 
Wittgenstein's remarks are not, however, being used to support the 
argument made by commentators such as Macintyre (1985), who suggests 
that psychology has the power to "make itself true or false" (p. 897; i.e., that 
in a restricted linguistic sense psychology "has itself brought into being new 
ways of thinking, feeling, acting, and interacting" (p. 897; see chapter 4 for 
accounts of ways in which language and forms of psychological expression 
change through which psychology). instead, we are interested in how 
philosophy can describe the relations between what Shotter (1993b) 
describes as conversational and academic discourses and thus provide a 
useful account of the limits of any reflexive effect of psychology on cultural 
and linguistic practices (Le., such as where the misuse and incorrect 
explanation of a useful theoretical concept in psychology by an average 
"man on the street" would be highly amusing to experts). 
Wittgenstein's philosophy can be used to describe the relations 
between ordinary language and the practices in which it is mastered 
represented, revised, or ignored by psychologists. Although it is reasonable 
to think that psychological studies may lead to some revisions of the 
everyday use of psychological concepts, they could not lead to complete 
revision of all of these concepts and categories. However, the aim here is 
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not to examine the broad view that our everyday use of psychological 
concepts is explanatory in a manner that might eventually be replaced. 
Strom (1994), for example, has already presented a convincing 
Wittgensteinian perspective against Churchland's (1988) eliminative 
reductionist view of everyday explanations of psychological phenomena. 
Rather; the conceptual criticism about the relations between psychology and 
particular cultural and linguistic practices is restricted to the point that the 
concept of revisability cannot itself be the subject of revision20. 
The basis of theorizing in everyday life provides an important point 
not only with regard to the fact that we do not need to change our language 
of psychological concepts after we have learned them, but also that the 
possibility of revising some concepts presupposes practical mastery of them. 
Hacker (1996) argues this point and extends it to include descriptions of 
data and non-theoretical observations: 
Theory presupposes description of data demanding a 
theoretical explanation. The bottom-level data for any theory-
construction are non-theoretical observations that stand in 
need of such explanation. One must have a high degree of 
concept-mastery and have engaged in extensive concept-
application before one can have any articulate observations 
that stand in need of a theoretical explanation. (p. 415) 
It is quite possible, of course, that some cultures use the vocabularies 
provided by psychologists to talk about their emotions in considerable detail 
(see next section). But this issue needs to be kept distinct from the fact that 
20 A better suggestion is that Wittgenstein's philosophy counters any view that psychology 
tests the theories that people offer as part of their ''folk psychology". But it is unhelpful to 
think that many of the concepts that people use to express their emotions and ascribe 
psychological phenomena to others are akin to scientific theories. Even if the problems that 
are disentangled by the private language argument, for example, are confined to western 
"theories" of autonomous individuals who have such private objects as emotions, there is still 
no need to adopt the view that the language used by individuals should be described as a 
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"numerous desires, beliefs, intentions, and emotions presuppose the 
possession of concepts available only to language-users" (p. 442). And 
although the examples offered by Hacker are clearly not motivated by any 
conceptual interest in reflexive agency and reflexive cognition, still one 
example of a language-dependent phenomenon that is relevant to Part 2 is 
"a love of one's country or pride in one's work" (p. 442; see chapter 5 for the 
possibility that these statements involve a form of reflexive positioning 
against other cultures and individuals). 
These points about the limits of revision, initially raised in terms of 
reflexivity in psychology, lead to the further issue of the extent to which 
participation in many cultural and linguistic practices is presupposed by 
psychology. A Wittgensteinian reconsideration again suggests some points 
that have not been raised by social constructionists but which have the 
potential to augment that perspective. Social constructionists are, of course, 
interested in the ways in which highly conceptual and language-dependent 
phenomena develop and are maintained in particular cultures. This issue 
might even be explored in the sense that, for example, emotions and 
emotion-related expressions might involve too much talk in some cultures. 
Such a cultural study might include an examination of how the highly-
conceptual and unnecessarily linguistic practices surrounding the 
expression of an emotion in mainstream American films could be contrasted 
with the use of silence and facial expressions in other forms of cinema, thus 
reducing the sense that everything of importance has been explained to the 
viewer. In other circumstances, it is important to entertain how limited the 
possibilities of moving other people would be without language. Such 
widely shared theory as to how psychological states are expressed in behaviour (Greenwood, 
1991 ). 
223 
perspectives may provide a contrast to the practices that we participate in as 
psychologists and also show that our engagement with such theory-
informed or highly-conceptual expressions of emotions is worthy of critical 
study. 
Wittgenstein's remarks also explore a similar line of argument that is 
relevant to a consideration of the participation and mastery of cultural and 
linguistic practices that psychology presupposes. Indeed, Wittgenstein's 
example takes the example of the sceptical student mentioned in section 3.2 
one stage further and applies it to the sort of knowledge that a child learns 
by participation. For many of the phenomena grouped under the ostensibly 
revealing categories of personal reflexivity and emotion presuppose a type 
of knowledge that "can only have learned it by living with people" (RPP II, 
§29). Wittgenstein's broad point is that although it is possible to imagine 
"being allowed merely to observe life without participating in it", Wittgenstein 
argues that "anyone who did this would then understand human life as we 
understand the life of fish or even of plants" (RPP II, §29). There are 
obviously degrees of difference in the understanding that is presupposed by 
participation in a culture and which might be represented by examining the 
, 
learning that either someone from another culture or a child would make (in 
addition to our reactions to them when they made a mistake). These are just 
two of many other potential examples of people (or potential people) who 
could not "fully understand" (Shotter, 1996) many of our everyday 
psychological phenomena. 
There are many circumstances in which we can watch other people in 
the same manner that it is possible to view a foreign film without subtitles 
and see how much we understand. However, it is doubtful whether we 
could so easily overcome our lack of participation in other cultures to the 
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extent that we could fully understand and therefore share the strange 
language, reactions and expressions of another culture (RPP II, §30). And, 
as already noted, it may be difficult to represent clearly the type of 
knowledge that "outsiders" from our culture learn by participation in its highly 
linguistic and conceptual practices. In this context, it might be tempted to 
. adopt a position in which we imagine what our highly conceptual practices 
are like from outside (Le., in order to represent the exact nature of what 
others have to learn and how this participation shapes their emotions, 
jadgements, actions and reactions). One relevant example Wittgenstein 
offers is where we might entertain the possibility that individuals lacked 
many of the phenomena described by Rosenberg's theory. In particular, 
Wittgenstein asks: 
... can't I imagine that the people around me are automata, 
lack consciousness, even though they behave in the same 
way as usual? (PI, §420) 
But in practice the result of an attempt to imagine, for example, that "the 
children over there are mere automata; all their liveliness is mere 
automatism" has unexpected effects: 
. . . you will either find these words becoming quite 
meaningless; or you will produce in yourself some kind of 
uncanny feeling, or something of the sort. (loc. cit.) 
Such "uncanny feelings" can hardly be regarded as a source of fundamental 
insights especially about the "real nature" of language-dependent emotions 
and other complicated psychological experiences. Instead, the use of a 
technique like this in psychology may simply create a feeling of distance 
from other people that goes against the participation in practices that the 
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ability to understand fully other people presupposes. 
To summarize, specific issues surrounding the social constructionist 
emphasis on psychological reflexivity by social constructionists were 
explored. It was argued that although Wittgenstein's philosophy does 
indeed examine ordinary language, psychological studies must not always 
be evaluated and eventually understood by the ordinary "man in the street". 
The contrasting eliminativist perspective was avoided in favour of a position 
in which some concepts and accounts in everyday life may be revised by 
psychological investigations. More specifically, it was noted that the mastery 
of many highly conceptual and language-dependent forms of emotion and 
personal reflexivity is presupposed by descriptions of data and non-
theoretical observations (I.e., that psychologists may attempt to explain in 
theoretical terms). In a final point it was noted that the importance of 
participation is better achieved by examining the type of learning that is 
required by "outsiders" in order to fully understand and share the linguistic 
practices of another culture (Le., in contrast to the sort of "uncanny feeling" 
produced by imagining that other individuals are not reflexive agents and 
thinkers). 
The relation between newly fashioned concepts in psychology 
and everyday linguistic practices 
It is clear from the previous section that there are normative and practical 
limits on the revision that psychology can achieve as well as the nature of 
the distance between psychologists and their "subjects" that theory can 
provide. However, both Greenwood's (1991, 1992) account of the lingUistic 
objectivity of theoretical descriptions and Shotter's (1996) contrasting 
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attempt to cut-out the theoretical "middleman" were not endorsed. Still a 
remaining question relevant to both perspectives is how newly fashioned 
concepts in psychology relate usefully to everyday linguistic practices. 
Further Wittgensteinian remarks are therefore used to address this issue 
before an evaluation of Wittgenstein's so-called methods of "social poetics" 
(Shotter, 1996; Shotter & Katz, 1996) is attempted in the last section of this 
chapter. 
The argument that a comprehensive conceptual-discursive survey is 
the appropriate end product of reflexive work within psychology has been 
developed to this point by examining Wittgenstein's remarks. The position is 
in agreement with some aspects of social constructionism although, pace 
Shotter (1996), it is argued that newly fashioned concepts and theories are 
important to psychology. This is not, however, to argue that an 
understanding of a particular phenomenon can be achieved by substituting 
a new vocabulary for those used in our present cultural and linguistic 
practices. Instead, we should be concerned with an account of how: 
... in order to create 'new theory', research must restructure 
the language out of which theory can grow. In order to do this, 
it is necessary to restructure those forms of practices to which 
the relevant elements of everyday languages are bound. 
(Gustavsen (in press) in Shotter & Katz (1996), pp.214-215) 
Shotter and Katz (1996) paraphrase Gustavsen's position with the remark 
that this different view of the relation of theory to practice "has grown out of a 
new view of the relation of language to reality, mostly influenced by 
Wittgenstein's (1953) later work" (Shotter & Katz, 1996, p. 214). 
One of the reasons why a form of restructuring of language and 
practices is involved is that "psychological concepts are just everyday 
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concepts" (RPP II, §62). In this respect, a Wittgensteinian surview of 
psychological concepts is quite different from the results of a theoretical 
survey because "they are not concepts newly fashioned by science for its 
own purpose, as are the concepts of physics and chemistry" (RPP II, §62). 
Therefore, we should not conflate Wittgenstein's interest in psychological 
concepts with the many concepts of psychology evident in discipline's 
theories and practices. But Shotter (1996) is right to challenge the view that 
we should first know about many psychological phenomena through the 
concepts and models of particular theories. Relating this issue to the 
comprehensive conceptual-discursive surview that will be produced in Part 
2, it is clear that a survey of theories would not achieve the same clarity (and 
potential for other new theories) as a surview. Unfortunately, with regard to 
training and teaching in psychology, by taking Wittgenstein's relevance to 
psychology to be a general argument against a theory-first perspective, 
potential reflexive psychologists seem to be spared the type of engagement 
with theory that led Shotter and other social constructionists to discover the 
relevance of Wittgenstein's philosophy. 
A surview also, of course, is likely to engage with theories in order to 
disentangle some (but not all) of their conceptual problems. As a result, the 
notion of a surview argued for thus far provides a different conception of the 
relations between theory and practice. It does not, however, provide a 
specific method that allows psychologists to avoid engaging with theory, nor 
does it entirely SUbstitute for theory construction which, it should be noted, 
may be both useful, challenging and creative. In this manner, it may still be 
regarded as allowing for theory construction to occur in specific domains 
without necessarily providing any guidance as to which lines of research to 
pursue into particular disciplines. Instead, it provides a resource and basis 
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from which these different areas of potential or actual growth can be judged. 
More specifically, by surveying particular clusters of concepts, their relations, 
and limits a surview does not proceed through the concepts of psychology 
even though these may also be in common use. 
In this manner, the survey of pride does not proceed through a survey 
of concepts such as self-esteem. Indeed, this activity reverses the attitude of 
researchers such as Wells and Marwell (1976) towards everyday concepts: 
. . . although self-esteem may be a theoretical construct 
requiring a clear conceptual statement of definition before we 
can arrive at its operational counterpart, it is also, 
unfortunately, a term in common day-to-day usage. (p. 8) 
The aim of the investigation in Part 2 is not to gather people's theories about 
other people or collect their reflections on personal experiences. An 
example relevant to pride might be the following: "vanity and pride are 
different things, though the words are often used synonymously" (Austen, 
1813/1985, p. 16). In other words, such embellished remarks about what 
individuals do and feel are not regarded as theories which can be 
systematically tested and refined (although the example may approximate 
what psychologists do when they formalize their insights). This account of a 
surview and its status therefore contrasts with Shotter's (1996) view that 
Wittgenstein "redescribes in a more practical way many topics and events 
that we are tempted to put into theoretical terms" especially "whenever we 
find ourselves faced with questions about why we act as we do" (p. 8). 
As noted in the previous section, a constraint on theorizing in 
psychology is that the theories produced cannot stem too far from the 
concepts of ordinary life. However, although the result of fashioning new 
concepts in psychology may be unintelligible to the "man in the street", why 
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should this be a criterion for psychology? For psychology does fashion new 
concepts and theories for the purpose of highlighting and perhaps even 
revising and explaining many of the ordinary circumstances in which 
psychological concepts are used. The criterion of intelligibility is therefore 
questionable because many challenging and creative scientific theories, 
techniques and discoveries can be described as external and additional to 
shared language-games, without necessarily being nonsensical. Moreover, 
legitimate reflexive work of the sort described by Barker (1989; see chapter 
1) is similar to other challenging and creative advances within the social 
sciences that initially may not be intelligible to other practitioners let alone 
the "man in the street". Of course, because psychologists can be said to 
work within, explore and extend the possibilities of grammar, this description 
does not mean that the general public must eventually be able to 
comprehend and support every aspect of theoretical advance. 
It can be difficult to distinguish between the description and exposure 
of philosophical prejudices and potentially useful and creative critiques of 
scientific work (as Baker and Hacker's (1985) account of a surview 
demonstrates; see chapter 1, section 1.3). A further aspect of Shotter's 
position is to argue that Wittgenstein's "ordinary language" methods are 
useful within psychology because: 
. . . by the careful use of selected images, similes, or 
metaphors he suggests new ways of talking that can lend or 
give a first form to such sensed but otherwise unnoticed 
distinctions, thus to make reflective contemplation of their 
nature possible. (p. 10). 
While it is clear that philosophers and psychologists may engage in such 
work, it is often difficult to distinguish where the line between philosophy 
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and psychology should be drawn. However, one way of drawing the 
distinction is to ask whether the images, similes or metaphors produced in a 
practice are for practical purposes (Le., since applicability provides an 
important criterion for any theory). In other words, a useful theory should do 
more than merely provide a rival language for talking about phenomena of 
interest to psychologists. Thus while new theory should not necessarily 
"restructure" a cultural and linguistic practice as Gustavsen claims, still it 
should lead to some practical change or, more specifically, change in the 
way we view our cultural and linguistic practices (see chapter 4). 
Considering the status of newly fashioned concepts in psychology 
also provides an opportunity to assess issues relevant to Rosenberg's 
reflexivity and emotion theory. For example, do the categories of reflexivity 
agency and reflexive cognition provide a specific example of "organizing 
models for the production of fruitful empirical theories or typologies" (8aker 
& Hacker, 1985, p. 539)? Or is it a misleading pseudo-explanation to say 
that these two reflexive processes radically transform the physiological basis 
of emotional identification, display and experience? While Rosenberg's 
account seems to provide an important organization of existing concepts, it 
is also a potential target of Shotter's (1996) Wittgenstein-inspired criticism: 
... we wilfully look for general theoretical principles hidden 
behind appearances instead of for the particular practical 
details we use in following the immediate activity between us. 
(p.7) 
To put this point in more relevant Wittgensteinian terms, the difficulty with 
conceptual redescription of the type provided by the categories of reflexive 
agency and reflexive cognition is that it involves a wider tendency to 
"confuse category differences with differences between kinds" (88, §64). As 
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such, the theoretical vocabulary gives us the mistaken impression that 
"reflexive processes" are something in common between a large number of 
diverse emotions and emotion-related phenomena. 
Apart from the fact that Rosenberg ignores many important 
conceptually-obvious details about emotion, further problems occur which 
seem to be internal to the theory and its definitions. We might want to know, 
for example, whether hope provides a good example of the effects of 
reflexive cognition or reflexive agency. Or is the main problem that hope 
may need to be identified through language in some contexts, controlled in 
its expression in others (e.g., in order not to upset others), and perhaps 
avoided in thought (e.g., to be preoccupied by the fact that a loved one may 
be still be alive in impossible circumstances)? The point is not necessarily 
to reject all general propositions and their role in a particular theory as it 
may be useful and interesting, for example, to know that most attempts to 
change negative emotions in everyday life involve attempts to act upon the 
body while positive emotion changes rely more on cognitive strategies. Or it 
might be important to have evidence which shows that only particular types 
of emotions can be accurately judged without being dependent on 
, 
individuals to confirm our guesses. And more specific, legitimate empirical 
work might flow from the provision of such general propositions and 
hypotheses. Nevertheless, it is also clear that general theories can prevent 
researchers from engaging in those practices where understanding and 
conversational engagement with research participants, practical mastery of 
relevant everyday concepts, descriptions of "data" and non-theoretical 
observations are crucial research requirements. 
This issue is also demonstrated by the fact that theories describe 
information gained from particular practices for the purposes of prediction 
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and control: that is, by summarizing knowledge about a particular 
psychological phenomenon or building on the experiences of others, a 
theory indicates how a specific instance or case can be approached. It is 
not necessarily the case, as Shotter and Katz (1996) describe it, that theory-
informed practice always puts us in situations where: 
... instead of being able to directly and immediately sense the 
fitting of one's actions to one's circumstances, bodily, one is in 
the position of having to act 'blindly'; one must work things out, 
cognitively, step-by-step, as if by inference. And furthermore, in 
such circumstances, one always has to argue and to justify to 
others one's interpretation of the theory in question. (p. 233) 
While much of the work of Part 2 was produced in agreement with Shotter 
and Katz's view of a kind of reflexive practice in psychology, it is also 
important to accept that theories can be useful in practice. For example, 
theories developed from the "resource" of a surview could provide skills and 
techniques that could help others to reduce the gap between theory and 
experience. And it is quite possible that the practical familiarity with a theory 
provided by training might well be independent of any debate about the 
worth of specific psychological explanations. For example, a theory may be 
useful even though it does not decide the issue of whether research 
participants or counselling clients have changed because they have directly 
controlled the cognitive cause of their emotions or, instead, adopted a type 
of linguistic and conversational practice that involves a variation in an 
emotional syndrome (and its uptake by others). 
To summarize, confusions surrounding psychological reflexivity in 
descriptions of the relations between psychological theory and ordinary 
linguistic practices were examined. A surview was presented as an 
alternative to more traditional views of the relation between theory and 
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critical practice in psychology. While Wittgenstein is correct to note that 
psychological concepts are not newly fashioned as is the case in other 
sciences, nevertheless theory should not be evaluated solely in terms of 
intelligibility constraints. Creative theoretical advances can occur without 
necessarily needing to be understood by the "man on the street". Particular 
problems with Rosenberg's theory were also addressed including its 
generality and avoidance of the detail of specific emotions. The issue of 
applicability also raises the issue of how to reduce and perhaps even 
replace the need to act in relation to a theory in psychology. Thus it was 
argued that newly fashioned concepts and theoretical constructs should 
continue to play a potentially challenging role in clinical and research 
practices. 
An assessment of social constructionist alternatives to 
theoretical explanation 
Shotter's (1996) account of alternatives to theoretical explanation seems to 
make one concession to the defence of some newly fashioned concepts and 
theoretical constructs in the previous section. In particular, Shotter's 
concern seems to be with our initial research stages or training in the 
discipline where it is important that we grasp ''the dialogical nature of our 
social practices more directly in practice, rather than attempting first to know 
them in theory" (p. 3). In this last section, it is important to examine whether 
Wittgenstein's philosophy can be inserted into the practice of psychology 
and used as an alternative to theoretical explanation (Shotter, 1996~ 
Shotter & Katz, 1996). For in contrast to Shotter's position, it has been 
argued that Wittgenstein's methods aim to achieve a surview of the use of 
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psychological concepts that can be contributed to by philosophers and 
psychologists without belonging exclusively to either practice. 
Nevertheless, Shotter's use of Wittgenstein's methods seems to be similar to 
the account offered thus far of the type of work that reflexive psychologists 
can achieve and which is, moreover, exemplified by the approach towards 
pride in Part 2. 
Although Wittgenstein's methods provide a radical challenge to 
traditional argumentation in philosophy, it is important to be clear about their 
relation to psychology. In particular, Shotter's (1992) rejection of metatheory 
and change from metamethodological discussion to the insertion of 
Wittgenstein's method into psychology sets a difficult precedent. For it 
combines an extension of Wittgenstein's rejection of explanation in 
philosophy and demonstrates the use of particular methods within 
psychology in order to provide an alternative to theoretical work. One of the 
reasons why Shotter adopts this position is that it follows the Wittgensteinian 
recognition that we have to work within language using various techniques 
and approaches to highlight our cultural and linguistic practices. But Shotter 
also presents an example of the temptation to include Wittgenstein within 
psychology which is motivated by the view that reflexive work can solve the 
problems of psychology autonomously (Le., without necessarily retaining a 
role for philosophy). In other words, psychologists do not need to engage 
with the ideas or arguments of an independent philosophical position, but 
instead can import what they need to be able to do reflexive work. 
Shotter and Katz (1996), in particular, admit "we have been most 
influenced by Wittgenstein's (1953, 1980a, 1980b, 1981) innovative 
approach to philosophical investigation" (p. 215). There are many ways of 
stating the "problem" of our dependence on language in ways that tease out 
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reflexive issues. For example, if theories are language-games how could 
one language-game be any more fundamental or useful than another? In 
this respect, it is interesting to examine Shotter and Katz's (1996) 
Wittgenstein-inspired solution for psychology: 
. . . we must begin our studies in a quite different way: by 
studying how, by interweaving our talk in with our other actions 
and activities, we first develop and sustain between us, different 
particular ways of relating ourselves to each other in our 
activities in the world - that is, that we should first study how we 
construct what Wittgenstein calls our different forms of life with 
their associated language-games. And only then should we turn 
to a study of how we might 'attend out' from within those forms of 
life, so to speak, to take explicit notice of the various ways we 
can make contact with our surroundings through the forms of talk 
(the language-games) that our forms of life make available to us. 
(pp. 228-229). 
This is similar to Harre's argument that it is important 'first to describe the 
"cognitive and moral features of the language-games of emotional display 
and ascription" (Harre, 1986, p. 12). But what are the details of 
Wittgenstein's methods and why are they more revealing than existing 
methods in psychology? 
This issue is important because the argument presented to this point 
, 
has suggested that a conceptual-discursive investigation will survey and 
include examples that psychological methods often bypass. For example, 
we want to examine the detail of how people engage with diverse and 
different cultural and linguistic practices and to assemble reminders about 
how such nontheory-based abilities are employed. One of the ways in 
which this "greater experience of mankind" (PI, p. 227) can be approximated 
is by assembling a wide variety of examples of a particular phenomenon of 
interest. Unfortunately, Shotter and Katz's example is quite different to the 
interest in the potential of a surview of pride to counter some of the 
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generalities of Rosenberg's theory of emotion. Wittgenstein's methods are 
instead applied to a mentoring program in which students and mentors 
focus "on 1:leeting events, on subtleties, on the unique, novel, only 'once 
occurrent' events that 'strike us'" (Katz & Shotter, 1996, p. 245). However, 
while the result in their case is a kind of reflective practice, it is interesting to 
examine whether the attempt to represent the clusters of concepts 
surrounding pride in a critical but clear manner has a similar basis. 
The notion of "cluster" in this context provides one example of the 
new ways of talking that need to be constructed to summarize the linguistic 
detail encountered (Le., novelistic details and examples that we are "struck 
by" which are also revealing). In this manner it is possible to extend 
Wittgenstein's notion of a surview since he not only indicates: 
. . . that, by the careful use of selected images, similes, 
analogies, metaphors, or 'pictures,' he also suggests new 
ways of talking that not only orient us toward sensing 
otherwise unnoticed distinctions and relations for the first time, 
but that also suggest new connections and relations with the 
rest of our proceedings. (p. 231) 
Part of the method used in Part 2 is to assemble examples from a broad 
. 
variety of texts that can be readily accessed by many participants in our 
cultural and linguistic practices. However, because of their different focus, 
Katz and Shotter provide few details as to how the results of the application 
of Wittgenstein's methods in psychology can be reported. For example, 
since all of the conditions in which a particular psychological concept such 
as "to pride oneself' cannot be enumerated, it is better to explore and 
evaluate talk employing the words "pride" and "proud" in all possible 
pronominal forms. In this regard, it may be difficult to argue that particular 
ways of organizing and presenting these conceptual similarities and 
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distinctions in psychology are not theoretical in some manner (e.g., that the 
notion of a "cluster" of concepts is purely descriptive). 
Nevertheless, by engaging in this activity we employ a less reflective 
and more practical ability with regard to representing the use of a concept. 
Wittgenstein describes this ability in the following way: 
... if a circumstance makes the use doubtful, I can say so, and 
also how the situation is deviant from the usual one. (RPP II, 
§202) 
Also while we may examine whether other synonyms could be substituted 
for pride without losing any meaning, we may also ask whether the opposite 
of pride, in different cases, might be inactivity or boredom as in children 
whereas it could easily be depression, shame, low self-esteem or a lack of 
dignity in adulthood. In this manner the linguistic detail and conversational-
dependence of pride can be revealed and represented (see chapter 2, 
section 2.1). Moreover, a comprehensive conceptual-discursive surview 
can achieve what Shotter and Katz (1996) describe as the use of 
Wittgenstein's methods to: 
... help us grasp something new, as yet unseen, in the 
emerging articulation of our speech entwined activities as they 
unfold in our very ears (if not before our very eyes). (p. 11) 
This focus on detail in specific circumstances may also indicate how 
particular word choices are, apart from their role in ascribing or expressing 
an emotion, employed ''to make crucial differences, in the larger flow of 
activity within which we are involved" (Shotter & Katz, 1996, p. 229). The 
linguistically-created, conversationally-maintained, materially-interwoven 
and culturally-specific practices that constitute this larger flow of activity are 
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therefore also objects of investigation in Part 2. 
In this last section, alternatives to theoretical explanation in 
psychology demonstrated in work by Shotter (1996) and Shotter and Katz 
(1996) were examined. In contrast to the position developed in this thesis, 
Shotter and Katz (1996) argue that Wittgenstein's methods can be inserted 
into the practices of psychology. But this aspect of their position is 
problematic especially when a comprehensive conceptual-discursive 
surview is regarded as a resource that should not be viewed as part of the 
activity of philosophy or the practice of psychology. Moreover, Katz and 
Shotter's (1996) example of developing a reflective mentoring practice does 
not relate particularly well to the surview of pride that is used in Part 2 to 
counter the problems of Rosenberg's (1990) reflexivity and emotion theory. 
Thus while many of their points are relevant to the conceptual-discursive 
survey of pride, Shotter and Katz's overall position on Wittgenstein's 
methods as a replacement for theoretical explanations in psychology was 
rejected. 
Summary 
The reconsideration of psychological reflexivity in this chapter focused on 
issues relating to critical psychological and philosophical positions on 
explanation and explanatory systems. One of the first tasks was to clarify 
Wittgenstein's remark that all explanation should be rejected in favour of 
description. In this context, pursuing psychological reflexivity to useful ends 
involves recognizing that at some point explanation must pass to 
description. Some of Wittgenstein's remarks were presented to show why it 
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is important to describe the grammar of concepts rather than offer broad 
explanations. More specifically, it was argued that psychology can achieve 
a critical, reflexive attitude towards general theories that seem to have the 
potential to inform both scientific and everyday reasoning, by a to and fro 
movement between explanations in psychology and philosophical 
description. Wittgenstein's revealing remarks therefore set important limits 
on attempts to apply concepts that are used within psychological theories 
and the use of those same concepts to describe the background of our 
activities. 
Wittgenstein's philosophy also has the potential to augment social 
constructionist alternatives to explanatory systems. Wittgenstein's remarks 
can be used to highlight the assumptions and tenets of theories, sometimes 
as the basis for creative scientific work. The ubiquity of causal explanation 
in psychology can be challenged by showing how related expressions and 
pictures in the articulation of the theory produce a distorted account of our 
use of psychological concepts. However, it was also noted that determinism 
could also become the property of an alternative to causal explanatory 
systems in psychology if not carefully examined. Consideration of these 
issues lead to a more specific treatment of the internal relations between 
concepts and the way in which these relations can be distorted by causal 
explanation. The importance of challenging causal accounts of the relations 
between individuals and collectives as well as individuals and cognitive 
phenomena was illustrated with examples of pride. The potential for 
psychologists to be trained to be "more reflexive" about the sorts of issues 
examined in this chapter by using Wittgenstein's philosophy was also 
examined. In particular, it was argued that reflexivity can be encouraged but 
not trained, especially if psychologists are to realize the potential to cross 
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from a reflexive stance within psychology to connect freely with 
Wittgenstein's methods and remarks. 
The relations between psychological explanations and everyday 
concepts and practices was also examined through notions of psychological 
reflexivity. In particular, it was argued that Wittgenstein's remarks help to 
counter any position that does not place important limits on the potential for 
revision of ordinary language. The fact that our understanding of 
psychological concepts that we may wish to revise in psychological 
practices presupposes participation in many cultural and linguistic practices 
was examined by way of Wittgenstein's example of detailing an outside 
perspective on a culture or adopting an odd perspective on other people. 
An account was then provided of the importance of newly fashioned 
concepts and theoretical constructs to psychology. While the aim was not to 
endorse the contemporary focus on theoretical explanation, theories are an 
important part of the training that we need to work through before the 
relevance of critical perspectives can be realized. In the last section it was 
noted that a comprehensive conceptual-discursive surview should not be 
regarded as an insertion of Wittgenstein's methods into the practice of 
psychology. In contrast to Shotter's (1996) position, therefore, it was argued 
that a surview provides a resource that reflexive psychologists should 
attempt to achieve, but it should not be regarded as a directly competing 
alternative to existing theoretical and empirical studies. 
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CHAPTER 4: Wittgenstein's conservatism, radical 
forms of psychological reflexivity and 
specific reflexive techniques 
Introduction 
The reconsideration of psychological re1:lexivity has, to this point, addressed 
a number of issues from a Wittgensteinian perspective. However, one issue 
that has not been adequately addressed is the extent to which 
Wittgenstein's philosophy is radical or conservative in its potential effects on 
psychology. Previous chapters have demonstrated the differences between 
Wittgenstein's view of his philosophy and the changes that psychologists 
have attempted to promote through different accounts of his remarks and 
methods. Shotter (1996), for instance, argues that Wittgenstein's methods 
can be inserted into psychology and used to dismiss theory in a radical way. 
In contrast, other critical psychologists emphasize the practical changes and 
political alternatives that reflexive theorizing promotes without any great 
concern about Wittgensteinian criticism. Many critical psychologists also 
focus on culture and power in order to produce challenging theories . 
• 
Accordingly, in this last chapter of Part 1 an assessment will. be made of 
Wittgenstein's conservative view of philosophy and the fact that recognition 
of this point need not rule out innovative and challenging reflexive work in 
psychology that can either be said to extend his work or "get beyond" 
potential criticisms. 
The conservatism of Wittgenstein's philosophy and the possibility 
that it bypasses many issues raised by new reflexive theories and 
techniques in psychology is examined in the following manner. Section 4.1 
assesses whether a sufficiently reflexive approach to psychology should 
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examine cultural and power aspects of many everyday practices. A 
question raised is whether the lack of explicit remarks on culture and power 
in Wittgenstein's work indicates a major oversight (and is therefore a 
limitation of the descriptive approach). Issues raised by cultural theorists 
and post modernists such as Foucault are also compared with Wittgenstein's 
philosophy. An introduction is therefore provided to some radical directions 
for contemporary reflexive psychological research. Section 4.2 extends the 
critical account of Wittgenstein's philosophy by examining the relations 
between psychology and culture. Examples from the psychology of emotion 
and personal reflexivity are used to illustrate how psychology shapes rather 
than merely reflects cultural, political and ethical changes. A major interest 
is whether any other forms of reflexive work in psychology also escape 
potential Wittgensteinian objections. This section also examines forms of 
psychological reflexivity that provide a source of social and cultural criticism, 
challenge the institutions of psychology and attempt to change its aims and 
practices. Section 4.3 explores the similarities between forms of 
psychological reflexivity and personal reflexivity. A central topic is whether 
the personal insights and experiences that psychologists gain as they work 
in the discipline are potentially of positive use. The supposed problem of 
psychologists' familiarity with many of subjects they investigate is also 
examined. The last section provides a brief account of specific reflexive 
techniques and experiences of various forms of reflexive technology that 
may provide a useful resource for future psychological studies. 
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4.1 Wittgenstein's philosophy, cultural issues and 
psychology 
By raising the issue of culture and Wittgenstein's philosophy at this point, it 
might appear as if remarks about the relations between Wittgenstein and 
other postmodern philosophers from chapter 1 were being presented in a 
new guise. In a sense the similarities and differences between Wittgenstein 
and other philosophers are being re-examined, but the main purpose is to 
highlight gaps in Wittgenstein's work that are addressed by other 
philosophers and psychologists. A central concern is to provide a 
Wittgensteinian account, if possible, of the insights provided by cultural and 
critical theorists along with criticial psychologists, social constructionists, 
critical realists and others. This includes the considerable potential for 
reflexive work in psychology to connect with other articulations of cultural, 
political, ethical and historical differences. Consideration of these issues 
from the perspective of reflexive psychology can be used to demonstrate the 
conservative nature of Wittgenstein's philosophy and, paradoxically, 
provide the intellectual space for the description of reflexive studies that 
may successfully promote moral, cultural and political changes. 
Postmodern and critical psychology views of Wittgenstein's 
philosophy 
One of the problems with Wittgenstein's later philosophy is the emphasis 
placed on the description of linguistic practices. Social constructionists 
such as Shotter (1996) argue that Wittgenstein's philosophical denial of 
explanation and emphasis on description have radical implications for 
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psychology. But this position contradicts Wittgenstein's own admission that 
he was not interested in reforming language (PI, §132) or interfering with the 
actual use of language in such practices as mathematics and psychology 
(PI, §124). Critical psychologists similarly adopt a conservative reading of 
Wittgenstein's later philosophy, but without considering other important 
aspects of Wittgenstein's later work. For example, Parker (1989) seems to 
regard Wittgenstein's philosophy as little more than an ordinary language 
approach that has been superseded by postmodern and poststructuralist 
theories. Social constructionism as advocated by individuals such as 
Coulter (1989) is similarly regarded as an approach that focuses on 
ordinary language. Thus the Wittgenstein-inspired emphasis on language-
based research and the social nature of the research subjects' forms of 
personal reflexivity is largely described by Parker (1989) as a humanist 
reaction to other approaches in psychology. 
However, critical psychologists often fail to recognize the 
developing cultural and epistemological orientation of Wittgenstein's later 
remarks in On Certainty, Culture and Value, Remarks on Frazer's Golden 
Bough and other collections of notes. It is difficult to summarize the 
potential for all of this work to be connected with postmodern philosophy 
and critical psychology. While the task is certainly beyond the scope of this 
thesis, some of the lines of thought in Wittgenstein's work can be explored. 
For example, Wittgenstein was concerned to survey the present terrain of 
many intellectual practices without feeling compelled to adopt any particular 
opinions or schools of thought. Moreover, the combination of Wittgenstein's 
attitude against traditional sources of progress in Western culture and an 
interest in ordinary language was, at the time, a radical and innovative 
philosophical position. An interesting point is that Wittgenstein felt that he 
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was writing for a future age in contrast to what he described as "the 
darkness of this time" (PI, p. vi). But whether social constructionism, 
qualitative psychology and discursive studies all demonstrate Wittgenstein's 
role in bringing that age into being is beyond this investigation (see chapter 
1, section 1.1 for Wittgenstein's vision of an analogous, conceptually 
sensitive mathematics). 
Postmodernists certainly give the impression that the age that 
Wittgenstein criticized has now passed. For example, Wittgenstein could not 
be said to place faith in scientific methods to solve all our problems or, in 
other cases, for social scientists to represent the role of religion and 
aesthetic judgements in our lives adequately. Moreover, themes in 
Wittgenstein's philosophy accord with Parker's (1989) description of the 
postmodern age: 
The deconstruction of each of the three aspects of the Classical 
Age of reason and the Modern Age now finds its end in 
language: the relativism, which displaced beliefs in absolute 
truth, is twisted further under a post-structuralist emphasis on 
discourse and texts as the grounds of reason; the common 
sense, which displaced science, is also seen as organized into 
language games in which science is an equal partner in tile 
search for pragmatic usefulness, and the 'self' loses its position 
as the central creator of meaning as its dependence on others 
becomes seen to be constructed by language. (p. 133) 
But all of these positions cannot be ascribed to Wittgenstein and, moreover, 
they are not necessarily the changes in our way of thinking that Wittgenstein 
was trying to produce. Thus the fact that critical psychologists and others can 
now discuss these ideas in terms that are close to Wittgenstein's does not 
necessarily confirm his place in a transition from modernism to 
postmodernism. 
To demonstrate this scepticism the description of the change of "ages" 
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can be examined point by point. A charge of relativism against Wittgenstein 
can be resisted as a way of summarizing his remarks on specific similarities 
and differences between cultures, subcultures and particular linguistic 
practices (see next section). Whether Wittgenstein would regard discourse 
and texts as the grounds of reason is also debatable since he emphasized a 
basis of common actions, similarities of judgement (PI, §242) and the 
importance of features such as recounting stories in our natural history (PI, 
§25). Parker's argument about commonsense displacing science and being 
organized into language-games that are perhaps, more accurately, an equal 
partner in social science owes more to Lyotard (1984) than Wittgenstein. As 
already argued, Wittgenstein's concern was to highlight the philosophical 
errors and prejudices that can occur in many areas of science without 
necessarily allowing the corrections to be taken as doing the work of the 
practices described. In terms of philosophy and its role in Western culture, 
Wittgenstein's scathing criticisms of Russell's attempts to popularize 
philosophy and science indicate the seriousness of his commitment to a non-
elitist, outside perspective (see Monk, 1990). And in so far as the self is 
described as losing its position, Wittgenstein helps us to recognize that we 
are culturally and linguistically saturated beings. 
However, many of these issues raise the question of whether 
Wittgenstein's remarks and insights based on a survey of language are 
sufficiently cultural. Does Wittgenstein's notion of a surview include unique 
features of our relation to a supposedly postmodern environment which 
includes the role of technology, specific cultural artifacts and objects, and 
considerations of their roles in creating an understanding of past, possible 
and future forms of life? In reply it may be said that many of the cultural 
aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations can be found among 
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the notes of his later philosophy (see below). Moreover, while technological 
changes may seem to consign Wittgenstein's remarks to a more simplistic 
age, these developments do not necessarily provide a permanent distraction 
'from enduring philosophical problems. Also, given the quite different 
interests of contemporary psychologists from the problems of interest to 
Wittgenstein, many of his remarks are relevant to contemporary forms of 
critical psychology which attempt to address, for example, cultural and 
historical differences between different peoples (see chapter 3, section 3.1). 
Moreover, regardless of whether Wittgenstein explicitly mentioned it, there is 
no reason to think that a surview could not include literature, works of art and 
many other material, media and cultural products. 
Nevertheless, few attempts have been made to detail useful 
Wittgensteinian observations in relation to reflexive psychological studies of 
particular psychological phenomena. A preliminary. engagement with some 
of Wittgenstein's specific culturally oriented remarks can be attempted that 
connects, potentially, with the results of more radical reflexive studies. For 
example, at one point Wittgenstein suggests that "one age misunderstands 
another; and a petty age misunderstands all the others in its own nasty way" 
(CV, 86e). The importance of the remark lies in its suggestion that we 
should not reproduce misunderstandings that characterize a "petty age", 
such as generalizations based on culturally and historically specific values. 
While it could hardly be said that Wittgenstein's use of "we" in many of his 
statements is perniciously restricted to Western individuals, it may 
nevertheless lessen any consideration that the excluded group, whoever 
"they" are, could have quite a different perspective. More specifically, 
although we can hardly blame Wittgenstein for failing to anticipate many of 
the cultural and political movements of the twentieth century, Monk's (1990) 
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account of Wittgenstein's attitude towards women suggests that he may 
have had little time for the insights and advances that have occurred as a 
result of the development of feminism and feminist theory (and which might 
now be used to provide further reasons for dismissing his relevance to 
critical psychological studies). 
Insights about the way in which one age may misunderstand another 
may also be derived from theories of art, artifacts, novels, entertainment, 
images, communication media, icons and the functions of all of these 
aspects of culture (despite the fact that they provide broad reconstructions 
that can become problematic). Obviously, many of these issues are 
restricted by an interest in psychological reflexivity and a concern with what 
the results of radical self-regard might usefully achieve in a culture (see 
Section 4.2). Some of these questions could be very specific although their 
range when reconstructing their psychological importance may vary 
considerably. For example, without the cultural invention of mirrors and our 
extension of abilities to use them would we ever take as much pride, as 
many Western individuals do, in our appearances? Or, to offer a completely 
different example, is the Parson's Tale in Chaucer's Canterbury Tales an 
early equivalent of a self-help book on pride? Was its dissemination 
through sermons or other means used at the time to support the power of the 
church to control and dominate people's lives that has since waned with 
increased literacy and education? And is it important whether instances of 
pride that make up a surview occur in a newspaper report, talkback 
discussion, magazine editorial, cartoon, arthouse film, television news 
programme, situation comedy, or number one pop song? 
Clearly, these specific aspects of culture indicate important points 
about the background discourse that surrounds us and which may be used 
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to communicate values, shape aspirations and provide cultural images that 
have a powerful role in directing individuals. These discourses and texts 
also engage different people for different reasons and, accordingly, may be 
more or less readily understood and accessed by an individual researcher. 
For the restricted purposes of the present critical study, examples of an 
emotion or emotion-related word may playa more or less explicit role in the 
remarks that can be as varied as those of a school principal, prime minister, 
feminist leader, political activist, parent, school-pupil, or octagenarian talking 
about themselves, another person or other people. As already suggested, 
people engage with the texts, examples, literature, and images of a culture 
that surround them. Sometimes this engagement occurs almost without any 
conscious recognition (e.g., notions of identity and home can begin very 
early and may not be as abstract and reflective as commonly believed). 
Other instances of cultural engagement occur self~consciously as in the 
case of an individual who wants to be like someone famous or, in contrast, 
through culturally self-referential forms of self-commentary. For example, 
Parker (1989) paraphrases work by Eco (1986) to provide a specific 
instance of the effects of an age on its culture and people: 
... while a modern expression ·01 affection might be 'I love you 
madly', the postmodern rendering might be 'as Barbara 
Cartland would say, I love you madly'. (p. 134) 
Among the myriad of possible examples that could be produced of culturally 
self-conscious expressions of pride it may be better to focus on more 
commonly occurring examples. Otherwise, these instances could invite a 
potential Wittgenstienian criticism that the interest in the products and 
cleverness of our own culture merely demonstrates the preoccupation of our 
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age with itself. 
A further postmodern temptation which has already been explored is 
the potential to regard "our" culture as more advanced in its emotions and 
related considerations than other less complicated groups. Alternative ways 
of life suggested by cultural differences showed in chapter 3 that there are a 
number of points at which "we", even as individuals, could not come to 
share the experiences of another culture or fully understand an analogous 
practice. In this sense, Wittgenstein's contribution to psychology through 
philosophical description is consistent with a growing concern in Western 
culture to articulate the background of ways of judging and feeling. It is 
important to add that judging and feeling are not regarded as the sole 
concerns of psychology, although they are certainly central to a full 
understanding of people. For in addition to these issues, a reflexive 
investigation may also involve other aspects of our everyday and 
psychological practices. As Gergen (1987) notes: 
... if technology, value positions, political and economic 
climate and the like favor the development of particular 
theories, then the theorist is invited to a reflexive repose. (p. 
13) 
Unfortunately, while features of our practices such as technology, value 
positions, political and economic climate are relevant to reflexive 
psychological studies, they play less of a role in Wittgenstein's philosophical 
remarks than the results and rich potential of a comprehensive conceptual-
discursive survey suggest they should. 
To reiterate, this section indicated why postmodern and critical 
psychologists present Wittgenstein as an ordinary language philosopher 
who had little interest in culture. Parker's (1989) account of postmodernism 
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was used to address features of the . "postmodern age" for which 
Wittgenstein seemed to be writing. For example, the importance of 
language, the blurred distinction between commonsense and social 
science, the relations between texts and reasons and a decentring of the 
self are all themes that can be connected with Wittgenstein's later 
philosophy. But it is more important that a surview can include the images, 
texts, technology and artifacts of a culture without necessarily requiring the 
insights and reconstructions of cultural theories. Also a Wittgensteinian 
survey should helps us to represent reflexive psychological issues in such 
way that any attendant form of cultural self·regard does 110t make our 
"postmodern culture" part of a "petty age". 
The philosophical articulation of cultural and historical 
differences 
One of the difficulties when collecting reminders of striking aspects of our 
cultural and linguistic practices is how to organize and present the remarks 
that we regard as significant. While there is no easy answer to this question 
some examples from Wittgenstein can be used to indicate a possible 
direction for our studies. More specifically, a few Wittgensteinian remarks 
can be assembled to help us imagine how Wittgenstein might have viewed 
many of the problems that now preoccupy postmodern philosophers, critical 
psychologists and social constructionists. These remarks are by no means 
comprehensive, but they do help to show how Wittgenstein's conservative 
interest in changing psychological practices might nevertheless relate to 
reflexive work by psychologists who want to understand the effects of 
culture. 
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One of the major advances that Wittgenstein's form of philosophical 
description provides is that the background of our practices cannot be 
represented by many of the concepts that are appropriately used within 
those practices (e.g., in the language-game of theorizing). Since these 
differences involve participating in (or taking up) a different way of living, the 
notion of any objective evaluation is removed. In some cases, an objective 
view seems appropriate as an ideal for our investigations (Le., especially 
where it can be shown from examples that we were indeed misguided at 
some previous time but required distance or detachment to be able to reach 
a more considered perspective). In one example of the sort of clash that 
psychologists might even contribute towards through their discipline, 
Wittgenstein suggests: 
At certain periods men find reasonable what at other periods 
they found unreasonable. And vice versa. (OC, §336) 
Although the remark seems quite reasonable, Wittgenstein's concern is to 
address individuals who would be tempted to ask "but is there no objective 
character here?" (OC, §336). It is important to be clear about what an 
appeal to objectivity could mean when faced with such a difference (see 
also chapter 5,section 5.3 for examples of circumstances that change 
around people's pride in particular societal roles). 
Although we might be able to appeal towards some certainties that 
hold across different cultures, subcultures, or periods of history, the broad 
problem is that it can be difficult to have a clear idea of what it means for an 
age (and its people) to be unreasonable. In part this seems to be because 
we have a much better notion of what it is for an individual to be 
unreasonable, myopic, or mistaken. Wittgenstein's example seems to take 
253 
the middle ground because of the way in which he describes the differences 
between individuals of contrasting backgrounds: 
Vel}' intelligent and well~educated people believe in the story 
of creation in the Bible, while others hold it as proven false, 
and the grounds of the latter are well known to the former. 
(OC, §336) 
This example, however, may seem to have little relevance to psychological 
reflexivity or, more specifically, any application to critical studies of emotion 
and personal reflexivity. But we might apply the same possible knowledge 
of the criteria of differing positions to accounts of pride since religion has 
provided a historical and cultural framework within which various groups 
have evaluated their own and others' behaviour. 
Articulating the way in which religious ideology and its related 
practices have persisted in the practices of Western cutltures is a obviously 
a difficult task. A more specific point of interest to reflexive psychologists is 
that the values of a religious perspective might provide a basis for 
evaluating the results of a type of scientific psychology (Le., that it might 
provide the reason for determining which of the techniques that Chaucer 
recommends for dealing with excessive pride might be the best). We might 
want to investigate why an individual might, for example, respond "no, I'm 
thankful" when asked by another person whether they were proud of a 
particular achievement. Within a moral~religious framework this denial 
makes sense, but in terms of social scientific criteria we might regard it as a 
potentially unhealthy and self-deceptive. And if we pushed such a person to 
justify her position she might well argue that God punishes pride and then 
proceed to cite particular examples. The reasons given might resemble the 
account in Faulkner's (1929/1986) The Sound and the Ful}' of an ageing 
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matriarch who views her handicapped son as a form of divine punishment 
for the fact that she was and still is "too proud" (p. 68). The point is that we 
could not combat such an "explanation" only by assembling current theories 
and evidence about the causes of disabilities. Obviously, "we" might say 
that in this respect that the other "system of thought" was poorer or less 
rational than our scientifically-informed view. But there is a sense in which it 
is only appropriate to regard it as different, simply because it cannot be 
changed by appealing only to factual claims. Instead other means of 
p'ersuading such individuals to think and live differently must be involved21 • 
The claim that science clarifies the lesser or folk "theory" of the 
religious view is ridiculous since it fails to understand the significance, role 
and basis of its practices and rituals. For example, a scientific 
understanding of pride would not dissolve any clash between a priest and a 
psychologist over their identification, definition and "cure" for a particular 
instance of pride. The inquiry, tests involved and proof required in both 
cases is different since the priest's view lies within a tradition and which has 
commitment as its basis, whereas for the psychologist the truth probably lies 
in the empirical investigation of mechanisms and processes of self-
evaluation and internalization (or the empirical investigations of different 
methods). Furthermore, both of these frameworks will also involve different 
forms of training and education so that any conflict between two individuals 
21 Interestingly, Rorty (1989) also speculates that despite many other differences, both 
religious and scientific approaches to human forms of judging and feeling involve a common 
but: 
... vague sense that it would be hybris (sic.) on our part to abandon the 
traditional language of "respect for fact" and "objectivity" - that it would be 
risky, and blasphemous, not to see the scientist (or the philosopher, or the 
poet, or somebody) as having a priestly function, as putting us in touch with a 
realm which transcends the human. (p, 21) 
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operating within different frameworks is likely to resemble the following 
description by Wittgenstein: 
. . . where two principles really do meet which cannot be 
reconciled with one another, then each man declares the other 
a fool and heretic. (Ge, §611) 
in such cases, the contradiction does not simply occur between two 
individuals but is instead about the different backgrounds that inform 
particular subcultures. Moreover, the example highlights the sense in which 
. 
such a dispute may be better explained in terms of power because of the 
possibility that one group will eventually use force to dominate the discourse 
of the other (see next section). 
As Wittgenstein also suggests, it is only in a complicated form of life 
that phenomena such as pride can occur and be spoken of as a reason for 
particular actions and events. This way of life will involve rituals, 
conventions for expression and appropriate forms of confession in particular 
circumstances: the point being that there seems to be no reason why a 
religious faith could not provide a world"picture with regard to human action 
that is the substratum .of all our (or my) inquiring and asserting. In other 
words, the values and ideology of a religious position would be part of "the 
inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false" 
(Ge, §94). In such cases it is important to see how the organization of a 
group has implications for the way in which individuals will think and act so 
that objective criteria, for example, will not be universally applicable. Again 
pride provides a good example of a problem that everyday people attempt 
to deal with in different ways within different systems of thought. For 
example, in a religious context individuals do indeed agonize over their 
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pride, attempt to control it and also seek guidance as to how to reduce its 
effects on others. It would therefore be ridiculous, as Wittgenstein notes, for 
a scientist or anyone else to fail to recognize that '''consciousness of sin' is a 
real event and so are despair and salvation through faith" (CV, 28). The 
interesting point about this and many other cultural differences is that an 
individual's experience is a consequence of "something like a passionate 
commitment to a system of reference" and can be understood as "a way of 
living, or a way of assessing life" (CV, 64). 
A further aspect of the appeal to objectivity is discussed by Rorty in a 
manner that is compatible with some of Wittgenstein's more cultural 
remarks. In particular, Rorty (1989) argues that the impetus towards 
objectivity is not: 
... the desire to escape the limitations of one's community, but 
simply the desire for as much intersubjective agreement as 
possible, the desire to extend the reference of 'us' as far as we 
can. (p.23) 
Rorty suggests that this is an alternative to a potentially meaningless 
theoretical reduction of the variety of human ways of judging and feeling to a 
common form or foundation (see chapter 3, section 3.1). Clearly, the 
judgements and feelings involved in expressions and experiences of pride 
in this and other cultures are very much connected to quite speci"fic cultural 
differences. The notion of solidarity is therefore useful in the sense that "we" 
may be regarded as including others when we attempt to understand their 
thoughts, feelings and actions. This seems to be consistent with 
Wittgenstein's remarks and his description of attempts to understand other 
peoples as well as to remove superficial and mythical differences that "we" 
have created (although this attitude might also obscure in principle 
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collective and individual limits to understanding that need to be examined in 
detail}. 
People from other cultures do not share the same sorts of cultural 
practices, complex problems, difficulties and preoccupations of 
contemporary western adults in specific countries. However, other 
differences within first-world countries may be articulated in statements 
which, despite their generality, contain claims that are still easily understood 
by many people. For example, Greenwood (1989) notes that cross-cultural 
and transhistorical differences are obvious in such statements as: "the 
English take pride in their homes while Italians take pride in their sister's 
virginity" (p. 46). While these generalities are understood to describe 
different values, institutions, societal roles and expressions of pride they 
need to be unpacked in specific detail if they are to prove useful for our 
purposes. Nevertheless, the ability to describe and understand broad 
differences between groups suggests a great deal of knowledge about 
common behaviour, institutions and propensities. The fact that "we" can 
understand these examples does not entail that the different cultural 
practices, of which pride provides the measure, are shared. Thus although 
an examination of general remarks about cultural differences extends the 
scope of a conceptual-discursive survey, their investigation is not entirely at 
odds with a Wittgensteinian approach. 
Although it has been ignored by critical psychologists, a 
Wittgensteinian approach can also help to study the manner in which many 
of our emotions and related personal considerations might well be 
described by individuals in other cultures as excessive, selfish, indulgent or 
luxuries. The latter might also help to provide more detail of cases where a 
culture may be regarded as degenerating or disappearing: not necessarily 
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because of an excessive self-regard but perhaps also due to suppression by 
another culture. The following remark by Wittgenstein is relevant to such 
possibilities: 
The disappearance of a culture does not signify the 
disappearance of human value, but simply of certain means of 
expressing this value. (CV, 6e) 
For a broad attitude of solidarity and an interest in generalities would be of 
little help to a culture that is losing its means of expressing (or defending) its 
values. Instead, it is important to detail the moral-practical surroundings and 
background to our activities that are raised by these sorts of issues (Shotter, 
1996). Interestingly, Wittgenstein also questions whether individuals in 
another culture must, for example, be acquainted with such a specific 
concept as that of "swaggering men" (RPP II, §680). Although Wittgenstein 
did not necessarily intend this point to be used to detail the relations 
between Western culture and indigenous peoples, the point is useful here 
because it suggests circumstances in which members of an indigenous 
culture may require such a concept. Moreover, the example also implies 
that improvements in the expression of value may occur at the very point in 
which cultural imperialism leads to the disappearance of, for example, an 
indigenous culture (see chapter 5, section 5.2 for examples suggested by 
pride). 
To summarize, the section began with an examination of the appeal 
of objectivity when describing cultural and historical differences. Views of 
what is reasonable may vary from one period or age to another so that it is 
important to be able to describe the grounds of any difference or dispute. 
Wittgenstein's example of disagreements in relation to a religious framework 
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on human life was used to highlight cultural or subcultural differences that 
might be of more interest to culturally-oriented psychologists: for example, 
where different ways of understanding pride and its role in human life may 
lead a priest and a psychologist, respectively, to declare the other a heretic 
and a fool. Rorty's argument that a notion of solidarity that extends our 
notion of "us" as far as possible seems, in such cases, to remove our 
concerns about objectivity. However, it is important to avoid the potential 
generalities of cultural theory in order to examine the detail of cultural and 
linguistic differences, generalities, disputes and clashes. 
Reflexive theorizing, Foucault and Wittgenstein 
To this point, sufficient material from Wittgenstein's remarks has been 
assembled to remind postmodern philosophers and critical psychologists 
that a Wittgensteinian position is capable of examining broad cultural 
differences (or at least, through a surview, of highlighting features of our 
practices that are important to reflexive perspectives on psychological 
phenomena). Although a detailed account of the similarities and differences 
between Wittgenstein and other postmodern philosophers was avoided, in 
this section an attempt will be made to consider the work of Foucault. The 
approach is relevant because the two main examples introduced in the 
previous section both give the impression that the cultural or subcultural 
clash occurs in a ideal space where eventual dominance of one group is not 
an issue: a sort of Habermasian "ideal speech situation" (Parker, 1994b) 
that is concerned with attaining a na'ive agreement to disagree. The last 
section will focus on criticisms derived from Foucault because his work is 
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increasingly connected with reflexive studies of culture and language in 
psychology. Thus, although there are flaws in Foucault's social theorizing, it 
seems capable of extending Wittgenstein's descriptive philosophical 
approach to include issues of materiality and power. 
Through a growing interest in reflexive work, many psychologists and 
social scientists have begun to examine perspectives that offer more radical 
and relevant solutions to contemporary problems (Stam, 1996). In 
particular, reflexive researchers in psychology and many other disciplines 
have turned to the work of Foucault and bypassed Wittgenstein's descriptive 
approach. Parker's (1989) account of critical psychology, for example, 
ignores any interest in Wittgenstein mainly because Wittgenstein does 
seems to consider power differences, their origins and reasons for their 
persistence. Although not explicitly considered by Parker, a potential 
Foucauldian criticism could centre on Wittgenstein's use of "we" and "us" in 
many of his philosophical remarks. For example, in chapter 3 the use of 
"we" in such statements as "we must do away with all explanation, and 
description alone must take its place" (PI, §109) was argued to suggest a 
general faith in science by many individuals in Western culture. Similarly, 
throughout the argument developed thus far, "we" has also been used to 
draw in as many individuals as possible who might see a connection 
between their work and issues generated by various forms of psychological 
reflexivity. In both cases it is important to realize that the language used is 
not without considerable cultural and historical baggage. As Parker (1989) 
reminds us: 
... the culture we have been describing is the dominant 
culture, not just one among many that compete equally in the 
world market. (p. 151) 
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Thus it seems possible that we feel compelled to cultivate an attitude of 
solidarity towards other cultures, subcultures or indigenous cultures 
because there is little fear that those cultures will ever dominate us or our 
institutions. 
These points about the discourse of a dominant culture and the 
institutions that provide its backing introduce a further Foucauldian theme: 
the view of discourses as "practices that systematically form the objects of 
which they speak" (Foucault, 1972, p. 49). Parker (1989) provides a 
summary of the relevant aspects of Foucault's (1970) book The Order of 
Things: 
The book described overarching structures of discourse -
called epistemes - which determine what it is possible to 
speak of, and think (though there will always be some 
swimming against the stream). The epistemes (or 
epistemological structures) are wider-ranging than Kuhn's 
(1970) paradigms, and the mutations which create and destroy 
them are not necessarily historically progressive. (p. 62; see 
chapter 1, section 1.3) 
The notion of an episteme conveys the sense in which the thinking of an 
age can be superceded in such a comprehensive way that it is difficult to 
survey and reconstruct what individuals thought and did in previous 
epistemes. Also it accords with Ash's (1993) description of a reflexive 
historiography of psychology in which the aim of examining the historical 
context of the discipline is to effect practical changes. Hence, the notion of 
episteme seems to describe cultural changes in a manner that is broader 
than Kuhn's concept of paradigm and also more relevant to cultural and 
historical changes than Wittgenstein's more neutral notion of language-
game. 
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The notion of discourses within epistemes explicitly includes a sense 
of language which is intertwined with issues of knowledge and power. 
However, it is interesting to see that a Foucauldian treatment of the problem 
of reflexivity in psychology by Stam (1996) appeals to a perspective that is 
close to Wittgenstein's: 
Psychological theories in turn support the edifice of an 
empiricist, justificationist network of claims like an unspoken 
grammar. In that sense, they are practices enabled by and 
productive of a discourse of human subjects "about which 
entire sets of psychological statements can be uttered that, in 
turn, as propositions can be judged true or false" (Bove, 1990, 
p. 57; in Stam, 1996, p. 27) 
Foucault's position is clearly complex and difficult to apply to psychology 
and its theories. But the general point to emerge from this consideration is 
that discourse "enables and maintains disciplines and institutions which 
circulate those discourses" (Stam, 1996, p. 28). In Wittgensteinian terms we 
might say that grammar is not autonomous but closely related to the forms of 
knowledge and related cultural practices that a particular age has "arrived 
at". 
Foucault's position also seems to be broader than Wittgenstein's 
notion that "grammar tells us what kind of object anything is" (PI, §373) 
because it allows us to examine the way in which "we" relate to others (Le., it 
shows the narrowness of Wittgenstein's focus on 'first person and third 
person uses of psychological concepts (Hacker, 1996)). As Parker (1989) 
describes it, the function of power and its related discourses is not only to 
constrain and exclude others: "just as discourse produces objects or topics 
of investigation, it also produces subjects" (p. 65). The implication for 
psychology is that the discipline is intimately involved in recreating and 
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maintaining broader social arrangements and power relations. The creative 
role of discourse is not avoided by the sort of linguistic distance that, for 
example, Greenwood (1991) attempts to achieve. Instead, Greenwood's 
approach might well be argued to provide the basis for psychologists to 
continue the dominance of particular individuals within a culture. For 
example, an emphasis on personal reflexivity does not merely represent 
existing independent "objects" to be studied by psychology but subtly 
reinforces moral-practical institutions that are prepared to discipline and 
cberce individuals who do not take responsibility for their own judgements, 
feelings and actions. 
The latter point suggests a feature of reflexive theorizing and the 
interest of some psychologists in Foucault which is not necessarily inimical 
to the broad aims of a conceptual-discursive surview, since a surview can 
include cultural practices and suggest background issues in a manner that 
provides the basis for more specific and revealing studies. In other words, 
there is no reason why a surview cannot also be: 
. . . concerned with culture, and in particular with the 
transformations ,in social interaction and self-understanding 
which have attended the emergence of postmodernity. 
(Parker, 1989, p. 129) 
A Wittgensteinian position, of course, might well be critical of the 
characterization of either "our age" or the one that Wittgenstein seemed to 
be writing for as postmodern. Nevertheless, many of the aspects of 
"postmodern life" suggested by Parker and others suggest new directions 
for work in psychology such as: the way in which technology alters our 
ways of relating to and connecting with each other, the effects on 
individuals of a growing cultural and linguistic self-consciousness, the role 
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of material objects in our social and emotional lives, the importance of 
television and other media in shaping reality, and the difficult task of 
charting the way in which our culture generates new forms of emotional self-
regulation and expression. All of these points occur in relation to a 
comprehensive conceptual-discursive surview and do not necessarily 
require a general cultural theory or broad reconstruction of history in order 
to frame an appropriate investigation. 
Given the specific interest in emotion and personal reflexivity, two 
potential lines of investigation are suggested by a further description of 
Foucault's relevant to psychology: 
In modernity, human agency is a valuable commodity, and 
humanist sentiments are, at first sight, progressive. Foucault 
goes on to show, however, that the belief that individuals are 
endowed with the ability to produce meaning, truth, is a trap. 
The human being is seen as both the object and also the 
subject of understanding. Foucault's later work described how 
although this paradox may be a mere academic puzzle to 
philosophers and psychologists, it is an unpleasant lived 
experience for inhabitants of the modern world. 'Subjects' in 
modernity are fixed in place from without by apparatuses of 
discipline (Foucault, 1977), and from within by processes of 
confession (Foucault, 1981). (Parker, 1989, p. 63) 
Foucault suggests the importance of examining the cultural meaning, power 
and practices, at least in this case, related to situations in which thoughts 
and emotions are identified, displayed, experienced and controlled (as well 
as studied by psychology). Description of many Western cultural practices 
in terms of forms of discipline and individual confession could be used to 
understand examples provided by the surview of pride in chapter 5 of Part 2. 
For example, many of the cultural and societal practices surrounding the 
ascription and expression of pride show how it is possible for individuals to 
"'freely" and "spontaneously" express their later embarrassment, shame and 
265 
guilt as a result of broad moral and political changes (or, alternatively, 
remain defiant and thus face more punishment and coercion). 
Foucault's (1977) notion of the panopticon may also provide a 
metaphor with which to examine the importance attached to pride, shame 
and guilt in Western culture as emotions of self-regulation. For example, 
Scheff (1988) argues that without the respective possibilities of self-praise 
and self-punishment demonstrated by the emotions of pride and shame, 
society in its present form would disappear. Interestingly, Scheff presents 
responsibility and agency as the potential to generate these and other 
conduct-maintaining emotions when "no one else is watching". In this 
respect, the circumstances in which 'these emotions are created resemble 
the coercive aspects of the panopticon: namely, a general extension of 
Foucault's argument that because prisoners cannot see whether they are 
being watched from a central vantage point they will eventually act as if they 
are under constant surveillance. The idea that people in such conditions 
come to "regulate themselves" and their emotions plays an important role at 
particular points (ct. Scheff's (1990) argument that these emotions occur all 
the time at low levels due to constant self-monitoring). However, the aim is 
not so much to present a Foucauldian account of the coercive basis of pride, 
shame and guilt as to demonstrate why Foucault's work appeals to 
psychologists who adopt a critical and reflexive stance on their "objects" of 
study. 
To reiterate, Foucault's account of epistemes and their discourses 
seems to challenge and extend the results of Wittgenstein's more 
conservative form of philosophical description. Parker's remarks, for 
example, were used to show that Wittgenstein's use of "we" refers to a 
dominant culture. Foucault's work considers cultural and power issues 
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which are relevant to- the discipline of psychology and are contrastingly 
difficult to find in Wittgenstein's descriptive philosophy. However, while a 
Foucauldian approach provides insightful and general reconstructions of 
our cultural past and present through notions of discipline and confession, 
more work is required to provide a convincing account of our "self-
regulative" emotions. 
4.2 Reflexive psychology and its relation to 
cultural and linguistic practices 
At this point, it may seem as if a central argument is that Wittgenstein 
anticipated the results of many forms of reflexive, critical, discursive and 
social constructionist psychology. While it is certainly true that 
Wittgenstein's philosophy has helped to stimulate the "turn to language" in 
psychology and related interest in reflexive issues, his methods and remarks 
are not without their limitations. The previous section made a case for 
incorporating cultural practices, changes, inequities, artifacts and 
arrangements in a Wittgensteinian philosophical perspective. In this 
section, further reflexive issues are examined that do not connect with 
Wittgenstein's conservative approach to psychology including: the relation 
of psychology to culture, reflexivity as a form of cultural criticism, and specific 
alternatives to the institutions of psychology. Although many of these issues 
could be described as Wittgenstein-inspired because they have been 
highlighted by social constructionists (e.g., Gergen, 1996; Shotter, 1996; 
Stam, 1996), the most relevant point is to consider the extent to which they 
are beyond potential Wittgensteinian criticisms. 
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The relations between psychology and culture 
Psychology is clearly related to culture in a way that does not simply reflect 
psychological phenomena and their wider constraints. Some individuals 
have argued that psychology shapes many of the phenomena it investigates 
and, as a result, "makes itself true" (Macintyre, 1985, p. 897). Of course, if 
this reflexive effect occurred with every psychological investigation, the 
certainty of many perspectives and findings within the discipline would be 
undermined. However, this extreme view of psychological reflexivity 
suggests the potential for a more reasonable account of the way in which 
psychology shapes and is shaped by cultural forces. In this section, an 
attempt is made to assess the following suggestion that psychology: 
... is not only the study of human thinking, feeling, acting, and 
interacting: it has itself - like the other human sciences -
brought into being new ways of thinking, feeling, acting, and 
interacting. (p. 897) 
Although the issue is relevant to many actual and potential investigations, 
only examples relevant to the reflexive effects of emotion and personal 
reflexivity studies will be examined. 
A central part of Macintyre's account is that psychology, in a manner 
that is similar to the role of philosophy in the past, "is inevitably a new mode 
- or rather a set of assorted, even rival new modes - of human self-
knowledge" (p. 897). One of psychology's roles in our culture is to alter 
many of the practices that previously were carried out without question, 
commentary or investigation as to their effects. Foucault's perspective, of 
course, gives some indication also of how practices and institutions of 
discipline in the past (e.g., such as prisons or the church) have played a role 
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in shaping the way in which individuals understand and regulate their own 
activities. But Macintyre's recognition of the interplay between culture and 
psychology leads to a more specific, exemplary question: "what happens 
when it is psychology and not the religious confession or the novel which 
provides us with our ideals of self-knowledge?" (p. 898). 
In an account that is similar to Parker's (1989) Foucauldian account of 
psychology, Macintyre's answer to this self-posed question is: 
The cultural impact of psychology is two-fold: it provides new 
models for self-knowledge and a partially new self for us to 
have knowledge of. Partially new, of course, because even in 
those geographical and social areas where psychology has 
had the most cultural impact, the new psychological models of 
self-knowledge and selfhood have to coexist - even in one 
and the same person - with a variety of older models. (p. 898) 
Interestingly, Macintyre suggests that the conflict between a new and old 
perspective might be found in one person (Le., a kind of individual version of 
the priest-psychologist dispute based on different systems in which two 
people respectively call each other a heretic and a fool). While an individual 
may feel this contradiction only where he or she thinks that one system must 
dominate, it is more useful to extend Macintyre's view and illustrate it with a 
case specific to psychology. One example is Averill's (1982) position that 
anger is very much like putting on a social periormance because the theory 
helps to create other forms and expressions of anger (Le., anger is no longer 
viewed as an uncontrollable, animalistic emotion and bodily affliction). But 
since this seems to produce no profound feeling of self-contradiction how 
can a psychologist advocating a position similar to Macintyre's respond? 
Macintyre argues, to reiterate, that new forms of self-knowledge 
produced by psychology lead people to adopt new views of themselves and 
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new ways of thinking, feeling, acting and interacting. Although Macintyre 
uses the example of suicide to support his account, the points he makes can 
be connected with other examples of new models of self-knowledge and 
personhood that contrast with existing experiences. For example, it may suit 
the purposes of a particularly angry and aggressive individual to view his or 
her anger as the product of uncontrollable bodily processes. However, that 
same individual might recognize that he or she is a risk to others and 
therefore attempt to institute some measure of self-control (e.g., by directing 
his or her anger toward him or herself). The example is plausible because it 
has been found, at least with psychiatric patients, that "a substantial 
proportion of violent individuals alternate between the display of aggression 
against self and against others" (Hillbrand, 1995, p. 670). 
The point is that the behaviour of such individuals might correspond 
to the example that Macintyre uses to demonstrate the effects of psychology: 
namely, where early work in 1952 on "self-damage" and the possibility of 
"self-destruction" suggested that in some cases individuals who engage in 
this behaviour may not be consciously aware that their behaviour is a cry for 
help. The most interesting aspect of Macintyre's example is that the 
subsequent effect of this early suicide study was that it: 
... made clear to many genuinely distressed people that if they 
were to appear to have attempted suicide in a particular way, 
their action would almost certainly be interpreted as just the 
type of cry for help which they had already been trying 
unsuccessfully to utter in different ways. (p. 899) 
Interestingly, this view of suicide has also been extended to the way in 
which the more specific phenomenon of deliberate self-harm is regarded: 
that is, although deliberate self-harm can be distinguished from suicide and 
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is instead better understood as a way in which many individuals under 
extreme stress attempt to regulate their own emotions, much of the literature 
reflects the general "cry for help" theme of the self-damage literature. In 
other words, the growing view that such forms of emotional self-regulation 
(e.g., by cutting or burning themselves) is perhaps a reasonable and often 
successful response by people in extreme circumstances is hindered by the 
view that self-harm is a misdirected form of communication (Le., in contrast 
to other less reasonable forms of self-harm which are used to manipulate 
other people or gain attention). Moreover, while many individuals who 
engage in self-harm do not agree with the "cry for help" account of their 
actions their attempts to resist the model and thus "make psychology false" 
are more isolated than the psychological institutions that continue to 
promote the "miscommunication" view. 
Macintyre's account is also useful because he suggests how 
individuals actively seek out new models of self-knowledge with which to 
understand and potentially create new forms of expression for themselves. 
In particular, Macintyre suggests that an additional way in which psychology 
changes the practices of a culture is through the popularization and 
vulgarization of theories and studies. One of the most obvious ways in 
which psychology has shaped the way we think about ourselves is through 
popular psychology and self-help books. Indeed, a recent account of 
emotional intelligence by Goleman (1996) seems to combine both functions: 
the book provides a selective summary of recent research and uses it to 
promote the argument that it is intelligent to be aware of and be able to 
control our emotions in many specific circumstances and also describes 
practical ways in which people may cope with depression, control their 
anxiety, assert themselves, increase their self-esteem and so on. 
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In a way, Goleman's book is useful because many of its ideas provide 
a more detailed account of the sort of abilities that are highlighted in 
Rosenberg's (1990) theory of emotion in which intentional activities and 
forms of cognition which focus on the self or its components are crucial to 
emotional and personal development. Indeed, the notion of emotional 
intelligence may be superior to Rosenberg's emphasis on the radical effects 
of the intentional use of "reflexive processes" by people (i.e., because many 
important aspects of our emotions can be described as the indirect products 
of other attempts to achieve other goals and, hence, are unintentional). Also 
the emotional intelligence account avoids many of the conceptual problems 
that accompany the "picture" of personal reflexivity as public thoughts, 
expressions and actions that are normally directed towards others in 
conversational practices, but which become significant when they become 
"self-directed" and "internalized" (Le., pride and shame can, respectively, be 
regarded as automatized forms of conversationally derived "self-praise" and 
"self-punishment"; see chapters 6, 7, and 8). Thus it could be said that 
Goleman's account is better than Rosenberg's because it indicates how 
individual variations both in levels of emotion and also in the strategies for 
emotional display and expression can be combined to describe a wide 
variety of types of people and styles of interaction. 
However, Goleman does not provide an account of why people feel 
that they must be able to cope with their emotion-related problems in an 
autonomous manner (Le., in a manner that includes the stigma in Western 
society that is still attached to people's seeking help when they are unable 
to cope with emotional and related psychological problems). It is also 
interesting to speculate that books such as Goleman's are not just catering 
to a need but, in a sense, creating demand by echoing wider aspects of 
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Western, individualistic culture. Perhaps the effectiveness of the techniques, 
advice and information disseminated through popularized versions of 
psychological research and therapy could also be questioned if our demand 
for self-help literature were found to be increasing. In relation to all these 
points, it should be noted that Goleman's main argument is to improve 
"emotional literacy" because of the social and personal costs of failing to act. 
However, it is still worth asking whether Goleman's popularized account of 
the work of individuals such as Rosenberg is maintaining a culture which is 
concerned with explicitly avoiding the effects of negative emotions and 
encouraging positive experiences (Le., as opposed to individuals who are 
not sure why they engage in such culture-based "diversions" as seeing a 
movie, "telephoning a delightful friend, reading an interesting novel, or 
engaging in a challenging task" (Rosenberg, 1990, p. 11)). 
In summary, an account was presented of the complicated relations 
between psychology and culture in which the former does not simply reflect 
the latter. Instead, psychology provides models of self-knowledge within our 
culture that may complement, compete with, or replace others. Averill's 
(1982) work on anger was used to demonstrate Macintyre's point about how 
the results of psychological investigations can be said to "make themselves 
true". Macintyre's example of the cultural effects of early studies of self-
damaging behaviour was combined with the more recent example of self-
harm by cutting or burning. In particular, the widely disseminated view of 
suicidal behaviour as a "a cry for help" has been extended to self-harm and 
continues to influence our view of what has, in contrast, been regarded by 
individuals engaging in it as a radical but effective form of emotional self-
regulation in extremely distressing circumstances. Psychology was also 
argued to create new models of self-knowledge and expressions of thought, 
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feeling, action and interaction in our culture, at least for more literate but not 
necessarily less disturbed individuals, through popular psychology and self-
help books. Further critical work should therefore study psychology's effect 
on an increasing literate but not necessarily more "emotionally intelligent" 
and literate population. 
The role of re1:lexive work as cultural and social criticism 
Although the relations between Wittgenstein's philosophy and psychology 
have been explored, for instance through the game analogy, there are still 
other forms of reflexive work that can have important effects in the discipline 
without appearing to attract Wittgensteinian criticisms. The point is that 
even discursive studies such as those advocated by Shotter (1996) and 
Shotter and Katz (1996) are not beyond Wittgensteinian criticism, while few 
criticisms can be offered of some psychological theories (Le., apart from a 
social constructionist reinterpretation). For example, Harre (1983), Gergen 
(1985) and Shotter (1996) have presented various arguments for the view 
that political and moral background aspects of psychological investigations 
should be included as additional, relevant aspects of a reflexive 
investigation. This process can be regarded as providing a radical critique, 
for example of individualistic psychological studies (Parker, 1989), because 
it invites psychologists to support, or become advocates for, a theory-based 
form of identity politics (Gergen, 1996). The issue to be examined here is 
whether the general insights of Gergen (1996) and Parker (1989) can be 
combined with points of social and cultural criticism raised by a 
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Wittgensteinian surview of pride in order to illustrate political and ethical 
problems with Rosenberg's (1990) reflexive theory of emotion. 
Even though it has already been argued that Wittgenstein's 
philosophy is conservative in a manner that contrasts with the results of 
some reflexive work in psychology, it is important to reiterate that a surview 
may provide the basis for studies that are considered radical. Moreover, 
while a comprehensive Wittgensteinian conceptual-discursive survey can 
arguably achieve many of the same ends as reflexive, qualitative and 
discursive psychological studies it should not be regarded as replacing 
existing methods within psychology. By occupying a position that is 
between philosophy and psychology that can be contributed to by both 
disciplines, a surview can counter philosophical prejudices within 
psychology, encourage a more conceptually-oriented approach and reveal 
the cultural and linguistic detail of many practices. Thus the detailed 
examination of pride in Part 2 can avoid a misleading account of 
Wittgenstein's relevance to reflexive work in psychology, while still 
demonstrating the potential to reveal what Shotter and Katz (1996) describe 
as "those fleeting moments in which the essentially ethical and political 
struggles are (or would be) at work in their initial formation" (pp. 229-230). 
This position on a surview allows for reflexive work within 
psychology to function as a form of social and cultural criticism, but in a way 
that is quite unlike the effects that Wittgenstein thought his remarks should 
have on psychology (see chapter 1, section 1.1). Also as argued in the 
previous chapter, approaches such as Gergen's (1996) retain an important 
role for theory. In this respect, Gergen's later position is more reasonable 
than the radical doubt espoused in the earlier version of social 
constructionism (Gergen, 1985). Moreover, Gergen's later remarks 
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demonstrate that many reflexively-revealed aspects of psychological 
phenomena can be explored in radical, creative and practice-changing 
ways within psychology. Gergen's (1996) position is therefore consistent 
with the surview account because it suggests the potential for further work 
that will engage in the critical evaluation of cultural practices, generate 
rationales for personal or collective action, alter conversational patterns, 
and create images of alternative futures. 
The potential for a surview to suggest issues and examples that might 
be used to develop further challenging remarks, criticisms and specific 
theories - always with the potential to return to the surview from these new 
directions if conceptual entanglement occurs - has therefore been 
established. Given this complicated positioning with regard to Wittgenstein, 
Shotter and Gergen it is important to ask what criticisms can be offered of 
Rosenberg's (1990) reflexivity and emotion theory, without feeling compelled 
to produce an alternative theory or theoretical organization of the sort of 
issues and insights suggested by Gergen. The best point at which to direct 
criticism against Rosenberg's theory is a core assumption: 
, 
It is my contention that people, unable to exercise direct control 
over their emotional experiences, adopt the strategy of 
attempting to control the causes of these experiences. Where 
are these causes to be found? The first place is in the mind: 
the second, in the body. (p. 11) 
Although Rosenberg examines the "logic of emotion" and "cultural 
scenarios" that help to guide our display and identification of emotions in 
particular situations, the main aim of his account is to emphasize the 
importance of self-directed cognitions and actions (see below for a more 
detailed account). 
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However, an initial problem with Rosenberg's position is that it raises 
ethical concerns about the possibility of having direct control over our 
emotions. Although it is unclear in Rosenberg's account, it seems that direct 
control implies a desired potential or ideal ability that can be contrasted 
individual's unaided attempts to produce particular emotions by "indirectly" 
controlling the causes of emotions: 
... it may be possible for me to decide which emotion to show 
and to proceed to show it, but can I decide which emotion to 
feel and then proceed to feel it? (p. 10) 
The questions of whether we would want to achieve the requisite 
technology of control and then what the cultural effects would be are worth 
contemplating. For example, if because of advances in the localization of 
emotions in the brain and the delivery of biochemical or electrical 
stimulation it were possible for us to produce positive emotions and remove 
negative ones, would we really want this technology? How might this 
potential undermine many aspects of our present existence? And, more 
specifically, would such direct control become addictive? Although this 
speculation seems to be in the realm of science fiction, it highlights the way 
in which ethical limits have curtailed many forms of research, mainly 
because of existing knowledge of the social and personal side-effects of 
widely available forms of "self-medication" in our culture. 
Another ethical issue generated by concerns about forms of reflexive 
agency and reflexive cognition in our emotional lives is the way in which 
they weaken and devalue our ability (or commitment) to endure particular 
experiences. In other words, continued use of Rosenberg's favoured 
strategies by an individual for the purpose of emotional control would 
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probably invite a charge of shallowness. For example, the first strategy 
mentioned by Rosenberg is to control the stimulus events that give rise to 
emotion-evoking cognitions through "selective exposure": 
If I am watching a movie that bores me, I can leave the theater; 
if I am talking to someone who angers me, I can cut short the 
conversation; if I am listening to news that depresses me, I can 
switch channels. (p. 11) 
In addition, he argues that: 
Also: 
... people may shift their thoughts intentionally from one topic 
to another or selectively may perceive, remember, attend to, 
and interpret events in ways that produce the intended 
emotional outcomes. (Joc. cit.) 
... a variety of physical methods (e.g., jogging, aerobics, 
controlled breathing, muscular relaxation) and biochemical 
devices (e.g., alcohol, tranquilizers, stimulants, hypnotics) are 
used by people for emotional self-regulation. (Joc. cit.) 
While the efficacy of all of these techniques for controlling or creating 
particular emotions would be worth examining, the point here is to imagine 
the cultural effects of widespread use. For example, if a widely shared aim 
in life was to feel happy or proud whenever individuals desired these 
emotions, the resulting emotion-culture would probably be what we would 
describe as self-centred. Moreover, it is likely that an emphasis would be 
placed on emotional distractions such as entertainment or leisure designed 
to appeal to people's preference for particular feelings, in contrast, to the 
sort of emotional control and discipline required, for example, to achieve a 
difficult goal. 
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A further point is that those emotions may be generated by focusing 
on what Rosenberg call components of the self rather than the whole 
individual. In the latter case, however, it is difficult to think that an individual 
could feel proud of themselves, for example, by altering one of these 
components; it would be odd and indeed strangely unethical for a person to 
attempt to produce an emotion such as pride by one of Rosenberg's 
methods since it would not actually involve according with or surpassing a 
standard, rule or goal. And if individuals were to make the production of a 
particular emotion or feeling the goal of many practices, many of the 
reasons for engaging in particular activities would be undermined, such as 
maintaining a focus on long-term goals, retaining a sense of personally 
important outcome, or according with notions of resilience, consistency, 
depth, or integrity. In this respect, Rosenberg does note that emotional 
display in particular circumstances along with concealment in others may 
play equally important roles "in enabling people to realize their objectives" 
(p. 9). However, Rosenberg does not consider that instead of focusing only 
on coping with or creating alternative emotions we might instead imagine 
the possibility of changing the situation or even society through collective 
action. 
But this possibility seems to be exactly the type of case which is, 
according to Shotter and Katz (1996), identified by the use of 
Wittgensteinian methods: ". . . fleeing moments in which the essentially 
ethical and political struggles are (or would be) at work in their initial 
formation" (pp. 229-230). Shotter and Katz are partly correct when they note 
that existing mainstream psychological theories overlook these aspects of 
our practices along with particular sources of the feelings that motivate 
ethical and political change. But the main point is to provide a social and 
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cultural criticism of the individualistic and apolitical stance of Rosenberg's 
focus on reflexive strategies and emotion. For example, some forms of 
reflexive agency and reflexive cognition do not merely involve coping with a 
marginal position in a dominant culture because individuals form social and 
political movements. These movements are directed towards changing the 
situations, society or culture that does not allow them to take pride in their 
identity, provide opportunities to achieve and also generating criticisms of 
the type of bodily appearances of which an individual can be proud (see 
Part 2, chapter 5). 
The formation of ethical and political positions and the articulation of 
the experience of effectively producing a desired change may, of course, be 
described by a theory or ideology (without necessarily implying that the 
formation of such issues is derived from theories). Gergen (1996) describes 
the sort of identity politics that has emerged to support the type of challenge 
that may lead to social, political and cultural change: 
Marginalized groups generate a self-designated identity (group 
consciousness) that is instantiated by the individual identities of 
its constituents (in the U.S., for example, blacks, feminists, 
homosexuals, lesbians, Chicanos, Asians, the aged, the 
homeless, the disabled). (p. 14) 
It is clear from the different identity politics issues summarized by Gergen 
that a wide variety of individuals may realize the arbitrary injustice of their 
exclusion or denigration and act in organized groups to challenge 
intolerance and discrimination (see chapter 5 and chapter 6, section 6.5). 
Similarly, Parker's (1989) account of critical psychology includes examples 
of political activity in South America, the resistance of gay men and 
lesbians, activism in South Africa, and women's rights (issues which are all, 
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it should be noted, illustrated in Part 2, chapter 5 by the survey of pride}. 
Thus it is crucial that we also look at how individuals can be isolated 
sources of cultural innovation until they begin to act with others to produce 
social change. 
In summary, when reflexive work in psychology takes a form that is 
similar to a Wittgensteinian surview it can provide the descriptive basis for 
important social and cultural criticisms of specific practices. Ethical and 
political issues revealed by a surview may also allow for theoretical work 
that is both pragmatic and challenging with regard to a wide variety of 
problems. The example of Rosenberg's (1990) reflexive theory of emotion 
was presented to show the cultural effects of the possibility that we might 
somehow be able to gain direct control over our emotions (and thus have a 
self-centred, shallow or distraction-oriented culture). Ethical problems 
associated with encouraging people's attempts to control their own 
emotions or create alternatives through "selective exposure", cognitive 
techniques and physiological changes were also examined. The 
individualistic and apolitical nature of Rosenberg's account was 
demonstrated by exploring attempts by marginalized groups to improve 
pride in their identity by changing the situation (Le., society or culture). 
Gergen's emphasis on identity politics therefore has the potential to identify 
in a reflexive manner, topics of social and cultural criticism that connect with 
the results of a survey and the possibility of further pragmatic and 
challenging theorizing. 
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The institutions of psychology: 
alternatives 
specific criticisms and 
An important part of this account is that philosophy has the potential to 
describe psychology as a practice, for example, through the similarities and 
differences between psychology and mathematics (see chapter 1, section 
1.2). Since the game analogy proved useful in highlighting the problems 
with other responses to psychological reflexivity issues, a further 
Wittgensteinian remark about mathematics can be used to highlight a further 
feature of reflexive work and the line between philosophy and psychology. 
In particular Wittgenstein argues that to attain a clear view of mathematics "it 
is not that a new building has to be erected, or that a new bridge has to be 
built, but that the geography, as it is now, has to be judged" (RFM, IV, §52). 
The point is important because of its similarity to a remark by Parker (1994a) 
about critical psychology: "it is necessary to reflect on the structure of the 
institution of psychology as it operates now" (p. 240). In this case, another 
important difference between Wittgenstein's approach and the reflexivity of 
critical psychology is the sense in which reflexivity is connected with 
attempts to erect a new building or, at the very least, make a number of 
radical changes to the existing "psy-complex" (Parker, 1994a). 
In On Certainty, Wittgenstein makes the point that "we" as a 
community are bound together by particular forms of science and education 
(oe, §298). The remark does not seem terribly relevant to psychology and 
an account of its relation to culture until we consider that much of the 
research taught in psychology still construes the reality of psychological 
phenomena in ways that Wittgenstein would criticize. In this context, the 
argument in favour of constructionism is essentially that "reality does not 
exist for us in a ready-made form; we 'construct' it" (Ravn, 1991, p. 96). 
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However, as argued in chapter 2, it may be better to think that we have 
"arrived at" many of our cultural and linguistic practices. There are also a 
variety of reasons why we may not have the power to change those 
practices (Le., in the sense in which someone might extend Macintyre's 
claims about psychology making itself true). Nevertheless, Ravn mistakenly 
insists "the point that social institutions are the constructions of a community 
of human agents" also implies that "the same human beings possess the 
power to radically change those institutions" (p. 96). 
However, because our community has "arrived at" various practices 
does not mean that the task of changing reality or, more radically, 
dismantling these practices can be so easily achieved. Still this activity is 
different from the view that linguistic changes may radically effect rather than 
affect reality because they focus "analytically upon the reflexive functions of 
language that construct representations of 'objects' in the world, and that 
have material-discursive effects" (Henwood & Pidgeon, 1994, p. 228). This 
position is described by Henwood and Pidgeon as the third and most 
radically discursive and reflexive of three strands of qualitative psychology in 
which: 
.. representations of the world, and specifically linguistic 
representations (called discourses), do not merely reflect an 
objective reality, but reflexively construct both objects and 
subjects. This general epistemological position is termed 
constructivism, and the term reflexivity is coined to refer to the 
power of discourses to effect practical actions in the world 
when language is used. (p. 233) 
Ravn's position therefore appears to be more reasonable when the 
clarification is offered that "we" do not construct or, as the case may be, 
deconstruct reality in a manner that is independent of "our predispositions, 
desires, histories, and social backgrounds" (Ravn, 1991, p. 96; see section 
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4.3). Ravn's point is evident in the extent to which we must share many 
community based experiences, considerations and commitments in order to 
produce theories, without necessarily implying that changes in our 
theoretical constructions have effects on our "arrived at" practices. 
Instead, in terms of the way that reflexive work may reveal and allow 
us to challenge the institutions of psychology, it would seem better to 
describe the language of discipline-based differences. For example, we 
want to know why - more than Wittgenstein can suggest to us 
mainstream psychology and, more specifically, "social psychology . 
traditionally abhors reflexivity" (Parker, 1994b, p. 528). The problems 
affecting the institutional differences between philosophy, when construed 
as having many of the aims of reflexive work, and the critical practices of 
psychology have already been explored (see chapter 3, section 3.2). The 
problem here is one of the relations between forms of reflexive work that 
attempt to produce institutional change in more mainstream areas of 
psychology. Although there are some indications that interdisciplinary work 
is being increasingly regarded as a virtue by mainstream psychologists, 
resistance to these and other initiatives may indicate that "perhaps 
continuing creative tension between critical scholarship and uncritical 
practice is the only viable answer" (Ash, 1993, p. 55). 
It is also illuminating to examine how discursive positioning by the 
mainstream works within psychology (i.e., in addition to attempts to construe 
work that connects with philosophy as between the two disciplines or in a 
"hinterland" of theoretical psychology). For example, Parker (1994a) makes 
the point that the institutions of psychology in their present form use criticise 
critical psychology in order to: 
. . . position those who are developing hermeneutic, post-
structuralist or feminist critiques of positivist methodology as 
being in favour of fragmentation (and so immature), in favour of 
sharing the research process with those outside the discipline 
(and so acting out), and in favour of conflict (and so irrational). 
(p.248) 
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Mainstream psychology also distances itself from sociology for reasons that, 
on occasions, seem to be based in arbitrary features of the present 
institutional forms of both disciplines. However, with regard to the work that 
constitutes Part 2, sociological aspects of pride are acknowledged without 
attempting to review the relevant sociological theories and literature. 
Moreover, despite Rosenberg's (1990) background in sociology, his theory 
provides a good substitute for mainstream psychological study because 
most of the research it summarizes is from mainstream psychology (e.g., 
Schachter & Singer, 1962). Moreover, as it also does not have many of the 
usual self-critical and discursive features of challenging reflexive studies, it 
is hoped that Part 2 will represent the benefits of challenging discipline-
based exclusions of otherwise relevant work. 
A further important way in which reflexive work provides a non-
philosophical and potentially theory-based challenge to mainstream 
, 
psychological studies is by challenging its culture of scientific presentation. 
For example, Harre (1989) emphasizes several directions for a potentially 
useful reflexive approach to psychology's institutions that would be the 
result of: 
... a thoroughly deconstructive effort to find out how the whole 
activity of experiments, written papers, conference 
presentations, text-books and the media of instruction go to 
create the illusion of knowledge. (p. 186) 
A specific criticism of emotion studies, which includes the study of pride in 
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Part 2 of this thesis, is the failure to use contemporary technology in order to 
include images of pride and examples from other existing forms of cultural 
and linguistic practice. Such text books and media of instruction would not 
only accord with the culturally~oriented position developed in relation to a 
surview, but also raise new questions for critical psychology. For example, a 
wide ranging study might include the reasons for and effects of the portrayal 
of negative aspects of pride in highly stylized, gender~based forms (Le., 
whether this occurs in contemporary news reports in addition to archaic 
forms such as pictures of Queen Superbia (see Part 2, Appendix, Figure 1 
and Figure 2, pp. 6g2~6g3)). 
Changes to the ways in which psychology is taught might also 
address the interdisciplinary use of psychological studies and the growing 
recognition that it is not only psychology students who may need to develop 
a critical, reflexive stance towards many of the concepts, theories, 
explanations and methods imparted in undergraduate and introductory 
courses. For example, sociologists, nurses, occupational therapists, social 
workers and many others gain a brief understanding of psychology without 
necessarily being presented with other worthwhile alternatives. The point is 
that although dissatisfaction with the simplified accounts of psychology may 
motivate an interest in critical perspectives, the interdisciplinary use of 
psychology makes it is more likely that mainstream views and 
preconceptions will be disseminated throughout our culture. The effects of 
interdisciplinarity on our culture may be more pernicious than the criticism 
that much empirical and laboratory~based psychological was in danger of 
becoming the empirical investigation of undergraduate students. For it is not 
uncommon to find that many of the "everyday individuals" who participate in 
research want to talk about the "theory" that is being tested or otherwise 
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provide their own theoretical contribution (e.g., pride is nurture rather than 
nature). Reflexive work in this context might alleviate the problems of 
conducting research on an increasingly educated and psychologically-
literate culture by avoiding theory-first introductory overviews in teaching, 
producing multimedia texts and suggesting that alternative perspectives to 
mainstream psychology can be creative. 
In contrast to Shotter's position, other types of theorizing are also 
worth pursuing especially where they have the potential to present novel 
accounts of many of the practices. Cultural theories, in particular, may 
provide an unsettling perspective on contemporary practices and promote 
change within psychology. In addition to this role for theorizing, it is 
important to retain a sense in which psychologists, rather than philosophers, 
might: 
... find out empirically 'that, contrary to our preconceived 
ideas, it is possible to think such-and-such'-whatever that 
may mean. (PI, §109) 
With regard to reflexive research, this phrase could mean that collected 
examples of the detail 'of our cultural and discursive practices reveal how 
misguided more traditional psychological studies are (e.g., where language 
is thought not to play an important role in constructing and maintaining 
private psychological experiences). Interestingly, Shotter and Katz (1996) 
are interested in assembling such reminders, but insist that an unsettling 
perspective is not necessarily a theoretical or empirical reconsideration. 
Instead of any positive role for theory they opt for the vague suggestion that 
"by shifting one's stance and position in relation to one's surroundings, yet 
further unnoticed aspects become visible" (p. 232). 
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Rather than attempt to resurrect an appearance-reality view of theory, 
a surview of our cultural and linguistic surroundings may help to challenge 
practices within psychology that support particular theoretical divisions. For 
example, the following tendency described by Parker (1994b) can be 
challenged by a surview so that, in this case, only some theoretically 
defined aspects of pride are allowed to dominate our attention: 
... either the individual or the social is described, and it is 
difficult, when we are stuck with behaviourist or cognitivist 
descriptions, to conceive of a model of the person which would 
account for both. (pp. 529-530) 
Although it is clear that Wittgenstein examined problems that do not involve 
directly changing the practices or language of psychology, some forms of 
pragmatic, reflexive theorizing can provide a challenging perspective. In 
this regard, theories may reveal unnoticed aspects of our practices, although 
it is still important to assess any general claims made as a result of reflexive 
work. For example, the notion that feminist theory is largely responsible for 
the current explosion of interest in emotion is itself an unsettling claim that 
needs to be carefully examined. A Wittgensteinian perspective is of limited 
use here, althoLlgh it is important to describe how an individual's shifting 
stance, whether it is informed by theories or other collections of what we are 
"struck by", can be revealing in relation to shifting surroundings. 
In summary, the potential to survey and criticize the institutions of 
psychology in a manner beyond Wittgenstein's concern not to attempt to 
construct "new buildings" or "bridges" was introduced. It was argued, 
however, that because we have, in a sense, constructed our present 
institutions, it is no easy matter to change those same institutions (e.g., 
through language). Parker's (1994b) arguments were used to show that it is 
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important to challenge the language upon which demarcations between 
disciplines are based. This includes specific forms of positioning to exclude 
reflexively-oriented positions from infiltrating mainstream approaches. 
Harre's deconstruction of institutional aspects of psychology was then 
described, illustrated and extended to problems caused by the 
interdisciplinary use of mainstream psychology. In contrast to Shotter and 
Katz's (1996) account of Wittgenstein's revealing "methods of social 
poetics", it was argued that cultural theories may also allow us to shift our 
stance creatively toward the theories, institutions and surroundings of 
psychology. 
4.3 The positive use and exploitation of similarities 
between psychological and personal reflexivity 
This chapter has been concerned with reflexive studies that can challenge 
contemporary practices and which cannot be viewed as a source of 
conceptual problems. The previous section showed that reflexive thinking 
and theorizing can promote changes in psychology in a manner that 
contrasts with the conservative nature of Wittgenstein's philosophy. In this 
section, similarities between useful forms of psychological reflexivity and 
relevant instances of personal reflexivity by individual researchers will be 
highlighted. In particular, the emphasis is on reflexive studies that provide 
an affirmative answer to the question of whether it is possible: 
... given one's intellectual interests along with one's passions 
and commitments . . . to undertake the self-conscious 
development of new and specialized mental accounts. (p. 13) 
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In contrast to the usual treatment of psychological reflexivity and personal 
reflexivity as separate topics, occasions when the two are combined will be 
examined. A particular reason for this combination is that it may seem 
difficult to provide a critical study of emotion and personal reflexivity if it is 
true that: 
... psychology continues to be in a quandary about whether 
and how scientific approaches can be applied to subject-
matter with which humans feel personally intimate. (Munro, 
1992, p. 110) 
The aim of this section to make some recommendations of positive uses of 
personal reflexivity in the conduct of a critical study of familiar forms of 
emotion and personal reflexivity 
The consequences and limits of useful forms of self-awareness 
Many individuals have argued that giving voice to and analysing the 
experiences of individuals as they carry out research produces new and 
revealing insights about the discipline. These insights range from jokes 
about experimental psychologists who admit "I'm not very good with people" 
to recognition that many fields of psychology are of interest to psychologists 
because of a relevant personal experience. Although some of these issues 
will be examined in the next section, it is important here to ascertain what the 
consequences and limits of useful forms of self-awareness could be in 
psychology. Thus, to put this issue more precisely, what use is it to ask "how 
do we function as subjects when we do research, and reflexive research in 
psychology?" (Parker, 1994a, p. 246). 
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Although it may seem unlikely, Wittgenstein entertained issues in 
connection to mathematics and psychology that would be regarded by 
contemporary researchers as reflexive. In particular, Wittgenstein 
considered whether an investigation of the psychology of individuals as they 
engage in the practices of mathematics might be useful. And it should not 
be at all surprising given the overall emphasis of this chapter to find that 
Wittgenstein was not particularly interested in examining a specific reflexive 
issue: 
Time and again I would like to say: What I check is the account 
books of mathematicians; their mental processes, joys, 
depressions and instincts as they go about their business may 
be important in other connections, but they are no concern of 
mine. (PG, III, p. 295) 
Is it similarly appropriate for a reconsideration of psychological reflexivity to 
examine only the account books of psychologists? Is the supposed 
similarity between psychological researchers and their "subjects" really 
psychology's equivalent of other interesting but otherwise logical problems? 
To be more succinct, why should turning the focus of a study back on the 
researchers and their discipline be of any benefit? 
One reason why it is useful to examine the "account books" of 
psychologists as they go about their research is that an understanding of the 
role of researchers' motivation, skills and insights should help to improve 
how we study psychological phenomena. Clearly, Wittgenstein was not 
interested in "doing psychology" in the sense of a commitment to improving 
its practices from within. Apart from the broader issue of the importance of 
participation in a culture to understanding its people and their experiences 
(see chapter 3, section 3.3), further evidence is provided of Wittgenstein's 
291 
conservative attitude towards directly changing the practices of psychology. 
Instead, Wittgenstein is more interested in what we, as psychologists, are 
tempted to say about what we do. And it is misrepresentations of linguistic 
and cultural practices, on Wittgenstein's view, that are central to the 
philosophical errors that we produce and sustain in accounts of our 
research activities. 
However, to be fair to reflexive psychologists, an important advance 
over the traditional emphasis on objectivity and disdain for subjectivity is to 
provide a clearer account of linguistic and cultural practices. Ash (1993) 
suggests: 
... psychologists already claim to do this when they state the 
number, age, gender, race and social status of subjects. It is 
only necessary, then, to include broader societal and other 
context-specifying conditions. (p. 55) 
But as Henwood and Pidgeon (1994) note: 
The tactic of reflexively writing in the personal and social basis 
for knowledge (as part of making the research process 
accountable) can be conceptualised as moving towards a 
stronger form of .'objectivity' than is provided by the traditional 
scientific mode of reporting in psychology. (p. 236) 
Henwood and Pidgeon's concern is to demonstrate the virtues of adopting a 
re'flexive stance against potential critics from mainstream psychology. We 
could add that there is a variety of techniques that may help to increase a 
researcher's self-awareness and also suggest the limits of their approach. 
For example, one technique for researchers is to acknowledge their own 
cultural backgrounds, personal interests, possible biases, and relevant 
experience. But what other tactics are possible and useful? 
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A further reflexive writing tactic that is especially relevant to the topic 
of emotion and personal reflexivity, is to turn the type of examples studied 
back on the discipline. For example, the personal and emotional nature of 
many debates in psychology between radical perspectives and the 
mainstream suggests that pride is often at stake. Indeed, where individuals 
refuse to discuss the merits of other positions because of personal 
commitments, the result can be described as a kind of "logical rudeness" 
(Bartlett, 1976). While psychology is no different from other cultural 
practices in allowing its practitioners to remain unmoved by a sound 
argument, more awareness and control with regard to this aspect of many 
debates would improve the discipline. It would then remain to be seen 
whether these differences could be avoided, as Greenwood (1991) 
suggests, by "scientists taking an open, critical, communicative approach 
('getting their egos out of the way') combined with the various social 
processes of criticism through which scientific claims are put before they are 
accepted" (p. 312). 
Although Greenwood's account may be hopeful, a further way in 
which reflexivity may lead to improvements in psychology is by explicitly 
, 
presenting (or making easily accessible) the "data" used to "ground" a piece 
of research. Since a comprehensive conceptual-discursive surview 
represents many of the aims of discourse psychology, a further point by 
Henwood and Pidgeon (1994) is also applicable to this investigation: 
... the emphasis is on presenting 'raw' transcripts so that 
audiences can create other readings. The onus is then on the 
researcher to present a more coherent and persuasive account. 
In this way the reflexive processes of constructing knowledge 
are laid open to public view. (p. 235) 
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With regard to the survey of pride in Part 2, examples are integrated into the 
text so that readers may judge whether they have been subjected to 
elabo rative interpretation. In addition, it is acknowledged that the 
presentation of topics resulting from the survey of pride is an organization of 
the examples along broad grammatical lines, not the organization. Also 
because the surview relies on documents that are widely available in 
Western culture this approach has the potential to allow others to produce 
rival accounts and organizations. However, although the surview attains a 
sense of objectivity and public access it only postpones the difficult issue of 
reflexivity in conversation with "research subjects" which would occur if 
many of the themes identified in Part 2 were to be researched in more detail. 
Self-awareness of the form cultivated by these techniques is not 
always a source of philosophical insight or of theoretical advance in 
psychology, but perhaps merely the first step towards clarity (ct. techniques 
such as imagining that other people are automata which were examined in 
chapter 3, section 3.3). Such psychological and personal reflexivity 
contrasts with forms of self-consciousness and doubt that would make it 
more difficult to carry out research. Useful reflexive techniques therefore 
work within normative limits (hence they can be criticized by philosophy) 
and the new stance they provide must have an intelligible rationale. This 
consideration is evident in Rosenberg's (1990) vacillation between a radical 
view and something that is obvious about us as individuals: 
... although the idea that the human mind can decide to 
manipulate its own content may seem paradoxical, in fact few 
processes are more familiar. (p. 10) 
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Interestingly, Shotter and Katz (1996) argue that Wittgenstein occasionally 
adopted a similar stance in his philosophical work. Their aim, of course, is 
to extend some of Wittgenstein's remarks into the methods and research of 
psychology to show that clarity is possible "only after he has brought us up 
against many things that we take for granted, causing us to see them as 
surprising" (p. 233). 
Wittgenstein supposedly demonstrates this method in the following 
excerpt: 
Don't take it as a matter of course, but as a remarkable fact, that 
pictures and fictitious narratives give up pleasure, occupy our 
minds. 
("Don't take it as a matter of course" means: find it 
surprising, as you do some things which disturb you. Then the 
puzzling aspects of the latter will disappear, by your accepting 
this fact as you do the other.) (PI,524) 
Despite Wittgenstein's clumsy expression, Shotter and Katz (1996) want to 
argue that such an unsettling approach is an important addition to 
psychology, However, it is also clear that Rosenberg adopts a similar 
stance in talking about reflexivity and emotion without achieving clarity or 
opening up the right kind of new possibilities for research (Le., at least with 
regard to overcoming our familiarity with "reflexive processes"). The 
relevance of Wittgenstein's point to psychology is that we should 
occasionally find various phenomena of everyday life surprising without 
necessarily allowing ourselves to be puzzled or mysti'fied. Unfortunately, 
Shotter and Katz omit the point that Wittgenstein added to the end of section 
524: "(the transition from patent nonsense to something which is disguised 
nonsense)" (PI, §524). It is relevant because it suggests that linguistic 
techniques designed to make us more aware of everyday aspects of 
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psychological phenomena need to be carefully used if they are to achieve 
clarity. Rosenberg's example, in contrast, demonstrates the use of an 
expression that is patent nonsense but which is quickly incorporated into a 
theory and thus becomes disguised nonsense because it seems to offer a 
revealing insight. 
In summary, there are a number of reasons why cultivating self-
awareness through reflexive techniques is useful. Although Wittgenstein's 
philosophical interest was on the "account books" of mathematicians and, 
hence also psychologists, the possibility that a "subject" of psychological 
research may reveal important points about the practices of psychology 
should not be underestimated. For example, it may suggest aspects of our 
practices that need to be changed. It was also noted that including the 
social and personal bases of knowledge can provide information that helps 
to make psychology more accountable. In a sense it is also closer to the 
traditional ideal of objectivity than those accounts which avoid the subjective 
experiences of the researcher. It may also seem as if important reflexive 
questions are addressed by describing the subjects of a psychological study 
along with other context-specifying conditions. However, it is important to 
turn the example of personal and emotional aspects of interaction back on 
the discipline in order to show how more open communication is required in 
the discipline's "reflexive accounting". 
Is psychological research an extension of personal reflexivity? 
In an account of critical psychology, Parker (1989) argues that the 
subdiscipline's continual "reflexivity also informs and subverts self-
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knowledge" (p. 139). But as already noted, the reflexivity of research 
cannot be reduced to the reflective, thoughtful and self-conscious properties 
of individual psychologists (see chapter 2, section 2.1 and chapter 3, section 
3.2; ct. Parker, 1994b, p. 531). Nevertheless, it may still be argued that 
apparent similarities between psychological reflexivity and personal 
reflexivity are problematic when researchers investigate personally familiar 
psychological phenomena. This section will address some of the ways in 
which psychologists "function as subjects" when they carry out 
comprehensive, critical work on such topics as emotion and personal 
reflexivity. 
The traditional contrast between objectivity and subjectivity in 
psychology has created problems that recent accounts of reflexivity are 
beginning to remove. Reflexive aspects of research have only been 
regarded as providing opportunities to explore research issues that would 
not be addressed by traditional psychological studies. In some cases, both 
the skills and experience of a researcher as well as a kind of "insider" status 
may encourage research participants to provide more revealing accounts, 
information and insights. Much of this work is, of course, restricted to the 
, 
experiences of researchers in carrying out qualitative research although the 
similarities between psychological reflexivity and personal reflexivity can be 
extended to include personal experiences that occur as a result of 
attempting reflexive research in the form of a comprehensive surview. We 
can therefore include experiences of being critical of training in the 
discipline, the development of a "reflexive career" and also, for a few 
reflexive psychologists, experiences of crossing between psychology and 
the work of philosophers such as Wittgenstein. 
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The added difficulty of engaging with Wittgenstein's work in 
contemporary terms - even when restricted to remarks on rules, rule-
following, the private language argument and psychological concepts -
would make the pursuit of the latter "fully reflexive" approach a daunting 
prospect for many students. A complicated engagement with existing 
theories is required as well as the ability to make the conceptual moves 
required to identify and remove a philosophical prejudice. Moreover, 
attempts to untie the "knots in our thinking" (PR, I, §2) may be difficult to 
explain to other psychologists especially if they refuse to acknowledge that 
they have a similar problem or confusion. Given these complicated 
connections between psychological reflexivity and personal reflexivity, it is 
easier to accept Wittgenstein's suggestion that "there is not a philosophical 
method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies" (PI, 
§133). Hence it is important that other psychologists must be brought to 
agree that they have similar problems before an attempt can be made to 
work through to a solution. 
Wittgenstein's remarks therefore invite us to engage with the detail of 
language in a way that adds more dimensions to descriptions of qualitative 
work such as Parker's (1994a): 
In qualitative work, where an analysis of renexivity is 
encouraged and where new forms of subjectivity are allowed to 
take shape in the course of the research, there is often a strong 
personal engagement with the material, a sense of being 
immersed, overwhelmed, and sometimes of being transformed 
by the subject matter. (p. 240) 
The details generated by examples of pride from newspapers, novels, plays, 
films, transcripts of conversations and many other sources provide the basis 
from which many connections can be drawn. The sense of immersion may 
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be overwhelming and the examination of similarities and differences within 
a particular "cluster of concepts" may not appear to be surveyable. But this 
activity can also be illuminating, especially where we are struck by cases 
that highlight similarities and differences between our practices and those of 
another group. An example is of children from another culture who wave 
flags at other people in an enthusiastic manner but who cannot be 
described as proud because they have no direct acquaintance with the 
cultural surroundings in which this practice is significant. Also we could 
examine the mistakes that children make in the early learning of 
psychological concepts: in part because adults' responses to children 
encourage further linguistic refinements and help to create new reactions 
(see chapter 8). The result of an investigation of such examples is often a 
kind of practical conversational skill which can, moreover, lead to a 
preoccupation with particular concepts or categories in everyday life (e.g., 
such as a focus on pride to the detriment of other emotions or a view of 
emotion). This effect of a discursive investigation may also require 
Wittgensteinian "therapy" in much the same way that the themes and 
categories produced in qualitative work need to be checked against 
• 
transcripts or returned to participants for confirmation. 
When the results of a comprehensive survey are used and refined 
in ordinary conversation we may find that there are aspects to the use of a 
psychological concept that we have assumed. For example, that parents 
refer to emotional aspects of pride in their use of the word more frequently 
than personality aspects. There is a sense in which a surview will, if 
combined with the preliminary, everyday form of qualitative investigation, 
improve a researcher's ability to represent linguistic distinctions and 
important cultural variations. It is also possible that other co-occurring 
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forms of personal reflexivity such as self~presentation and social skills 
(Jenkins, 1995) will help the research process in the sense that they will 
prevent a research agenda from dominating conversation (including any 
interest in particular theories or accounts that provide a critical focus). In 
this sense, both the task of engaging in reflexive research and the 
personal results (including any personal transformation of interest or 
understanding) should not be regarded as a private, individual skill or 
experience. The results of reflexive research must, in principle, be 
communicable and intelligible to others even if this means supplying new 
metaphors and further refinements based on personal experience (e.g., as 
is demonstrated by the relatively rare circumstances in which people may 
vacillate between particular emotions; see Part 2, chapter 7, section 7.4). 
The results of a comprehensive conceptual~discursive survey are 
also not a finished product. For example, Henwood and Parker (1994) 
argue that although there are many different qualitative approaches that use 
individual reflexive skills, they "all face up to the task of making sense in 
some way of multiple, ambiguous and shifting meanings" (p. 235). Shotter 
and Katz (1996) take this argument further and draw a connection with 
, 
Wittgenstein's philosophy. They argue that using Wittgenstein's methods 
never "leads to a final, fixed account of what something 'really' means" (p. 
232). Both accounts are consistent with the extended view of personal 
reflexivity in relation to the potential to become aware of new and unfamiliar 
cultural and linguistic practices. This perspective is consistent with Parker's 
(1994a) view that "the method a researcher should use, then, also needs to 
grasp the specific forms of experience lived as culturally constructed 
resources - resources shared by researcher and researched" (pp. 244~ 
245). But it is also possible that some forms of personal reflexivity may be 
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extended and provide a basis for research though the further cultural 
resource of new technology. This adds to Shotter's (1996) sense of being 
"struck by" incidents and events in everyday life and thus attempting to 
make unnoticed aspects of our lives visible. For example, watching a 
video recorded interview with subjects may not only reveal interesting 
aspects of a researcher's emotions and reactions but also improve his or 
her potential to provide a commentary on those responses. And it is also 
possible to imagine a person using similar technology to determine how 
well they could hide or convincingly reproduce particular emotions. 
Technological and other means of improving both researchers' and 
subjects' reflexive abilities may therefore provide us with new and unfamiliar 
ways of re-presenting many psychological phenomena. However, 
familiarity with culturally shared or available resources is not the same as 
personal familiarity with emotional and related experiences, for included 
with the latter category are accounts of unusual and potentially unique 
experiences. Regardless of whether these accounts are recorded by 
psychologists or others, they constitute an autobiographical resource about 
such phenomena as emotions and personal reflexivity. Interestingly, Ellis 
(1991) is tempted to describe such forms of "introspection" as a research 
tool (see Part 2, chapter 5) although it is important to ask what extra tools 
and abilities sociologists, psychologists or other academics bring to their 
articulation and exploration of these experiences. One answer is that 
academics are aided by an additional vocabulary that allows them to 
explore and express their own and others' personal experiences. This skill 
could be based on the type of understanding that could emerge from 
accumulating the insights and intimations of novels and biographies (I.e., in 
addition to people's accounts when ethical guidelines about confidentiality 
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have been followed). The activity of assembling reminders from novels and 
biographies may therefore provide a challenge to assumptions about our 
own and others' emotional experiences. The overall conclusion, therefore, 
is that personal familiarity with particular forms of emotion, reflexive agency 
and reflexive cognition may be overcome by collecting our own or others' 
autobiographical accounts of unique experiences. 
To reiterate, the theme of forms of psychological reflexivity that are 
beyond Wittgensteinian reproach continued in this section with an 
investigation of some ways in which psychological research is an extension 
of personal re'flexivity. An initial concern was to describe the extension of 
individual awareness of cultural and linguistic practices that occurs through 
attempting a comprehensive conceptual-discursive survey. This may lead 
to a feeling of being immersed in and transformed by the material involved, 
in the sense that conceptual and practical skills have been attained. These 
experiences and skills should not be regarded as private since new aspects 
and stances will occur in relation to the researcher'S cultural and linguistic 
surroundings. In this manner, forms of personal reflexivity will be useful 
although other cultural resources can also augment understanding of 
ourselves and others. Collecting relevant examples of other people's 
private experiences may also see aspects of emotion and emotion-related 
actions in new and surprising ways (but without necessarily producing 
nonsensical remarks or disguising them in theories such as Rosenberg's). 
Such cultural resources may include our experiences and reactions in 
relation to the personally reflexive possibilities of new technology. 
Autobiographical accounts of our own or others' unique, private and 
personal experiences can also be used to extend our forms of personal 
reflexivity and provide a resource for further research. 
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Summary 
The chapter began with an attempt to examine why postmodern and critical 
psychologists present Wittgenstein as an ordinary language philosopher 
who had little interest in culture. Parker's (1989) critical psychology 
summary of our "postmodern age" was used to identify similar themes in 
Wittgenstein's later philosophy. However, several of Wittgenstein's 
overlooked remarks on culture and value seem to connect with the results of 
r~flexive social scientific theorizing. Wittgenstein's remarks on cultural, 
historical and linguistic differences, disputes and clashes are also insightful 
and manage to avoid the generality of many social and cultural theories. 
Unfortunately, Wittgenstein's philosophy does not match the challenging 
perspectives and new directions provided by Foucault which seem to extend 
the results of Wittgenstein's more conservative form of philosophical 
description. Foucault's work also examines power and ideology issues 
relevant to the discipline of psychology that are not found in Wittgenstein's 
philosophy. Thus despite the many additional problems that a Foucauldian 
approach would bring to critical and reflexive psychological studies, its form 
of broad theorizing ma~ contribute to psychology in ways that Wittgenstein's 
cannot (Le., through the awareness of cultural aspects of power/knowledge 
as well as the detail of disciplinary and confessional practices). 
The limits of Wittgenstein's philosophy to criticize or direct forms of 
reflexive theorizing in psychology were also illustrated by the further issue of 
the relations between psychology and culture. Examples of forms of 
personal reflexivity illustrated how psychology provides models of self-
knowledge and new forms of thought, emotion, action and interaction that 
may complement or replace others. Macintyre's (1985) example of the 
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effects of studies of self-damaging behaviour was combined with the more 
recent example of research on deliberate and repetitive self-harm. The aim 
was to show how widely disseminated views of both behaviours as a "a cry 
for help" and "miscommunication" continue to influence our view of 
deliberate self-harm as a radical but effective form of emotional self-
regulation in extremely distressing circumstances. Psychological studies 
also change our culture through popular psychology and self-help media 
although this is perhaps a product of education, increased literacy and the 
interdisciplinary use of psychological studies. Reflexive research also plays 
a role in our culture in a manner that is beyond any Wittgensteinian criticism 
when it offers cultural and social criticisms of psychological practices. 
Rosenberg's theory was taken as an example of how ethical issues arise in 
relation to research of which the aim is eventually to achieve direct control 
over our emotions (in addition to an increasingly self-centred, shallow and 
distraction-oriented culture). The individualistic and apolitical nature of 
Rosenberg's account was also demonstrated by marginalized groups 
attempts to improve identity-based pride by changing the situation (i.e., in 
accordance with Gergen's view of pragmatic re'flexive theorizing and identity 
politics that involve changing our society and culture). Also specific 
comments on the potential of reflexive work to change the institutions of 
psychology - in contrast to a Wittgensteinian survey of the "buildings" -
were presented. Issues included changing the language of the discipline, 
extending its presentation media in connection with a wider view of a 
surview and problems associated with psychology's interdisciplinary use. 
An account then followed of reasons why psychological reflexive 
techniques that cultivate forms of personal reflexivity or self-awareness can 
be useful to psychology. Despite Wittgenstein's philosophical interest was 
304 
on the "account books" of mathematicians and, hence also psychologists, it 
was argued that some of the "subjects" of psychological research may also 
be used to reveal important points about the discipline. The main reason for 
adopting this contrasting position to Wittgenstein is that an awareness of the 
role that emotions play in research, teaching and knowledge dissemination 
can be used to improve the discipline's practices. It was also noted that 
writing in the social and personal basis for knowledge can provide 
information that will help to make psychologists more accountable. Also 
examined were some ways in which psychological reflexivity provides an 
extension of personal reflexivity rather than a source of bias. Personal 
reflexivity was argued to provide an opportunity for the experiences of 
researchers - as users of cultural resources and people with similar 
experiences - to contribute to our understanding of many psychological 
phenomena. The analysis included an account of the extended awareness 
of cultural and linguistic practices that is a result of immersion in the activity 
of providing a comprehensive conceptual-discursive survey. It was also 
noted that the skills researchers acquire, as well as their personal 
experiences of being "struck by" new aspects of personally familiar cultural 
and linguistic aspects of psychological phenomena, should not be regarded 
as private (e.g., through experiences of using a culture's new technology). 
Collecting relevant examples of other people's private experiences may also 
allow us to see culturally and personally familiar aspects of emotion and 
emotion-related actions in new and surprising ways. 
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CONCLUSION: PART 1 
Wittgenstein's philosophy continues to be relevant to psychology in ways 
that Wittgenstein himself could not have envisaged. The increasing mention 
of reflexivity in relation to a number of psychological and social scientific 
debates presents an opportunity to demonstrate this relevance. Although 
the final form of the issues presented across the various chapters is not the 
only possible way of organizing the psychological reflexivity literature, the 
argument that the chapters embody is less likely to change: it is a useful 
and revealing exercise to reconsider the variety of forms of reflexivity 
understood to occur in psychology through the methods and remarks of 
Wittgenstein's later philosophy. A critical part of this reconsideration is that 
adopting a reflexive stance in psychology involves a to and fro movement 
between philosophy and psychology. Thus while there are many points at 
which reflexive issues and problems considered by psychologists are very 
similar to Wittgenstein's concerns, it is crucial to recognize the limits of 
philosophizing for or against particular forms of psychological reflexivity. 
A number of '{Vittgenstein's remarks were used to show that 
philosophy should not attempt to take over the work of psychology, even 
though the work of theoretical psychology may seem to be indistinguishable. 
Wittgenstein's outside perspective cannot therefore be subsumed by 
increasingly self-critical (and self-confident) multidisciplinary social scientific 
work in areas of psychology. Moreover, approaches that are closely 
connected with Wittgenstein's later philosophy and emphasize reflexivity are 
not immune from "reconsideration". In this regard, social constructionism 
received more attention than the more obvious target of realist-cognitive 
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accounts of psychology. In particular, the Wittgensteinian "end" to reflexive 
issues in psychology is a comprehensive conceptual-discursive surview of a 
given domain of grammar. But in contrast to a number of social 
constructionist positions, a surview was argued to provide a resource that 
can be contributed to by both philosophers and psychologists. Moreover, 
while a surview can provide a basis for empirical investigation and theory 
construction, it is not because surveyed remarks and assembled reminders 
are the "psychological reality" that needs to be explained. Instead, a 
surview can be used to resist the constant push to theorize in psychology 
(Le., to understand ourselves and others only in terms of existing theories). 
While it may seem important to use Wittgenstein's philosophy to describe 
the differences between theories, it is the central role of theories in 
organizing representations of our cultural and linguistic practices that we 
must upset. Thus we examine cultural and linguistic details from "within" in 
a critical tension with existing psychological theories, models and methods 
while acknowledging the in principle difficulties of mastering both 
philosophy and psychology and the necessity of moving to and fro between 
them. 
The further important component of the argument for a 
Wittgensteinian reconsideration of psychological reflexivity is that some 
forms of reflexive work within psychology are capable of criticizing and 
extending Wittgenstein's work. It may seem that the argument has turned 
full circle by suggesting that some types of reflexive work should be 
encouraged (although in the present form this suggests a task that few are 
likely to achieve given the present institutions of psychology and the limited 
possibilities to pursue such a "reflexive career"). Nevertheless, social and 
cultural theories were used to highlight issues of power which are largely 
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ignored in Wittgenstein's descriptive philosophy. Reflexive studies within 
psychology may also suggest important social and cultural criticisms, reveal 
deficiencies in the present institutions of psychology and provide 
alternatives to individualist and apolitical psychological accounts. In this 
respect, a surview provides a basis for potential multidisciplinary theoretical 
and empirical work which complements other linguistic, cultural and 
technological devices we use to reveal new aspects of our emotional and 
personal experiences (or to collect relevant examples of experiences we are 
"struck by"). Thus, even though some social constructionists have used 
Wittgenstein's remarks and methods for the purposes of doing work within 
psychology, a surview should not compete directly against and potentially 
replace the theories and methods of psychology. 
